



Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-95-207
Thursday
26 October 1995

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Ministers Pledge To Shut 'Unsafe' Nuclear Plants

AU2510160795 Paris AFP in English
1547 GMT 25 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sofia, Oct 25 (AFP)—European environment ministers on Wednesday pledged to phase out, as soon as possible, unsafe nuclear installations at the close of a pan-European conference on the environment.

In a closing communique, more than 40 environment ministers reiterated their commitment to shut down such stations—"almost 10 years after the Chernobyl accident"—through international cooperation.

They also urged all nations with nuclear power stations to join "as soon as possible" the International Convention on Nuclear Safety.

But the statement did not refer to the European Union's demand for the shutdown of Bulgarian reactor Kozloduy I, which resumed operations on October 6.

Bulgarian Vice Premier Rumen Gechev ruled out an immediate shutdown, but did not dismiss the possibility of holding talks with the EU.

Gechev, speaking at a news conference, said his country was "worried about all the criticism converging on Kozloduy despite the fact that experts have concluded that safety standards were being respected."

"We have no document from the experts on the actual safety problems, while we have a mountain to prove that standards are being respected. We must not mix up politics and safety and we will take no decision on Kozloduy under political pressure without concrete proof from the experts," he said.

Another vice-premier, Kyril Tsochev, said "consultations" could start from Friday between the European

Union and the NEC [National Electricity Company], Bulgaria's national electricity firm and the State Committee for Energy.

The final statement also failed to mention French nuclear tests, contrary to the wish of several northern European nations, and much to the ire of non governmental organisations (NGOs).

On Tuesday, the European Union offered to help Bulgaria "get through the winter" by supplying needed energy while needed repair work was carried out on the country's sole nuclear power plant, which has raised safety concerns.

The offer was conditional on Bulgaria shutting down the number one reactor at Kozloduy.

A report by Greenpeace International on Kozloduy, released at the conference, also stressed the need to shut down the power station, but acknowledged that an immediate shutdown would pose problems for the winter.

It proposed solutions such as installing gas turbines, importing electricity and immediate measures to fight energy wastage in both industrial and domestic consumption.

The report said Bulgaria's electricity crisis was principally a problem of poor management and distribution.

The country is too reliant on Kozloduy, it said, as well as thermal power stations using lignite, among the worst polluters in Europe.

It also pointed out that consumers had little access to information, and criticised the over-centralised decision making system—where all energy issues are decided by the government or State Committee for Energy, which resists new solutions and privatisation of the NEC.

Commentary on U.S. Interest in Socialist Meetings*AU2510185095 Tirana ALBANIA in Albanian
24 Oct 95 p 2*

[Commentary by A. Gjuzi: "Why Did Zibendrit Go to the Textile Mill?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A U.S. diplomat was present at the Socialist Party [PS] meeting at the Textile Mill [in Tirana] and listened to Dokle and Meta's oratory on 21 October. He was even present in the hall when Deputy Chairman Dokle declared that one of Zhulali's [defense minister] trips to the United States cost Albania \$70,000. The PS leaders were not aware of the foreign diplomat's presence in the hall, otherwise they would have spared the anecdote about government expenditures for another meeting where foreigners would not be present — especially the Americans.

Dokle's words, reflected in the press, appear to have been taken seriously by the Western diplomats in Tirana. Inside sources at the U.S. Embassy point out that Dokle's argument to attack the present government in Albania is dangerous for the future of the country's foreign policy if the Socialists come to power.

If the strongest opposition party, which is claiming to seize power after the 1996 elections, considers the contacts of Albanian Government officials as superfluous, as "expenses to the detriment of the people," then the foreign diplomats consider this stand as a revision of Albania's opening to the West and a return to the previous status quo.

There are two strong reasons that prove that the Western diplomats in Tirana are worried about Dokle's declaration. First, the example he cited is especially uncouth because the United States was mentioned. The Socialists have recently made great efforts to prove that they are not anti-American, and they have attacked the propaganda of the party in power, which according to them, has tried to describe them as such. While the example of Zhulali — who is one of the protagonists for establishing ties with the United States and NATO — reveals the aims of the Socialists more openly at a time when they have been accused in Albania as the ones who are against the strengthening of military cooperation with the United States and NATO.

On the other hand, the Albanian Communists are the most untrustworthy and doubtful contingent for the Westerners in general — especially the Americans. For the architects of international global policy, the time when Albania was under the Communists and in total isolation for about 50 years is still too recent. Dokle's declaration can be translated into English, French, or German as a return to the past of the

proletariat dictatorship. If Dokle says today that the defense minister does not need to travel to the United States or elsewhere because it is the people that pay, then the Albanians and foreigners are reminded of the time when the Political Bureau was isolated for more than 20 years within Albania, but they went abroad either for their holidays or for medical treatment and only the small ministry officials had the contacts.

Another indicator is the direct participation in the previous leadership of many people who are today at the head of the SP. To these facts are added recent events in the Socialist leadership — the dismissal of five people whose image was more acceptable for Western policy than the newly appointed ones. This has had an undesirable effect on the PS' image in Europe and abroad.

The Albanian Socialists must weigh very carefully every word they utter when addressing the West if they want to convince the world and their electorate that the PS alternative, if it comes to power, will not change the course of Albania's foreign policy. The Socialists must do it more than the others because all their movements are observed very carefully. The presence of an American diplomat at their meeting can also be explained by the fact that the Americans are aware that the Socialists speak against the United States in their meetings. This fact becomes more convincing if we remember the time that former Ambassador Rayerson climbed the rostrum together with the Democratic Party leaders during the past electoral campaign. On 21 October, Zibendrit was somewhere in one of the corners of the hall and had arrived there after Dokle and Meta had started their speeches.

PS Chairman on Socialists' Future Alternatives*AU2510152995 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT
in Albanian 24 Oct 95 p 1*

[Message from PS Chairman Fatos Nano to the party's Steering Committee; date not given: "Albania, Its People, and the Times Demand an Alternative Government of Socialists and the Forward-Looking Opposition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dear friends,

It is my pleasure to greet and congratulate you on your political maturity, your patriotic and democratic devotion, and the intellectual and professional maturity with which you are fulfilling the tasks of the Socialist Party [PS] leaders on the eve of the election campaign and in the abnormal situation created for the opposition and the majority of the people by the Berisha regime.

The political decisions and actions we have taken to set the party structures in motion, to revive and increase

its political effectiveness, and to prepare the PS for its coming congress, as the main alternative governing force in Albania, are of vital interest for the future of democracy and the country.

Albania and its people, tired and deceived by adventurism, authoritarianism, and the Berisha regime's policy of revenge and corruption, demand an alternative government of socialists and the forward-looking opposition. We have understood this imperative of the development of democracy and, accepting the challenge, will assume with wisdom and courage all civil and political responsibilities to give the country and people better prospects.

Our motto is: "No to communism, no to anticommunism."

In domestic policy we are aiming to accelerate the balanced development of reforms of the market economy and the rule of law, relying on political partnership and national reconciliation.

In foreign policy, we want dignity in the Euro-Atlantic integration of the country, good neighborliness, and the Europeanization of the Balkans, as a way to the national solution.

Our readiness for dialogue and cooperation in the domestic political spectrum is strengthened by political involvement in partnership and protection of the democratic principles and values of contemporary civilization in international relations.

The basis of our world outlook is coexistence and not ostracism, harmonization of free initiative and social solidarity and not oppression and exploitation.

There are a number of things our political values exclude: political persecution, economic abuse, oppression of personality, submission to dictate, class struggle, revolutionary violence, collaborationism, the violation of the fundamental rights and freedoms or their being "offered" as a gift, etc.

We are neither Marxists nor anti-Marxists. We are antifascists, against dictatorships, we are socialists in opposition to the regime of the "Stalin without a moustache."

The hierarchy of our values is different from the antivalues of Berisha and his kind. Your vote of confidence in the Presidium and the vote of the people are proof of this truth. We are the servants of the law and the citizens, because we accept and defend the principle "my freedom ends where the freedom of the other begins." We do not think of power as a means of making a career or enriching oneself. On the contrary,

we put career and our own worth at the service of the state.

The socialists have nothing in common with crime, even less with genocide. We are like fellow sufferers as we are fellows in responsibility for the past. We are not irresponsible and speculative like Berisha and his kind. We are not without a past, so we are not without a future.

We are not nostalgic for the years of the dictatorship, or the years of "continuity" evoked by Berisha. We will not revoke the decisions of the Workers Party Politburo recognizing political pluralism in Albania, which enabled the former Communist secretary Sali Berisha to throw away his membership card and "to climb down from the moon" as Democratic Party chairman. We will abrogate the pseudo-antigenocide law and other anticonstitutional acts of the present regime. We will not keep our political adversaries in prison for 3/4 of our mandate and will not treat them as enemies, but as partners. We will achieve national reconciliation and social peace.

We have shown who we are, and the Albanians are asking for us, trust us, and vote for us. Our people, who are the best, did not meddle with genocide, did not speculate with the crowds to instigate destruction and to cause innocent "political" victims. On the contrary, they undertook political and government responsibilities to avoid destruction and victims of the communist dictatorship destruction, at the time when Berisha and his ilk struck alliances with the crime that came out of the prison cells to the streets, to the detriment of those who were really persecuted.

We have begun our democratic reforms and we are capable of continuing and expanding them.

Our people are the first that in the conditions of pluralism, guaranteed the first free and democratic elections and the peaceful transition of the power into the hands of the opposition, for the first time in postwar Albania. Berisha has not done this yet, and this is the only constitutional task he has to perform, before his inevitable withdrawal from state power. If he continues to be involved with politics, we guarantee him the freedom to revive and correct himself. Otherwise the rule of law will suppress him.

Dear comrades and friends,

I am quite sure that you will continue and develop our historic values, and responsibilities. I wish you every success, knowing that you will convey my greetings to all the members, partisans and numerous well-wishers of the PS in Albania and abroad.

[Signed] Fatos Nano, chairman of the PS of Albania

Serbs' Weapons Searches Pretext for Violence

AU2510152195 Tirana R/LINDJA in Albanian
19 Oct 95 p 2

[Article by "A.M.": "Searches for Weapons as an Excuse for Violence"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The elderly remember the notorious campaign to collect the Albanians' weapons in 1956. Now history is repeating itself. This process is still continuing today and has intensified especially since 1990. Not a day passes in Kosova without one Albanian family or another being raided. Albanians are taken in for what are called informative discussions. They are tortured for hours on end, for days and weeks, under the pretext that they supposedly possess weapons and must surrender them. The raids occur every day and the occasional weapon is found, but if nothing is found, the threat follows: "Either hand over your gun or clear off to Albania!"

The raids concentrate mainly on the villages. Albanian families are "visited" during the night or in the early hours of the morning and even old people are manhandled. The police methods are more "refined" than in the winter of 1956 or in earlier campaigns against the Albanians.

For instance, a villager from Babai i Bokes in the commune of Gjakove [Djakovica], was physically tortured in the course of a search for weapons in September and required medical attention. In the same village, the Serbian militia raided nine other Albanian families. The victims were "advised" to emigrate to Albania, but first to hand over their weapons! A 90-year-old man from the village of Sverke near Kline was manhandled at a police station because of a hunting rifle, for which he had a license. A pharmacist in Kacanik, who had previously worked in Prishtina, was searched for an automatic rifle that did not exist. He was summoned for "discussions" several days running and asked about other things. Weapons have been demanded even from journalists, as in the case of the raid on our Ferizaj [Urosevac] correspondent Rexhep Rifati. The police asked him for weapons, but took away his pens, a typewriter, a camera, etc. The search for weapons from the Albanians is, therefore, only an excuse for ill treatment and violence, with the purpose of forcing them to leave Kosova. Raids on Albanian homes take place without any written authority. People can be raided and arrested if merely suspected of possessing weapons or if suspected of planning a crime under Articles 136, 116, and 138 of the Penal Code of the self-styled Yugoslavia,

famous articles reserved exclusively for Albanians. Of course, no warrants are presented for these measures.

A special law of Serbia, Article 33 of the Law on Weapons and Ammunition, is also reserved for Albanians. It is enough for a weapon to be found on somebody and the charge is ready. Many charges have been filed on the basis of this article and many Albanians have been sentenced to six years' imprisonment. Suspects charged with "carrying an unauthorized weapon" often become embroiled in other political show trials, too.

Sociological Study Examines Emigration, Diaspora

AU2410130395 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE
in Albanian 22 Oct 95 p 7

[Article by Dr. Vladimir Misja and Dr. Elena Misja: "Detailed Study on 'Fleeing Albania' — 70 Percent Under 30 Years Old, Majority Clandestine — What Do the Albanians Do Abroad? — Building, Agriculture, Industry — Jobs To Earn Money"]

[FBIS-Translated Text] *When the Albanians knocked on Europe's doors five years ago, having climbed over the walls of the embassies in Tirana, nobody thought that communist Albania would end in such a way. Only a few politicians had predicted the future of this small nation. A few months later, when the dictatorship was undergoing the agonies of abdication, Albania finally opened her gates to the future.*

Meanwhile, thousands of refugees illegally crossed the borders to reach for what they had been missing for 50 years, if not paradise, then that lost happiness that they had secretly watched on their television screens. The images of these refugees with features scarred by exhaustion, sadness, distress, and hunger could not fail to make an impression on ordinary people all over Europe: The Albanians were no longer those isolated people, but these people they saw scrambling onto ships and boats.

This pitiful image has perhaps begun to change in the Albanians' favor. Albania is now no longer famous for its illegal migrants scattered throughout the world, but its lovely landscape and hospitable people.

Starting in the second half of 1990, a number of mass exoduses led to the migration of a considerable number of Albanians. According to indirect estimates, the number of Albanian emigrants in this period may be up to about 450,000.

Motivation for Migration Abroad

An observation of migration to Italy and Greece shows three main motives impelling Albanians to go abroad.

Higher wages were mentioned as the principal motive by 29 percent; 28 percent mentioned helping their families who remained at home; 17 percent, better material living conditions; 7 percent better material conditions for the education of themselves or members of their families; and 3 percent political reasons.

Economic motives, in accordance with the economic theory of equilibrium, have been and remain primary. However, other sociological factors, especially the role of the family, should not be underestimated. An analysis of reasons behind recent migrations reveal such traditional family values as solidarity, love, respect, dedication, and encouragement.

Motives prompting Albanians to emigrate also differ according to their educational levels, place of residence, marital status, their age group, and the size of their families. Analyzing the reasons for migrants choosing Italy or Greece as their destination, 41.6 percent said "geographical proximity"; followed by 41.6 percent who said "employment opportunities"; 11.7 percent mentioned "presence of family and friends" and 5.4 percent "cultural affinity, language, religion, customs."

Social-Demographic Structure

Questionnaires have shown that 60 percent of migrants are single and 40 percent are married. Men account for 83 percent and women 17 percent, although the balance is almost equal in the 15-16 age group. About 70 percent of migrants are under 30 years old, and about one-third have elementary education.

Of the total number of migrants, 31 percent have left with members of their families. About two-thirds are from the towns, and the remainder from the countryside. Emigrants to Greece are mainly from the southern districts, and those in Italy are from the coastal regions and central Albania.

Social and Economic Structure

Before they left Albania, 65 percent of migrants were employed and 21 percent were jobless. Of those who had not previously worked, 48 percent were in the 19-20 age group and 27 percent were between 25 and 30. The remainder were in older age groups. The wages of those employed in Albania had been considered low, and only 8 percent said that they were able to save.

In their host countries, 20 percent of migrants work in industry, 26 percent in construction, 19 percent in agriculture, 7 percent in tourism, etc. In Italy, the number of migrants employed in the catering industry is three to six times higher than in Greece. It turns out that the majority are clandestine migrants — 68 percent in Italy and even more in Greece. The clandestine character of Albanian emigration is its weak point, reducing its effectiveness. Economic logic suggests that, as long as Albanian migrants are finding work, even illegally, the countries concerned could do more not only to regulate their status, but to regulate migration itself by organizing the work force before it leaves Albania.

Tsochev, U.S. Ambassador Discuss WTO, Kozloduy
AU2510183195 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network
in Bulgarian 1800 GMT 25 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] On 25 October, Kiril Tsochev, deputy prime minister and minister of trade and foreign economic cooperation, met U.S. Ambassador to Bulgaria William Montgomery.

During the meeting, which took place at the invitation of the Bulgarian side, the possibilities of Bulgaria's participation in establishing New Forum were discussed.

The talks between Bulgaria and the United States, which were just completed, on implementing the conditions related to the membership in the World Trade Organization [WTO], were also discussed.

The functioning of the Kozloduy nuclear power plant was also discussed during the talks. Ambassador Montgomery agreed to the opinion expressed by the Bulgarian side that it would be beneficial to replace the strong politicization of the problem with expert talks.

Zhelev: Kozloduy 'Unnecessarily Politicized'
AU2510131295 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian
21 Oct 95 p 3

[Report by Yovka Dimitrova and Albena Draganova: "Zhelev: "Economic Interests Are Also Acting Against the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] One should carry out as many expert checks on the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant as are needed to be sure that the plant is safe, President Zhelev told representatives of eight nongovernmental ecological organizations from Europe yesterday.

The president told the ecologists that in his opinion the problem of the No. 1 Reactor Unit at the nuclear plant has been unnecessarily politicized. According to the president, a solution should be sought instead at the expert level, Yuliya Gurkovska, head of the president's office, announced.

Zhelev further believes that economic as well as political interests are playing with the nuclear plant issue at the moment. He noted that it is no accident that the campaign is being mounted just as winter approaches.

Krasen Stanchev of the "Nature on Loan" Independent Society reported that the ecologists said in reply that they were worried by the fact that Western technologists who do not hold antinuclear views are concerned about the plant. [passage omitted]

EU Official Suggests Study

AU2510151595 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network
in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 25 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Press Service of the Council of Ministers has issued an announcement which reads:

Regarding the incorrect information disseminated by certain Sofia newspapers regarding the unwillingness of the Bulgarian side to receive specific aid for the Bulgarian power supply from other states, the Press Service informs:

Only today at noon, Ambassador Thomas O'Sullivan, leader of the delegation of the EU Commission, presented certain ideas of the EU Commission about a possible study mission, which will determine whether and how is it possible to compensate Bulgaria's losses caused by disrupting its power supply balance as a result of closing the first reactor of the Kozloduy nuclear power plant, as demanded by the EU.

The announcement points out that Kiril Tsochev, deputy prime minister and minister of trade and foreign economic cooperation, received Ambassador Thomas O'Sullivan, leader of the EU Commission delegation. Thomas O'Sullivan proposed talks at the expert-technical level between representatives of the EU member-countries and Bulgarian experts on preparing medium-range and long-range projects on assisting the Bulgarian power supply system.

Ambassador O'Sullivan pointed out that such projects could be implemented in anything related to the conventional production of power, as well as to the Kozloduy nuclear power plant. He specified that if an agreement is reached with our power supply experts, the implementation of such projects could begin only next year.

Thomas O'Sullivan noted that the proposal to begin talks on preparing projects on assisting our power supply system is not directly related to the discussion on the functioning and safety of the Kozloduy nuclear power plant, but refers to the Bulgarian power supply system as a whole.

In his reply, Kiril Tsochev said that he will coordinate the formation of a Bulgarian expert group.

Mr. Tsochev also told a BTA reporter: We agreed with Ambassador O'Sullivan today that the Kozloduy nuclear power plant issue must be discussed at the expert-technical level and that the talks must be conducted in a prudent, logical, and levelheaded manner in order to find a solution that could involve possible short-range and long-range financial assistance from the EU.

He also said that, on Friday, talks with the EU will begin at the National Electricity Company and at the

Committee on Power Supply on a purely technical level, and expressed the opinion that all this noise must be stopped.

Road Agreement Signed With Iran, Armenia, Georgia

NC2310215595 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1700 GMT 23 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A quadripartite meeting was held among Iran, Armenia, Georgia, and Bulgaria at Bulgaria's port city of Burgas. It examined the issue of opening a new transportation corridor between Europe and Iran. Armenia was represented by Arshaluys Stepanian, director of the Freight Transportation Department at the Armenian Transportation Ministry, and Vladimir Asirians, director of Hayyerkatgits [Armenian Railways] state enterprise.

An agreement was signed according to which the contracting sides agreed to work for the operation of the new Burgas-Poti-Armenia-Iran transportation corridor. A ferry able to transport 40 loaded trucks began operation between Varna and Poti while the talks were still going on.

Thus, the new corridor enables Armenia to send freight to Bulgaria and have access to all the European countries from there. It is also possible to build a special quay to handle the railway freight cars that are to be transported by ferry.

Accord on Balkan Transportation Corridor Signed

Zhelev on Importance of Accord

AU2510203495 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 25 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] On 25 October, President Zhelev returned from New York, where he took part in the extraordinary UN General Assembly session, devoted to the UN 50th anniversary.

The Bulgarian head of state described the declaration signed by the presidents of Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and Turkey on the East-West transportation corridor as the most important event for Bulgaria within the framework of his visit to New York.

Upon his arrival in Bulgaria, President Zhelev again spoke about this declaration and made certain additional clarifications about its preparation:

[Begin recording] The East-West and North-South corridors are issues that have been repeatedly discussed by all our political forces—both parliamentary and extraparlimentary—and I allow myself to say that we

have a consensus on this issue. I do not know of any objection to those projects. I think that it would be a great success for Bulgaria, its foreign policy, and diplomacy if, one day, we succeed in becoming the crossroad of those corridors.

As far as preliminary consultations related to the declaration are concerned, I think that declarations do not need any consultations. During the talks related to signing a declaration, the participants express various opinions. It is impossible to ask the government about its opinion after every opinion expressed at the talks.

Therefore, I deliberately invited a representative of the Foreign Ministry as a member of the delegation I led. He also was a representative of the government—Mr. Glavanakov. He attended all meetings, including the signing of the declaration.

Our institution, unlike certain other institutions does not act in a conspiratorial manner. Everything is totally open. [end recording]

President Zhelev commented in the following manner on the reservations of Greek Foreign Minister Papoulias regarding the East-West corridor: Mr. Papoulias is the foreign minister of a neighboring and friendly state. We respect his state, but the opinion he expresses is the opinion of the foreign minister of that country. A comparison between his opinion and the signatures of four Balkan presidents puts the things in their proper proportion.

Pirinski Expresses 'Suspicion'

AU2510203695 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 25 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] On 25 October, Georgi Pirinski, minister of foreign affairs, and Irina Bokova, deputy minister of foreign affairs, gave a news conference on topical issues of Bulgarian foreign policy.

Mr. Pirinski commented on the agreement President Zhelev signed in New York with the three other Balkan states on the Adriatic-Black Sea transportation corridor. According to Pirinski the government discussed that project together and on an equal basis with two other projects—Berlin-Greece and Baltic-Greece. Giving priority to one of the three corridors evokes suspicion and questions. Why for example an agreement on the Berlin-Greece corridor has not been signed first? This corridor is an EU priority. The issue is related not only to the prerogatives of the president to represent the country in the field of international relations, but also to projects which involve hundreds of millions of dollars.

In connection with the Kozloduy issue, Mr. Pirinski said that one should approach this issue on the basis

of a sufficiently benevolent dialogue and not through unilateral notes.

Greek General Visits To Build Up Contacts

*AU2410145495 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA
in Bulgarian 19 Oct 95 p 1*

[Report by Miroslav Dobrev: "Discussions on More Direct Contacts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Implementing the bilateral cooperation program agreed between the Defense Ministries and General Staffs of the Bulgarian and Greek Armies, Lieutenant General Charalambos Kasimatis, commander of the Greek 1st Army, is visiting this country. This visit is at the invitation of Major Gen. Ivan Tomov, commander of the Bulgarian 1st Army, and its purposes are to establish personal contacts between the two armies' commands, to discuss the state of cooperation, and to outline directions for further developing cooperation next year.

Yesterday the Greek military delegation was received by Colonel Gen. Tsvetan Totomirov, chief of the Bulgarian Army General Staff. During their talks, both sides expressed satisfaction with the development of cooperation, especially with the increasing tendency toward establishing military contacts at lower levels. This year, cooperation was implemented at the battalion level and there are plans to hold joint activities in the future between individual companies and platoons.

Yesterday Gen. Kasimatis also met with his host Gen. Tomov and with the military council of the Bulgarian 1st Army, as well as met with Lt. Gen. Zakharin Iliev, commander of the Bulgarian Army Land Forces.

Today the Greek delegation will visit Pleven, Belogradchik, and Montana, while tomorrow they will be in Vratsa, where soldiers and commanders of the local unit will demonstrate their combat skills to the delegation.

Army Plans To Meet NATO Conditions by 1997
AU2510180395 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES
in Czech 24 Oct 95 p 1

[Article by "km, gag": Army Wants To Join NATO Within Two Years]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Defense Minister Vilem Holan claims that the Army will be able to join the North Atlantic Alliance no later than within two years. The defense sector plans to fulfill all the strategic tasks it assigned itself in connection with joining NATO by that time.

"From a military vantage point, I do not see any reason that would prevent our joining NATO in 1997," Holan said yesterday. When making the statement, the minister referred to an Army study prepared by military experts in September of this year, which basically is a technical scenario for joining the alliance.

Within two years, 11 fundamental military tasks will be completed. The first of them is a seemingly insignificant condition of conforming all requirements for working with fuel. "The Army must be equipped with the technical means that facilitate refueling and lubricating Western machines," the minister specified. The Army must also replace its communication hardware within two years because so far, it has been either impossible or only slightly possible for the soldiers to communicate with their fellow soldiers from the NATO armies.

The study further expects that, from the level of a battalion, the staff officers will speak foreign languages, and the conformation of military terminology and the usage of identical symbols on maps are described as a very important prerequisite for joining the alliance.

In the modernization of the Army, until 1997, aviation hardware will have priority.

The Army will first be equipped with new navigation equipment and each aircraft with a system that will facilitate a differentiation between our own and enemy aircraft.

Holan: NATO 'Cheaper Than Isolated Defense'
AU2510173595 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES
in Czech 24 Oct 95 p 7

[Article by Jan Gazdik: "Participation in NATO Will Be Cheaper Than Isolated Defense of the State"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Despite the belief on the part of some political officials that joining the North Atlantic Alliance would result in increased expenditures on the Army, the economy experts at the Defense Ministry claim that entry into NATO cannot be linked to fears

of astronomical sums being spent on the reequipment of the Army.

Defense Minister Vilem Holan even said that defense will be much cheaper for the Republic if it is admitted into the alliance.

"If the Army is to work within the framework of NATO, it will need a much lower budget than if it worked on its own and tried for the same effectiveness. Of course, the expenditures will temporarily increase, but that is normal," the minister said.

The Army expects a budget of some 30 billion korunas [Kc] for 1996. It is a lower amount than the budgets of the departments of education or health. The Health Ministry is to receive Kc90 billion and the Education Ministry Kc55 billion. According to the Defense Ministry, if the government decided against joining NATO, the Republic would be on its own regarding defense, and the Army budget would have to be increased in the coming years to some Kc45 billion annually.

Namely, in such an instance, the Army would have to purchase some military hardware, which is not necessary if we join NATO.

Even among the NATO members, only the armies of the strongest countries own these arms. They are, among other things, antimissile or antinuclear defense systems. At this time, the purchase of such systems is beyond the realm of possibility of the State Treasury.

Estimates by the economy experts at the Defense Ministry indicate that the Republic would necessarily have to spend more on its isolated defense than the alliance member countries are spending today. The 3 percent of the GDP that the NATO states spend on defense on average corresponds to Kc40 billion. Because the Czech Army has not reached the technical standard of the Western forces, in the beginning the military expenditures would have to be even higher, and with the additional risk of never achieving really effective defense. On the other hand, according to the economists, the amount connected to NATO membership is estimated at Kc35 billion annually, which corresponds to approximately 2.6 percent of the GDP.

This year's Army budget of Kc28 billion represents 2.4 percent of the GDP. Nevertheless, the government requested that the ministry continue cutting expenditures until they reach 2 percent. Nevertheless, Miroslav Kalousek, deputy defense minister in charge of economy, observed that the eventual NATO membership will not come cheap. The United States, for instance, following a reduction at the end of the millennium, wants to spend 2.8 percent of the GDP, which means that, in

time, the Czech Government will have to reassess its endeavors to cut military spending.

"Today, the Czech economy cannot afford, however, to give the Army more than 2.5 percent of the GDP," Kalousek stated.

Minister Holan said that in 1997 the Army intends to ask the government much more emphatically for a significant increase in the budget.

General Staff strategists claim that admission of a country into the alliance is possible only if it is to become a full-fledged partner. They refuse the role of a petitioner who asks for protection of his borders because his own means do not facilitate it. "We seek a partner's protection, but he has the right to ask the same of us," Defense Minister Vilem Holan said.

The ministerial economic experts are convinced that, when the discussion on the entry of the Republic into NATO reaches the stage at which the questions of when and how are answered, the government will remove the pressure on continuing reduction of Army spending.

Czech President on Changes, Balkan Conflict

WS2510143895 Warsaw GAZETA SWIATECZNA
in Polish 21-22 Oct 95 pp 14-17

[Interview with Czech President Václav Havel by Adam Michnik and Andrzej Jagodzinski; place and date not given: "Completed Revolution and Belated Avengers"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Andrzej Jagodzinski] In many countries of our region, postcommunist groupings are winning democratic elections: in Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria... Why is this happening?

[Havel] There are probably several reasons for that. First and foremost, communists were the only people who were experienced in governing, who were disciplined, who had the apparatus and the structures, etc. Naturally, all of this comes in very handy—even in democratic states. Moreover, their victory may be a sign of a natural pendulum—which we can also see in Western democracies—where right-wing politicians are being replaced by left-wingers. Finally, there is a factor that I mentioned right at the beginning: the feeling of fatigue and a lack of ability to function under new conditions, which gives rise to frustrations.

In all, however, I would not overestimate this phenomenon, and I would not talk about the return of communism because what has already happened is irreversible. Instead of that, I would rather look upon all of this as a certain expression of stabilization that may help crystallize the political scene. When people find out that there

are no miraculous remedies and that beautiful promises cannot be kept, the results of the next elections may be entirely different. [passage omitted]

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] There is a dispute in Poland over the interpretation of the two-year governing of the current coalition. According to one hypothesis, it is recommunization, another Polish People's Republic. In line with the other hypothesis, which I support, it is "velvet restoration." It is not tantamount to a return of the old regime, but to the return of the people of that regime, people who further implement the mechanism set in motion by the revolution. In England, restoration occurred after Cromwell's rule, but the old situation did not return. The same goes for France after Napoleon's rule. What do you think are the consequences of such a restoration?

[Havel] What you call "velvet restoration" cannot be seen in the Czech Republic's political sphere; however, certain signs can be noticed in the economic sphere. Members of the former managerial apparatus of various plants have become powerful entrepreneurs and capitalists, who have craftily changed their banners. I believe, however, that, after such a great change in ownership relationships, such a phase is indispensable. This can be compared to the times when former convicts who were sent to Australia gradually began constructing the country's economy. They were still criminals, but their descendants were not.

A market economy cannot be built overnight because it is not only a matter of legislation. It is not enough to give factories away to private proprietors. In our countries, the traditional bourgeois class was destroyed. Recently I had a meeting with the 20 biggest private entrepreneurs in our country. They asked me the following question: "Are we bourgeois?" I told them I did not know. [passage omitted]

Over all those years, the people of the old communist economic apparatus managed to develop so many contacts that it was much easier for them than for those who had no such experience to actively participate in the privatization process. They also had the know-how, knew the markets, and had the money—no wonder they won. Thus, it is some kind of "velvet restoration." In addition, we can see certain signs that show that links are forming between these people and representatives of circles related to the right-wing government. Some radicals severely criticize the Klaus Cabinet for that. It seems to me, however, that this phenomenon would have appeared anyway. [passage omitted]

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Our revolution was a revolution without utopia. We did not think that the new world would be perfect and free of conflicts. On the

contrary, we knew that it would be normal and full of conflicts. I remember our talks on the border, those in 1978 and those in 1988. At that time, we did not delude ourselves as the Jacobins and Bolsheviks deluded themselves. Nonetheless, we were convinced that, in this normal world, we would find a relatively straight road to the democratic structures in Europe. Now it has turned out that this road is far from being straight. We aspire to join EU and NATO, but we are having difficulties achieving this goal. Why?

[Havel] The West was totally unprepared for the collapse of communism. It had fought with it for decades and become so accustomed to it that it did not even think that this system might collapse one day.

Over 40 years the West created huge, bureaucratized structures, inclined to think in a stereotyped manner and adopt attitudes characterized by cautious pragmatism. Moreover, today there are no brave and magnanimous politicians such as Adenauer, de Gaulle, and de Gasperi. The world itself has also changed. Contemporary politicians' hands are tied more tightly now. Clinton must really reckon with the media, whereas Truman did not have this problem because there was no television, so he did not have to keep smiling all the time.

To cut a long story short, Western politicians are not prepared to make quick decisions. They mince their steps and stay in the same place, which is detrimental to both them and the European and global order. It is not true that Europe does not want us because in the postcommunist countries there are unstable conditions, nationalists, populists, etc. The situation is quite the opposite. The longer the West delays these decisions, the greater assistance it provides in the process of generating those nationalists, populists, and extremists because they always fill a vacuum. Then they can say: "Well, look and see, the bad West does not want you anyway"; then they can propose their "miraculous remedies" and win elections.

For this reason, I use various occasions to appeal to the West and to remind it that the victory was also, to some degree, a commitment. I remind it that it is not as many Americans tend to think: Because we defeated the evil empire, we no longer have to worry about anyone but ourselves. Because the old system has been destroyed, we must build a new one together.

Meanwhile, the West still thinks in terms that were binding in the bipolar world. When Portugal was being admitted to NATO, no one cared that there was Salazar and a dictatorship in that country. That country was simply strategically vital in the bipolar world, and that was the most important thing. Now they are concerned

and wondering whether Poland or the Czech Republic are sufficiently democratic states.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] As you know, we are journalists of a daily that has become involved in Central European cooperation. Sometimes I come to the conclusion, however, that goes against common sense to create a common supplement along with three other dailies—in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary—because no one, except the presidents, wants this cooperation.

[Havel] I am one of those who believe that we should not be exotic countries to each other. In historical and spiritual respects, this is a common place. In addition, in the past, people in this region went through considerable tension and conflict. Today we have a historic chance to create a cooperative space and to take advantage of common experiences—including the experience of communism.

However, I would like to defend our government a bit. The situation has changed since 1989. Right after the revolution, we had to liquidate the Warsaw Pact and get the Soviet troops out of our countries. It was also necessary to show the West that these countries were being governed not by a group of accidental brawlers, but by people who realize the importance of good-neighborly cooperation. Therefore, there were many reasons to ostentatiously stress our ties and to institutionalize them in a way.

Now the situation is a bit different because the basic tasks have been carried out. This does not mean, however, that our cooperation is now unnecessary; it must simply assume different forms. Let us note, for example, how Russian policy has changed over the last three years. Three years ago, Yeltsin publicly said in Prague and Warsaw that it was all the same for Russia whether or not we become members of NATO. Today he is saying totally different things. This is largely due to the fact that in Central Europe there is some kind of vacuum, and our integration with European structures is still being postponed for a later time. The West's indecision emboldens Russia, and, as a consequence, Russia is trying to regain the zones it has lost. In this situation, it is important to stress our cooperation in this area.

We know which world we want to belong to, and, if we say this together, our voice is naturally stronger.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] A big shock of recent years has been the Balkan problem. The war between the Serbs and the Croats is a war in which there will be no winners; there will only be losers. It is a war that gives Europe a signal that a multicultural state is losing and an ethnic state is winning. It is a war that has revealed

Europe's helplessness, a war in which Europe has not been able to do anything. As a matter of fact, I do not know on which side I am. Increasingly often I come to the conclusion that it is a war waged by "ethnic cleansers" because both sides want to achieve this goal [ethnic cleansing]. How should we people who fought for freedom, democracy, tolerance, and a multicultural character look at this war?

[Havel] This is a subject I very often come back to. I am convinced that the conflict in former Yugoslavia is over Europe, over its fundamental values. One of them is the principle of civil coexistence of people of different nations and different religions. Thus, when the international community agrees to ethnic division, it means that it spits on the principles on which it based itself.

First, it recognizes Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state within its present borders. Soon after that, they start to draw lines on maps and wonder how it should be divided. It cannot be divided because the dividing line would cut through every family, house, and village.

The worst thing is that there are three fighting sides, and there is also a fourth side—which does not want any war. These are people who want to lead normal lives. This fourth side is the largest, but no one is holding any talks with its representatives. Everyone is talking to the three sides that have weapons. Thus, the civil principle was sacrificed for the ethnic principle, and everyone seems to agree with that. It is terrible that the Karadzic army is referred to as one of the sides fighting there; it is terrible that this army is put on a par with the army of the sovereign, diplomatically recognized state of Bosnia. The negotiators certainly have good intentions, but I believe their work is extraordinarily dangerous.

It is also absurd that Russia, which was unable to obtain a good position in the Balkans when Tito was in power, is now a presence there; it is a presence there due to Western countries—and a superpower at that.

The Balkans are a spark that may cause a big fire affecting Macedonia, Kosovo, Bulgaria, the Islamic world.... Thus, it is not the case that we must support one of the "ethnic cleansers." On the contrary; we should endorse those who do not want ethnically clean states. This is a great challenge and a serious test for Europe. If it fails and sets the borders just as the unofficial armies decide in their fighting and cleansing, it will spell a failure that may bring about fatal consequences in very unexpected places: Corsica, Catalonia, or the country of the Basques. If Europe decides that the likes of Le Pen, Haider, Sladek, and Zhirinovskiy are right in the Balkan conflict, it will decide that such people are generally

right, and thus it will undermine the principles on which it has based itself.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] What can be done to help that fourth, non fighting side?

[Havel] I posed this question to our soldiers in peace-keeping missions and to NATO generals. The conclusion that can be drawn from all those talks is that, if this conflict is to continue for another 20 years, it can be stopped only by force from outside. It will not be done by UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force], which is able to perform police and humanitarian functions. The war must be ended by force, and this is technically possible. However, the political will is too weak.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] We have broken free of communism and for the past six years have been heading in some direction. Tell us in what possible directions we can go and what the options are.

[Havel] The worst option is that, over the next dozen years, the entire postcommunist area will be an area of chaos, destabilization, unrest, and local conflicts. The communist discipline will be replaced by noncommunist disorder. This will be used increasingly more by extremists and populists, who will immediately propose their "rules." If democrats fail to create a new European order, things will be handled by extremists, and then one fine day we may be unpleasantly surprised.

A better option is that we will gradually become normal democratic states—a poorer Netherlands, Belgium, or Portugal.

However, I believe that there is also an even better option—even though in my circles I am severely criticized for expressing such views; I am called a naive dreamer and a seeker of third roads. In line with this option, we will draw conclusions from our experiences and try to think a little more in global terms in this global society. This means that we will take on greater responsibility and, in a way, we will be an inspiration for the rich West. This will happen if we are able to see dangers lurking in the contemporary world long before they actually appear and if we are able to articulate them properly—thanks to the unique experience related to communism and thanks to our entire history.

It is my dream that we will not become some kind of "other Portugal," but will try to think differently and see a broader context. Thanks to that, we may be able to make a special contribution to global politics. I believe that this is the best option, though I must admit that it is at the same time the least likely one. [passage omitted]

Minister Dlouhy Confirms Jaundice Infection

AU2510170195 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES
in Czech 24 Oct 95 p 2

[Article by "(nak, rea)": "Dlouhy Was Most Probably Infected With Jaundice on a Foreign Visit"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Trade and Industry Minister Vladimir Dlouhy (Civic Democratic Alliance), who has been hospitalized in the infectious diseases unit of Na Bulovce Hospital since 20 October, confirmed yesterday that he has contracted jaundice.

His spokesman, Miroslav Konvalina, has conceded that the minister could have been infected on one of his official visits. "The minister has visited 20 countries this year, and the course of his illness indicates that the disease could have been contracted abroad," said Konvalina. Therefore, the variant that the minister was the carrier and that his wife was then infected by him is also possible. She contracted hepatitis A almost four weeks ago. The doctors, however, will not complete the tests that determine the type of jaundice until today.

When Dlouhy's wife contracted hepatitis, the minister went for a medical checkup every five days. "The tests were always negative, and the minister asked the doctors regularly whether he could infect other members of the government. Each time they said no," said Konvalina. When Dlouhy's condition deteriorated on Friday, he was hospitalized immediately.

Jaroslav Kriz, director of the State Health Institute, said that the minister's illness does not mean a special procedure for members of the government. However, they will evidently go for preventive examinations and will probably be given an injection of gamma globulin that could conceivably alleviate the course of the disease. Kriz does not think it very likely that other members of the government will be infected. "Mr. Dlouhy would have to have either prepared food for someone or not washed his hands after using the bathroom and then shaken someone's hand," said Kriz.

Everyone who came into close contact with Dlouhy recently—for example, the staff in his secretariat—will have to undergo preventive measures. The Health Ministry's spokeswoman, Klara Potocna, confirmed yesterday that the department is compiling a list of people the regular medical checks would concern. "This is also being considered for all of the Cabinet members," said Potocna.

Minister Dlouhy, who could be in the hospital for up to six weeks, is now receiving infusions. He will be replaced by his deputy at government meetings.

New Anti-Money-Laundering Bill Drafted

95CH0348B Prague PRAGUE POST in English
22 Aug 95 p 7

[Article by Jan Stojaspal: "Money-Laundering Bill May Not Wash Away Corruption"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Czech government wants to wipe out money laundering, in the hopes of cleaning up its international image and possibly uprooting organized crime.

"This is the best place to launder money, by far," said Jaroslav Kubisa, a former employee of the Privatization Ministry who currently works on the bank-supervision board at the Czech National Bank. Kubisa, who insisted that he is not speaking on behalf of the bank, said, "Banks would take any amount of cash...and the entire country is for sale."

Kubisa said that a lack of client identification and monitoring has made the Czech Republic a money-laundering haven.

Jan Bosak, a specialist on money laundering with the Czech national police, estimated that billions of crowns are being laundered in the Czech Republic every year.

He said that tightening control would take much wind out of the sails of organized-crime groups. "All organized crime is motivated by money, and if the money dries up, so does the crime," he said.

Money laundering is a two-step process.

First the criminal must find a legitimate business to filter the tainted cash through—typically any enterprise where the value of the item sold is not correlated with its cost, such as restaurants, casinos or antique shops.

Second, the crook must obscure the money's path. Most often, the money is divided, deposited into separate bank accounts, transferred a number of times and eventually consolidated in "clean" bank accounts.

The Ministry of Justice has drafted a new anti-money laundering bill that would require all financial institutions, such as banks, brokerages and even casinos, to identify their clients and all other parties involved in monetary transactions.

But critics remain skeptical as to how effective the new bill will be. Kubisa said that the proposal leaves plenty of leeway for criminals to carry on their business. For example, he said the ceilings for identification are too high, and fines are too low. Violators could face fines of up to 10 million Kc (\$385,000) or loss of their business license.

He also said that use of a transferable bank book—exempt from client identification under the current proposal—could make the bill "nonfunctional."

"The law (if passed as proposed) would be useless. (Its purpose) would be for government officials to be able to tell foreigners how money is not laundered here, while the mafia will be laughing its head off," he said.

Under the proposed law, banks would also be required to report "unusual" transaction—those suspected of being used to launder money—to the Finance Ministry.

The ministry would carry out comparative analysis of the data gathered and file charges if suspicions proved founded.

"It's easy to tell an 'unusual' transaction in practice," said one of the authors of the proposed law, Vladimir Kral, director of the department of criminal legislation at the Ministry of Justice.

"I come to a bank, open up 20 bank accounts, deposit under 100,000 Kc in each of them to avoid identification, and transfer (the money) to a different account."

All financial institutions would have to identify clients who make transactions of more than 500,000 Kc (for banks, this figure would be 100,000 Kc), rent a safe-deposit box, open a bank account or exchange the equivalent of over 200,000 Kc.

A casino or a betting office paying out over 200,000 Kc in winnings would also have to identify the recipient.

Kral said an attempt to transfer money to a bank in a country outside the Convention on Laundering, Tracing, Seizure and Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime would also be considered an "unusual" transaction. The convention, a "soft law" outlining principles for prevention of money laundering, was adopted in 1990 by the Council of Europe. The Czech Republic could become a signatory if it passes the new money-laundering bill.

Vera Hartlova, deputy director of the legislative department at the Czech National Bank, vests much hope in the clause on "unusual" transactions. Many countries have this provision, she said.

Michal Tomasek, senior expert in European affairs of Komerční banka, said that while the law would put additional strain on the bank's administration, it would not affect the bank's clients.

He said, "We are a European country. We have an association treaty with the European Union and we have to proceed accordingly."

More Companies, Banks To Be Privatized

95CH0348A Prague PRAGUE POST in English
22 Aug 95 p 5

[Article by Alex Friedrich: "State Sell-Offs to Be Accelerated"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In a surprise decision Aug. 8, Czech government ministers agreed to reduce state ownership in more than 53 major and 1,400 minor companies.

The National Property Fund (FNM), the state agency overseeing the government's stock, should begin selling 344 billion Kc (\$13.2 billion) worth of shares before next year's elections, Privatization Minister spokesman Milos Ruzicka said. It should finish divesting in 1997.

Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus said at a news briefing that he was surprised the amount was so high. Of the total, the government holds 161 billion Kc in strategic companies, about 5 billion Kc more than was offered in the second wave of privatization. It also has 181 billion Kc in small stakes of minor firms.

Privatization Minister Jiri Skalicky was in charge of working out projects for further privatization, Klaus said.

FNM Chairman Roman Ceska said, "It hasn't yet been decided whether all these shares will be sold, but we've decided to look into their fate."

He said the government knows how it will privatize about one-third of its strategic companies. Most of these will be sold through tenders or a standard scale on the capital market.

The prospect of further privatization of banks was welcomed by Skalicky and representatives of Komerční banka, Československá obchodní banka, Ceska sportelna and Ceska narodni banka. FNM Chairman Ceska said shares of one of the four biggest banks could be privatized very soon, but he would not say which one.

The state will probably retain its majority share in some of the 53 strategic companies for a while. SPT Telecom, for example, is expected to remain under state control for another five to seven years, and some petrochemical companies will remain state-owned.

Skalicky said the state must review its position concerning the privatization of the north Moravian metal companies Vitkovice and Nova Hut this fall. Nova Hut assistant director Jiri Mazura told economic daily *Hospodarske noviny* that the prospective U.S. corporate partner, IFC Kaiser, has stated it would not invest in the company if the state has a majority share.

Petr Plachy, trade director of mining company OKD, said, "Lowering of state shareholding from 52 percent to 34 percent would not be a surprise to management. But when it comes to energy policy, state participation is very important."

Jan Maixner, an advisor to Skalicky, said that after the government and parliament pass an energy policy, the state won't need to have majority shares in the energy-distribution companies. Eight regional electric companies and eight gas companies are being privatized. Ownership of almost 35 percent of shares will be transferred to towns, and a further one-fifth will be offered to foreign investors by the end of the year.

"So the National Property Fund will still have a 26 percent share in them, which doesn't guarantee a decisive authority," he said. The remaining 19 percent includes employee and management stockholdings and shares placed into two government funds.

Antonin Jakubse, president of Czech Airlines (CSA), said the privatization of his company should run smoothly. Further privatization should have a positive effect on all companies, forcing them to function in an aggressive, market-oriented manner.

Klaus wants the FNM to continue working even after it finishes its job of selling off property. He said it will exist for purposes of debt collection, payments from new owners and ecological insurance. Ceska said the fund will exist through the year 2000, but Economy Minister Karel Dyba said it should end much earlier.

The FNM has transferred 550 billion Kc of state property into private hands during its four years of existence.

Kovac Blames Government for U.S. 'Disquiet'*LD2610141895 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Here is a report from the news conference with Slovak President Michal Kovac, who has returned from a seven-day visit to the United States. Representing Radiozurnal at the news conference was Jan Baranek. [passage omitted]

[Baranek] President Michal Kovac replied to correspondents' questions. Asked about the disquiet of the U.S. President regarding the internal political situation in our country, Kovac said:

[Begin Kovac recording] Yes, he [Clinton] expressed disquiet after praising the path we covered as an independent Slovak state. It was disquiet in relation to the democratic path—he was concerned that we do not depart from the democratic direction—disquiet as to attacks at politicians, certain disquiet as to other questions of our internal political development. So, unfortunately, he did express disquiet as to some specific questions. [end recording] [passage omitted]

[Baranek] The Slovak president also replied to the question from Slovak radio as to what international response he expected in connection with the fact that, immediately after Bill Clinton expressed support for Slovakia, the Slovak National Party decided to ask at the November meeting of parliament that a commission be set up to investigate the suspicion against the president that he committed the crime of high treason. He also replied to the question concerning the international community's reaction in case the EU demarche does not find an adequate response with the Slovak Government.

[Begin Kovac recording] Some representatives of the government coalition do not want to see reality as to our current international position. They do not want to realize that, if 15 member states of the European Union and the United States express certain disquiet, it is not because of what the president of the Slovak Republic is doing but perhaps because of what steps the government coalition has been taking. If, after the demarche you are talking about, the politics that caused the disquiet continue, it is indeed possible to expect certain international isolation of the Slovak Republic, although I want to say that, both during the talks in Germany and the talks with President Clinton, I was asking for intensification of the dialogue at all levels, starting with the highest level and ending in a dialogue between businessmen, between the Slovak Republic, the member states of the European Union, and the United States. [end recording]

TV Criticized for Ignoring Kovac-Clinton Meeting*AU2510174995 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
24 Oct 95 p 4*

[Commentary by Gabriela Rothmayerova: "What We Did Not See Did Not Happen"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the U.S. city of Cedar Rapids in the state of Iowa, the Slovak flag was flying on 22 October next to the Czech and U.S. flags. The heads of state of two small, free Central European countries found themselves as equal partners at the side of the U.S. President. All three constitutional officials made speeches to mark the opening of the Museum of Czechs and Slovaks in the United States. Since the partition of Czechoslovakia, this was probably one of the greatest events in which the Czech Republic and Slovakia made themselves visible, in the good sense of the word.

Apart from world news agencies and television crews, the public service [Czech Television station] CT 1 and private [Czech television station] NOVA took careful note of this and devoted the appropriate attention to this event. A viewer watching [Slovak television station] STV 1 news, however, was spared the gush of joyous feelings and patriotic pride. For Slovak Television, the meeting of the three presidents meant absolutely nothing. While the government, the majority of Slovak parliament deputies, and workers' collectives are calling upon the president of the Slovak Republic to vacate his office, television, which is obliged under the law to be a public service institution, has decided to act. Because the president ignores the appeals, television ignores the president. He is not worthy of its attention, notwithstanding the fact that he represents overseas not only himself and his offspring, but also the country and all citizens living here.

Surely, this conduct of public service television can be punished. Provided, of course, that the television council (which parliament has turned into a paid body, paid from the taxes of all citizens) meets the obligation assigned to it by law.

Clinton's, HZDS's Treatment of Kovac Contrasted*AU2510152895 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
24 Oct 95 p 4*

[Commentary by Marian Lesko: "In Cedar Rapids and in Cingov"]

[FBIS Translated Text] U.S. Presidents, whether or not they so desire, are among the best informed people in the world. The current U.S. President, unlike some of his predecessors, supposedly likes being informed. Yet it seems that not everyone in Slovakia really believes this....

While Bill Clinton was delivering his speech at the opening of the Museum of Czechs and Slovaks in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, he could not know what decisions would be made by the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] National Presidium at its meeting in Cingov on Saturday [21 October]. But, when deciding whether to go to Iowa in the first place, he certainly knew that the strongest ruling movement in Slovakia was using every possible, and even impossible, opportunity to call upon the [Slovak] president to resign. He must also have known that the coalition majority in parliament had passed a vote of no confidence in the Slovak president and that the cabinet had declared further cooperation with Michal Kovac impossible. However, the U.S. chief of the executive considered none of this important enough to avoid meeting the Slovak president. And, once he decided to attend, he treated Michal Kovac politely, as is customary in treating a head of state in the United States.

Bill Clinton said that he was proud to find himself in the company of two presidents who are steering their nations through transformation. Turning to Michal Kovac, he noted that the United States supports his personal dedication to openness and reforms. On the 22 October Radiojournal [news program], Slovak Radio correspondent Ivo Kunsch even "let slip" Bill Clinton's words of gratitude, in the English original, for the way in which the president of the Slovak Republic is leading the country.... At the very same time, the HZDS National Presidium, meeting in Cingov, confirmed that "it continues to view critically the work of Slovak President Michal Kovac, who is persistently damaging the good name of our republic." About a man who was negotiating at that very moment with the U.S. President, the HZDS Presidium said: "The nature of his activity is clearly destructive to the principles of democracy, law, morality, and human ethics." From the HZDS's point of view, it is incomprehensible and from that of the government inexplicable that Bill Clinton could not only negotiate with such a destructive person, but could even thank him in public for his activity.... The HZDS and the government refuse to accept that their assessment of the Slovak president is not internationally "recognized" and are complicating the situation not only for themselves, which is their right, but also for the state, for which they do not have a mandate. When State Secretary Jozef Sestak was thanking Bill Clinton on Saturday [21 October] in the name of the Government of the Slovak Republic for the assistance that the U.S. Administration and he personally are extending to Slovakia, did he also thank him for his kind words about President Kovac? The fact is that the U.S. President is not dissociating himself from anyone. When Jozef Sestak asked him whether he could meet our prime minister and the

chairman of parliament in the foreseeable future, Bill Clinton replied that he would do what he can.

A few years ago, an American comedian used to joke about his President. George Washington supposedly could not tell a lie, Richard Nixon could not tell the truth, and Ronald Reagan could not tell the difference. If the same comedian today mentioned Clinton, instead of Reagan, people would hardly laugh. Today's President knows how to differentiate.

U.S. Attitude Toward Kovac, Meciar Juxtaposed

AU2510175995 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA
in Slovak 24 Oct 95 p 3

[Commentary by Julius Gembicky: "Will the Second EU Demarche Also Be 'Laudatory'?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As Slovak President Michal Kovac was packing his diplomatic suitcase for his U.S. trip to attend the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the United Nations and to meet President Bill Clinton in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, the leadership of the ruling Slovak National Party [SNS] bade official farewell to him in a hearty Slovak manner. To raise his spirits and wish him a good journey, it let President Michal Kovac know that, still this week, it could consider the possibility of proposing to parliament that it file charges of high treason against him with the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic.

Even before the president's departure, the SNS leadership got the suspicion that the stands he upholds abroad, particularly during his recent visit to the FRG, constitute a criminal offense under Article 107 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic because they severely damage the interests of our young state.

While U.S. President Bill Clinton was honoring Michal Kovac with his favors not only during their talks after the solemn opening of the Museum of Czechs and Slovaks in the U.S. corn belt, but also by his long debate with him during the joint lunch in the UN's New York headquarters, and even dared to pronounce about him the sentence: "Thank you for the way you are leading Slovakia," the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] Presidium, at a meeting held concurrently, hardened its posture. It accused President Michal Kovac of permanently damaging the good name of our Republic and destroying the principles of democracy, law, morality, and human ethics. HZDS Deputy Chairman Arpad Matejka was even more convincing when he declared at a news conference that the HZDS has not yet attacked the president; it has only been reacting to his statements. And, without beating about the bush, Matejka betrayed the nearest plan of the strongest government grouping: "We have to get rid of the problem

of the president very quickly. It is slowing us down." It is a pity that he forgot to add in what. Did he perhaps want to suggest that the president is one of only a few constitutional obstacles left to the concentration of absolute power in the hands of the sole movement that is capable of solving the problems of Slovakia and of which Vladimir Meciar himself is the main current?

When comparing the aforementioned statements, a judicious person should, perhaps, ask one question. How is it possible that the U.S. President and Vladimir Meciar, or his HZDS, so diametrically differ in their assessment of the activity of our head of state? Has even Bill Clinton, about whom Vladimir Meciar claimed only two years ago that he was his friend, also because the U.S. Democratic Party and his HZDS supposedly are so close in their programs, "betrayed" Vladimir Meciar? How is it possible that the U.S. President does not find time to receive his fellow traveler in terms of programs [programovy spoluputnik] but, quite the contrary, utters about the traitor-to-be words that must hurt the SNS: "Michal Kovac is standing here as the leading figure of a new independent nation with a proud heritage and a promising future." How is it possible that State Secretary Jozef Sestak must plead, during [President Kovac's] talks with Bill Clinton, for the reception of Vladimir Meciar and Ivan Gasparovic, and his request remains without a specific response from the American side? In spite of this, the "flagraft of Slovak journalism" [allusion to a recent eight-day voyage of three rafts down the Vah River, sponsored by SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA to mark 1,000 days of the Slovak Republic's independence], the daily SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA, writes on its first page about the U.S. President's wish to meet the Slovak prime minister.

Who is camouflaging matters?

Why do we not want to understand the tactful and diplomatic warnings of major European and American politicians? Why is Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, in defiance of all conceivable efforts by Slovak diplomacy, unable to get an official handshake from German Chancellor Helmut Kohl? Why do we present to our public, at the highest state level, a warning EU demarche almost as a praise of Slovakia under the EU's flying blue flag? Why does the chief of our diplomacy, Juraj Schenk, who, during his visit to Great Britain, is ironing out Jan Slota's and Jan Luptak's unfortunate statements about their vision of Slovakia's neutrality guaranteed by Russia, not dissociate himself unequivocally from such views? And why is he, instead, concealing [British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs] Malcolm Rifkind's concern about developments in Slovakia and the unambiguousness of our path into the EU

and NATO and even denies the official reporting of the trustworthy BBC?

Why is it problematic for Vladimir Meciar's government to dissociate itself from the course of investigation of Michal Kovac Jr.'s abduction? Do we really assume that we will get away with all this abroad? Or are we going to become the whole world's laughingstock when we undertake to interpret an even sharper protest of the EU countries addressed to us—such as is being drafted, according to trustworthy information—as just another praise?

Or are we only waiting for this [demarche], to have an excuse ready before the nation: You see, they do not want us. We have no choice but to turn in the other direction.

Foreign Minister on NATO Enlargement

LD2610104695 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 0900 GMT 26 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk has reaffirmed that the recently released study on NATO enlargement does not envisage deploying NATO nuclear weapons or troops on the territory of new member countries in the first phase.

In an interview granted to Slovak radio and the Slovak news agency TASR during his official visit to Poland, Schenk said that a possible strategic agreement between the alliance and Russia should give a chance to other countries to join NATO and create conditions for launching a building of a comprehensive European security system.

Schenk said that the other aspect of the problems encountered in the discussion on NATO enlargement was the fact that this issue had been affecting the domestic political situation in Russia in the run-up to the elections.

Comment on EU Demarche Declined

LD2610120295 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 0600 GMT 26 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk will end his two-day official visit to Poland today. [passage omitted]

Peter Stano, our special correspondent in Warsaw, is on the line with details about yesterday's activities:

[Stano] [Passage omitted] This is what Juraj Schenk said about the visit to Poland:

[Begin Schenk recording] The visit was well timed. It passed in a very good, friendly, and constructive spirit

and yielded good results. We agreed that we not only have common objectives, but also that the actions and strategies we are opting for are far more similar than we thought before the meeting.

The message I conveyed here, not just to representatives of Polish politics, who are aware of it, but also to the Polish press, was also of great importance. I said that [Slovakia's] efforts to gain full membership in the European Union and a sovereign decision to join NATO are unchangeable and irreversible. [end recording]

We learned while in Warsaw about the report that the EU delivered a demarche to the Slovak Republic. My colleague from the Slovak Republic News Agency [TASR] asked Juraj Schenk for a comment.

The Slovak foreign minister's answer was: I shall not comment for the present. Schenk added that he will comment after his return to Slovakia.

Pro-Meciar Group Privatizes Nitra Printing Plant

AU2510180495 Bratislava SME in Slovak 24 Oct 95
p 1

[Report by "agt, lsz": "Association of Workers of Slovakia, Represented by Jozef Darmo, Co-Owns Nitra Printing Plant"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bratislava—At its 37th meeting on 20 October, the National Property Fund [FNM]

Presidium of the Slovak Republic approved the proposal on the privatization of a majority stake—51 percent of shares—of the Nitrianske Tlaciarne [Nitra Printing Plant] Nitra a.s. The set purchase price is 65 million korunas [Sk], the buyer, the Nitratlac Ltd., will pay to the FNM of the Slovak Republic 10 percent of the purchase price—that is, Sk6.5 million—as a first installment. Originally, Nitrianske Tlaciarne was on the list of companies that were to be privatized within the second wave of coupon privatization. The total book value was set at Sk89.896 million, of which Sk37.53 million worth of shares were to be traded for coupons. Partner in Nitratlac Ltd. is the Association of Slovak Journalists [ZSN], with a stake of Sk80,000. It is represented in the company by Jozef Darmo (ZSN chairman and, at the same time, director of Slovak Television); Jozef Kuchar (ZSN deputy chairman); and members of the ZSN Board Michal Kriska and Gabriel Zelenay (former sports reporter, known as moderator of Movement for a Democratic Slovakia rallies). The other partners are Pavol Lehotak, Marian Janota, and Kamil Beresecky, all three from Nitra district, each with a deposit of Sk20,000. All seven partners are at the same time the company's executives. Three executives must be present during talks—always two from the ZSN and one representing the three other partners. [passage omitted] The ZSN thus acquired the power of decisionmaking in the management of one of the largest regional printing plants in Slovakia.

Reportage on Goncz Meeting With U.S. Legislators
LD2510223695 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 2100 GMT 25 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] President Arpad Goncz has met high-ranking U.S. legislators in Washington. They talked about the situation of the Hungarian minority beyond the border, NATO enlargement, and Bosnia. Miklos Martin Kovacs reports from Washington:

[Kovacs] It would be important to include the matter of the Hungarian minority into the topics of the Bosnia peace talks, Arpad Goncz stressed during his talks with the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives. The Hungarian president emphasized that the Vojvodina Hungarians might lose their weight in the local authorities due to the settlement of Krajina Serb refugees in Vojvodina.

Benjamin Gilman and two other representatives, Tom Lantos and Peter King, inquired about Hungarian-Romanian ties. Hungary is ready to settle relations, but only if a genuine solution can be expected for the matter of the Hungarians living there, Arpad Goncz confirmed. It would not be fortunate if the border between the West and the East were drawn between Hungary and Romania, he added.

Benjamin Gilman, who supports NATO's enlargement, inquired about Arpad Goncz's position. The Hungarian president said that admitting new members will obviously be a political decision and a delayed decision might have unwanted historical consequences. [passage omitted]

Keleti on NATO, Stationing of Nuclear Weapons
LD2510224295 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 2100 GMT 25 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] According to Hungarian Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti, it is not yet appropriate to discuss whether NATO would be allowed to station nuclear weapons in Hungary if we were accepted into the organization. Gyorgy Keleti stressed that giving consent to the stationing of nuclear weapons in Hungary is not a precondition of joining NATO. If the question arises, then the National Assembly will have to take a decision on it, the defense minister told Kossuth radio.

The antecedent of the statement was that Ferenc Somogyi, foreign affairs state secretary, in an American paper called it completely acceptable that the countries joining NATO in the future, among them Hungary, should allow nuclear weapons onto their territories if necessary.

Official: No Military Conflict With Neighbors
LD2610122795 Budapest MTV Television Network
in Hungarian 0600 GMT 26 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Minority problems between Hungary and the neighboring countries have no risk of military conflicts, Laszlo Labody, chairman of the Office for Hungarians Beyond the Borders, said at a discussion forum entitled "Security and Minorities" held last night.

Labody, on behalf of the government, and Ivan Baba, on behalf of the previous government and also as an expert of the matter in the [opposition] Hungarian Democratic Forum, participated in the forum organized by the Security Research Institute. According to Labody, there is no military conflict situation between Hungary and the neighboring countries and, in the lack of political will, there will not be such a conflict situation either.

[Begin Labody recording] I consider every conflict that can lead to a military conflict a traditional challenge. To sum up my opinion, I do not think there is any likelihood of this, either within Hungary or in Hungary's relations with any other country. [end recording]

Baba did not dispute what Labody said. [passage omitted]

Horn Interviewed on Relations With Slovakia
AU2510180595 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
23 Oct 95 pp 1, 14

[Interview with Prime Minister Gyula Horn by Pal E. Feher and Ivan Drabek; place and date not given: "The Basic Treaty Is Unequivocal; Opinions About It Cannot Be Incorporated Into It"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prior to the imminent start of the Slovak National Council's ratification process for the Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Hungary, a document that the prime ministers of the two countries signed in March and whose text has already been approved by the Hungarian National Assembly, we asked Gyula Horn, the prime minister of the Republic of Hungary (celebrating its national day today), to share with PRAVDA's readers his views on the development of relations between our countries and peoples and on the prospects for their historical reconciliation.

[PRAVDA] Mr. Prime Minister, Slovak-Hungarian intergovernment talks have become more frequent and intense recently. Among other things, you have also met with Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar. What is your assessment of these meetings? Some people in Hungary

and Slovakia are criticizing the governments for holding these talks. Your opinion on this would also interest us.

[Horn] Maintaining the ongoing relations with our neighbors is one of the important principles of Hungarian foreign policy. That is, we are convinced that, by doing so, we will also be of the best help to the Hungarian population living beyond our borders. We hold talks very regularly with the Slovak Government and especially with Prime Minister Meciar. This is also discernible in relations between the two countries. Naturally, our discussions at the meetings are not exclusively about the ethnic minorities living in our countries. Let us just mention the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros affair, in which we are striving for an out-of-court agreement that would stave off a decision by the International Court in The Hague. Opposition deputies in the Hungarian National Assembly do sometimes express the opinion that the government should alter its foreign policy. Such criticism is quite natural in a country with a democratic system and it would be wrong if the extragovernmental political forces were unable to express their views. But, at the same time, it is also quite natural that in a country with a democratic system the government and the parliamentary Foreign Committee determine its foreign political principles. So, the occasional criticism that you mentioned can in no way bring about a substantial change in the course of Hungarian foreign policy.

[PRAVDA] The Hungarian Government—and you personally—has set itself the aim of a historical reconciliation with Hungary's neighbors, not just on a declarative level, but in reality. What are your specific views in this regard?

[Horn] I see a need for reconciliation in that, on the level of real policy, we have to put an end once and for all to the constant dissecting of imagined or real historical wrongs. This Hungarian Government has recognized from the outset that the community of European states will under no circumstances admit into its ranks countries that squabble relentlessly among themselves. The basic treaty that we have already concluded with Slovakia may also assist reconciliation. At the same time, however, it is necessary for Hungary to forge—in addition to political agreements at a senior political level—productive relations in the economic and trade spheres. I can cite Romanian-Hungarian relations as an example. That is, our negotiations with Romania on a basic treaty are at a rudimentary stage, but, on the other hand, diverse Hungarian-Romanian joint enterprises are being established on a weekly basis and cooperation between the two countries' armies is also not insignificant. It is possible to describe it as exemplary.

[PRAVDA] The approach to the minorities issue and the means of possibly resolving it are causing considerable concern in Slovakia and Hungary. Naturally, with regard to the issue of the two countries' ethnic minorities, it is impossible to proceed on the basis of the principle of reciprocity. But, at the same time, the countries have much in common in these issues. So-called alternative education, which is being debated in Slovakia, has been applied in Hungary for decades. What is your view on these issues? What kind of steps to support the enhancement of the ethnic awareness of Slovaks in Hungary do you consider to be realistic?

[Horn] I quite agree that reciprocity cannot be the determining maxim of minority policy. The past and the magnitude and circumstances of the settlement of ethnic groups differ considerably, which creates different forms of identity and claims. Taking the differences into consideration is contained in European norms, for example, in the framework agreement on protecting ethnic minorities, and also in the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty, which is of exceptional importance for bilateral relations.

On the basis of the Law on the Rights of Ethnic Minorities adopted in the Republic of Hungary in 1993, there is no obstacle to instruction in the language of the ethnic minorities. Pupils and students belonging to the minorities can—with the exception of Hungarian language and literature—study all of their subjects in their native language. The government is pushing for the teaching of the native language to be as intense as possible and intends to facilitate this with additional budgetary support. The point of view of parents and the local Slovak minority self-administrations is important.

By the way, the Hungarian Government is not 100-percent satisfied with the standard of Slovak instruction and of minority instruction in general and we are trying to improve it. We expect suggestions from the Nationwide Slovak Self-Administration, which was established at the beginning of the year, on how we should develop Slovak instruction so that it is in harmony with the demands of the Hungarian Slovaks. The overwhelming majority of Slovak parents in Hungary are demanding bilingual teaching for their children that cultivates their native language. But, this cannot serve as an argument for turning the Hungarian-language schools in Slovakia into bilingual ones. Hungarians in Slovakia want instruction in their native language; cultivating their native language is important to them. Mastery of their native language on the part of pupils and students provides an appropriate basis for instruction in schools.

The Hungarian Government intends to assist in the nurturing of Hungarian Slovaks' ethnic awareness and is

also taking specific steps in this regard. The aforementioned system of minority self-administrations was also established with this aim. It gives the minorities public-legal status [verejnopravny status] in a manner that—at the same time—in no way curtails the forms of self-administration and support established previously. In response to Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's suggestion for improving—and here I would emphasize the word improving—the status of Slovaks living in Hungary and of Hungarians living in Slovakia, I put forward a proposal to establish mixed commissions that would draft an action program. Mr. Meciar received the working documents positively. Now, it is the Slovak side's turn to respond to this specific initiative, on the basis of which a joint point of view may be formulated and a joint action plan may be drafted. This would also be in harmony with the contents of the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty.

[PRAVDA] In reply to a recent interpellation in parliament—concerning the Hungarian Government's point of view on the foreign Hungarians' endeavor for autonomy—you said that, to date, no international document has been defined, either within the United Nations or under the patronage of the Council of Europe, that would clarify and explain precisely the concept of autonomy and bind governments to granting autonomy to minorities. You also emphasized in your reply that the Hungarian leadership can only advocate among the governments of neighboring countries what the international documents contain. Does this mean that the Hungarian Government will not support the various attempts of individual foreign Hungarians to gain autonomy?

[Horn] The unifying Europe has institutions—I mean, for example, the Council of Europe or the European Parliament—that have, in my opinion, a responsibility to make sure that the democratic rights indispensable for the European way of thinking apply to all of the continent's inhabitants. Therefore, the Hungarian Government in no way intends to interfere in relations between the governments of neighboring countries and the Hungarian minority there. Quite simply, we believe that, during the "test" preceding admission into the EU, it will be absolutely natural that the candidate country will render an account not only of its institutional system of parliamentary democracy or, for example, of its general legal system, but also of the rights of the minorities that live within its borders.

[PRAVDA] Many people in Slovakia and Hungary have given a positive reception to the conclusion of the joint interstate treaty. At the same time, however, some people have also voiced criticism of it. According to this criticism, the basic treaty in its signed form is

not formulated sufficiently unequivocally and, therefore, some people are suggesting that a kind of explanatory note be attached to the treaty. What is your opinion on this?

[Horn] I believe that the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty is formulated quite unequivocally in its signed form. The Hungarian National Assembly has already ratified this text and we expect the National Council of the Slovak Republic to do the same as soon as possible. Naturally, it may transpire that individual paragraphs of the basic treaty will be assessed differently politically. These opinions, however, cannot be incorporated into the treaty.

[PRAVDA] Uniting Central and East Europe with Europe is often discussed. It is as if a competition has been launched in this region among the individual countries. In your opinion, what are the possibilities for resolving these matters?

[Horn] I would in no way talk about a competition among the aforementioned countries oriented toward placing each other at a disadvantage. The resemblance to a contest is perhaps caused by the fact that numerous international economic organizations or research institutes from time to time publish tables ranking the countries in accordance with specific criteria. These include, for example, the element of risk for investors or the ability to repay debts. My view on such tables is that each government must, of course, analyze them thoroughly, but they are not suitable for determining the order of the countries of Central and East Europe from the point of view of their affiliation to the EU.

Will Support MKDM, MPP

LD2510171495 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1400 GMT 25 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungarian Prime Minister [Gyula Horn] will turn directly to Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar with a complaint, if the language bill approved in Pozsony [Bratislava] is contrary to the points included in the basic treaty. This was said by Csaba Tabajdi, political state secretary at the Prime Minister's Office, after talks he held with Slovakia's Hungarian party leaders.

Prior to this meeting, Miklos Duray, chairman of Coexistence, Bela Bugar, chairman of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement [MKDM, MKDH in Slovak], and Laszlo Nagy, chairman of the Hungarian Civic Party [MPP, MOS in Slovak] also met Prime Minister Horn.

According to the Hungarian politicians of Slovakia, the two nation's relations have been continuously deterior-

rating since the signing of the basic treaty, and the language bill, which is disadvantageous for the minorities, is only one of the manifestations of this.

Peto Views Coalition Matters, MSZP Debate

AU2510165195 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG
in Hungarian 25 Oct 95 pp 1, 8

[Interview with SZDSZ Chairman Ivan Peto by Istvan Tanacs in Szeged; date not given: "We Will Not Interfere in the MSZP's Internal Debates"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Tanacs] In your view, what makes the current debate within the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] similar to or different from the earlier arguments between the coalition parties?

[Peto] The debates between the coalition parties were made public in connection with concrete plans of action that did not always seem to be essential. There is no debate on these issues within the MSZP. Today, the debate within the MSZP is about ideological issues and issues that affect the party's political line, as well as on who should be the prime minister and whether the position of party chairman should be separated from that of the prime minister. Of course, there is an issue behind the debate within the MSZP as well as in the debate between the coalition partners which is less obvious to the public, namely the type of policy, economic policy and social policy the government should conduct. Does the government represent a policy that, in the current situation, is possible to represent as a government program, or is there an alternative to this...? Occasionally, one feels some uncertainty regarding the commitment to the accepted government program; at other times, opinions emerge that fully question the economic policy included in this government program. There is this much similarity between the coalition debate and the debate within the MSZP. However, most polemics have emerged in connection with personnel and position matters, rather than on basic issues, because persons representing the economic policy and organizational issues can make commitment to the accepted economic policy doubtful. This is the way a dual structure emerged in which there is a debate on the surface and polemics on genuine issues in the background.

[Tanacs] Does the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] have any interest in what direction the debate within the MSZP should take?

[Peto] The SZDSZ thinks that the coalition is better for Hungary than a one-party government. We think it is better for Hungary to have a good government. There can be a good government if the political forces behind the government are as balanced as possible and are burdened by as little internal debate as possible.

Therefore, the SZDSZ is directly interested in seeing the end of the debates within the MSZP at the upcoming MSZP congress in November, and the government members and the political forces behind them should be able to concentrate on the main task, namely the implementation of the government program.

The Confrontation Should Be Delayed

[Tanacs] The various political forces within the MSZP will probably change little. At most the persons delegated into the government might change....

[Peto] If they have the opportunity and if some issue brings the different views to the surface, the political forces within one party will measure their strength. In the case of a party with considerable differences of views, a congress provides an opportunity for this. If some kind of a consensus or a somewhat acceptable solution emerges at the congress, the confrontation can be postponed for some time, and it becomes meaningless, and it will no longer contain any direct stake. Therefore, in my view, from the viewpoint of the government functioning, it would be better to close these debates at the MSZP congress scheduled for November this year.

[Tanacs] It seems to the public that the prime minister is attacked from the left within the MSZP for his support of the Bokros package and for accepting the social effects of this package. In such a situation, should the SZDSZ openly support Gyula Horn, who took it upon himself to implement the stabilization package?

[Peto] I do not want to analyze or evaluate the debates on the prime minister within the MSZP. For example, Gyula Horn was criticized at the meeting in Hajos; at the same time, he also received support. Others in the MSZP criticize the prime minister in another position and do not support him. I do not think that, in this situation, the prime minister or any group within the MSZP would be interested in having the SZDSZ provide justice in their debate. If we told them what is the right position regarding the prime minister issue by taking any sides, this would definitely mean that the SZDSZ is providing justice.

Will the MSZP Make Any Changes?

[Tanacs] Perhaps the SZDSZ would nevertheless prefer to work together with another prime minister?

[Peto] It is impossible to answer such a question. At this moment, the SZDSZ does not want to deal with this at all. The evaluation of the prime minister is the debated issue within the MSZP today, and I do not know whether this is the main issue of debate or the main possibility of confrontation. In signing the coalition agreement,

the SZDSZ started from the premise that the MSZP would nominate the prime minister. I repeat that, at this moment, we do not want to interfere in the internal debate of the MSZP. Of course, if the MSZP wants to make any changes, something that does not appear in the plans today, the SZDSZ will have to prepare and decide what to do with the possible personnel solutions. However, we are not in such a situation at the moment.

[Tanacs] Will you prepare an evaluation of the achievements of the SZDSZ ministries and ministers in the past 18 months?

[Peto] We are constantly examining the activity of these ministries, but this does not mean that we prepare some kind of a report on what the plan was and what has been achieved. Besides, it is rather difficult to evaluate the activity of a ministry or a minister because, although the SZDSZ delegates the relevant persons, the minister and the activity of the ministry are integrated in the government as a whole, and their achievement can only be separated from the government achievement as a whole by means of a complex evaluation. Therefore, I would not engage in a concrete evaluation now.

We Know What Is Happening in This Country

[Tanacs] Is the SZDSZ leadership aware of what has taken place in the society since the beginning of the stabilization program?

[Peto] We know about many things from personal impressions, and we know many other things on the

basis of statistics and other information. Therefore, we know what is happening in this country. I have been saying for a long time that, in many cases, the issue is not what would be preferable and desirable and what many people already feel as unbearable; instead, the issue is what is it that is possible.

[Tanacs] Does the SZDSZ have a concretely formulated and clear future image today, like the one formulated in the "blue book" of 1989, in the program of the change in the regime?

[Peto] I must honestly admit that I do not like this fashionable slogan that one should at least provide some kind of a future image here. I think one does not have to come up with a future image every year. The parties that identified themselves with the democratic change have formulated their own future image. In simple terms, this means that, after a general restructuring, Hungary should become a European country like most EU countries. This is the future image. I do not think we should often present a more precise image. It is another matter whether we have any ideas on how to achieve this goal. I think we have. Even if we are not always able to put it in practice, partly because of our own limitations, and partly because of outside limiting factors. I think that the part of the Hungarian society that is interested in politics knows this future image. It is alarming, however, that they do not see the road leading to this clearly.

**Izetbegovic's UN Activities, Meetings Outlined
'Truly Bursting Schedule'**

*AU2510203095 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 24 Oct 95*

[Statement by Ivica Misic, Bosnia-Herzegovina ambassador to the United Nations, in New York on 25 October — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] President Izetbegovic had a truly bursting schedule of activities. He met with a great number of statesmen, among them the emir of Kuwait and Slovene President Milan Kucan, and he took part — as is already known and has been widely reported to our public — in the trilateral talks of the presidents of the United States, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina on the pressing issue of an end to the conflict and the signing of a peace agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina — that is, on the continuation of the peace conference in Dayton, Ohio. Afterwards, Izetbegovic met with Pakistani President Benazir Bhutto, Dutch Prime Minister Kok, Bangladeshi Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia, and President of the Maldives Maumoon Abdul Gayoom.

He started his working day today with a meeting with the Azerbaijani President, Mr. Geydar Aliyev, and the secretary general of the OIC [Islamic Conference Organization], (Mr. Algabit Sunid). At the time of this report, our president is talking to Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen.

The domineering topic of all these talks was the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the talks, the collocutors voiced profound sympathies for the struggle of the Bosnia-Herzegovina people for independence, preservation of sovereignty, and territorial integrity, wholehearted support for the just struggle of the Bosnia-Herzegovina people, and wholehearted support for the policy of President Izetbegovic and the republic's leadership. In all these talks, they promised support to the Bosnia-Herzegovina's struggle for its noble goals, not only a political and a moral one but also in the reconstruction of our country after the achievement of the peace agreement.

With the OIC secretary general, President Izetbegovic today discussed the problems involved in the formation, the financing, and the equipment of troops for the implementation of the peace plan in our republic, especially the participation of the troops from the Islamic countries.

President Izetbegovic is yet to have some other contacts here before he travels to Moscow — a trip to which he had agreed following yesterday's talks with President Clinton. In Moscow, Izetbegovic will head a delegation

of our republic at a tripartite meeting with President Yeltsin, the Croatian President, and the Serbian President.

Therefore, we can say of this visit by President Izetbegovic to New York, which was organized to mark the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, that it was primarily a working one, and only ceremonial in those parts required by the UN jubilee.

As is known, President Izetbegovic will return from Moscow to the United States, to Dayton, Ohio, to take part in a conference of the chiefs of the three countries from the former Yugoslavia to agree on a peace arrangement for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

To Attend Moscow Talks

*AU2610113695 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] As has already been announced, Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, will after all travel to Moscow to meet [Russian President Boris] Yeltsin, [Croatian President Franjo] Tudjman, and [Serbian President Slobodan] Milosevic.

This meeting had been uncertain, but will take place after all, before the beginning of the peace talks that are to be held in the United States, it has been learned in our diplomatic circles in New York.

Bosnian Federation VP Opposes Russian Presence

Interviewed in Madrid

*BR2510152195 Madrid ABC in Spanish 25 Oct 95
p 34*

[Interview with Ejup Ganic, Bosnian Federation vice president, by Francisco de Andres in Madrid; date not given: "Ganic: 'We Do Not Want Russian Troops on the Territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Until yesterday, he was just the voice of reason. Now he is also the reason behind the force, the card held by the Bosnian authorities. In this game, Bosnian Vice President Ejup Ganic, who has recovered from a serious car accident, has become a thorn in the side of the government in Sarajevo. A few days ago he openly denounced the division of Bosnia into two. Yesterday, he openly rejected the Russian presence in the peace force.*

Yesterday in Madrid, Ejup Ganic and other authorities in the Croatian-Muslim federation attended the meeting organized by the Spanish presidency of the EU to encourage the future constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina

according to the model set out in the recent Washington agreements. The absence of Serb representatives highlighted the EU's interest in not supplanting the current negotiation process between Russia and the United States. Oh, the modesty of their resources.

[Andres] Why is the 49-51 division of the territory for the Serbs and the Muslim-Croatian federation obsolete, since so far this is the only point that has been peacefully accepted?

[Ganic] The problem cannot be resolved with this distribution. There are only 400,000 Serbs in the occupied territories, that is, just 12 percent of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Giving them half of the territory is not only not fair but it is not realistic either. When peace is achieved, the owners expelled from their land will return to reclaim it and the problem will reemerge.

[Andres] So why are you now asking for more territory? Do you think you are winning the war?

[Ganic] We have a truce that is working reasonably well. In addition, after so many losses in three years of war, it is very hard to say that one has won.

[Andres] What are you going to ask for in the next round of negotiations planned for 31 October in the United States?

[Ganic] We want, above all, to preserve Bosnia. If there must be some kind of division, then it should be fair. Private property must be respected.

[Andres] Will you take advantage of the upcoming negotiations to claim a bigger proportion of the territory?

[Ganic] We will ask for protection of the property belonging to all the citizens of Bosnia, which, by definition, will give us more territory.

[Andres] Will the Bosnian Government accept the presence of Russian troops in the multinational peace force that is to replace UNPROFOR in the event of a peace agreement?

[Ganic] We do not need them. The idea of the Russians participating in the peace force is not a propitious one, because the Serbs will demand that the territories they currently control be supervised exclusively by Russian units. More pragmatically, it should also be noted that the serious internal problems at the Kremlin will prevent them from being involved in Bosnia, unless somebody else picks up the expensive bill.

Furthermore, Russian nationalists are putting heavy pressure on Yeltsin. As soon as he deploys soldiers in Bosnia-Herzegovina this pressure will become almost unbearable.

[Andres] You boast that you are a realist. How do you think you can avoid Russia's presence in any peace agreement supervised by the world powers?

[Ganic] I would like to stress that this is not advisable. Naturally, the Western powers are inviting the Russians more for cosmetic reasons than for any substantial reasons.

[Andres] Are you prepared to accept a division along ethnic lines if the Bosnian Serbs offer you an attractive division of the country?

[Ganic] Bosnia is not currently divided along ethnic lines, despite the brutal "ethnic cleansing" campaigns. The Bosnian Serbs control eastern Bosnia, but they are still a minority of the population there. They also control the "corridor," but they are, and have always been, a minority in the north. They are only a majority in a few areas around Banja Luka. The country is not divided ethnically, but militarily.

Cure of Realism

[Andres] Do you think it is realistic to acknowledge the private property that existed before the war, and for the refugees to return to their land in order to vote in free elections in the future?

[Ganic] If NATO controls the entire territory, then I am sure that it will be possible. If not, then there will be a situation like in Cyprus.

[Andres] For once and for all, you do not trust the United Nations or the Russians.

[Ganic] I am going by the facts. The UN forces have demonstrated their inability in the past.

[Andres] Washington's peace plan puts on paper the unity of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its current borders, but it de facto opens the possibility of the split in allowing the two governments and the possibility of alliances on all sides with neighboring countries.

[Ganic] The partition will be avoided if private property is respected. In this case, the division will be artificial, because the Muslims and Croats will return to the territories controlled by the Serbs, and will once again be in the majority.

[Andres] But is it still possible to have a multiethnic country after three years of ferocious civil war?

[Ganic] Yes! Because the problem was created by political leaders like Karadzic and Mladic, who are now viewed as criminals. The problem was not created by the people, who want peace.

[Andres] If the truce fails and the war starts again, are you prepared to capture the Serb stronghold of Banja Luka?

[Ganic] Of course! The Serbs control more territory than what fairly corresponds to them. If the Croatian-Muslim federation reconquers more territory it will be easier to find a definitive solution to the conflict.

Herzeg-Bosnia To Be Abolished

LD2510220195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 25 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation Government will soon be formed, and the government of so-called Herzeg-Bosnia abolished. This was also confirmed at a meeting of countries supporting the federation, said Ejup Ganic, member of the federation and vice president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, in Zagreb upon his return from Madrid. Nada al-Isa reports from Zagreb:

[Al-Isa] When the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation Government is formed — a solid government that will control all of its territory — as soon as the government of the federation is formed, the government of the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia will be abolished, Ganic said. This stand was supported by representatives of 21 countries — friends of the federation, who recently attended a meeting in Madrid, which was also attended by representatives of the Bosniak and Croat people, Ganic recalled. Representatives of the international community will be present all the time. This was granted at the request of Federation Vice President Ganic, who told representatives of the international community that it was not sufficient for them to invite representatives of the federation for talks every six weeks, but that it was necessary for their international representatives to be present all the time.

Upon his return from Madrid, Ganic gave a lecture in Zagreb's mosque, where he also spoke about the federation. He stressed that preparation work for the federation was proceeding slowly, but it was proceeding nonetheless. However, its implementation cannot begin without the return of refugees to their homes — to Stolac, Capljina, Pocitelj, and Mostar alike. I told the Croats — Ganic stressed — we do not want anything that belongs to you, so do not take what belongs to us.

Positions Outlined Prior to Bosnian Peace Talks

'Sharp Change' in Power Balance

AU2610092295 Paris AFP in English
0044 GMT 26 Oct 95

[By Diane Bartz]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Oct 26 (AFP) — Bosnian peace talks begin next week with a sharp change in the balance of power between the Bosnian government and separatist Serbs because of NATO airstrikes and Croatian involvement in the war.

A lot has changed since the last serious round of peace talks fell apart two years ago in Geneva.

Most importantly, two weeks of NATO airstrikes in September in retaliation for artillery attacks on civilians in Sarajevo cost separatist Bosnian Serbs their military advantage.

Croatian troops, who had retaken portions of Croatia in May and August, seized sections of west Bosnia. And the Bosnian army's Fifth Corps, backed by Croatian artillery, advanced in the northwest. Serbs who had held 70 percent of Bosnia now hold 50 percent, at best.

The Bosnian Serb leadership has also been weakened, with Radovan Karadzic marginalized and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic leading talks for the Serbs. For his own domestic political reasons, Milosevic would dearly love to see the crippling sanctions against Serbia lifted.

As negotiators gear up for talks Wednesday [1 November] at a military base in Ohio in the United States, another obstacle that has been cleared away is the Bosnian government's distrust of its negotiators.

At the earlier talks, one participant complained here recently, negotiator Lord Owen tried to convince the Bosnians that they had lost the war.

US envoy Richard Holbrooke is different, he said. "Holbrooke says, why just one corridor to Gorazde? Why not four?," the Bosnian official said.

But although obstacles have been cleared away, huge problems remain, not the least of which is the balance of political power between the Serb Republic and the Moslem-Croat Federation.

This, a US official said, would likely be the stickiest issue.

Already some Bosnian Serbs have indicated they will push for a confederation with Serbia, something the Bosnian government finds unacceptable.

At the very least, the Serb Republic will want considerably more autonomy than the central Bosnian government will want to cede, although the official indicated that Sarajevo would have to give a certain amount of autonomy to "attract the allegiance" of Bosnian Serbs and prevent secession attempts.

Talks on reconstruction aid are designed to keep the Bosnian government interested in the talks. The "further agreed basic principles" reached on September 26 mandate that foreign policy will be determined by the central, Sarajevo government.

Such things as police and schools in the Serb Republic will likely end up under local control, according to Bosnian officials.

Bosnian leaders are looking at countries like Switzerland — and especially Belgium — as possible models for a nation divided between two disparate peoples.

The September offensive, and subsequent gains for Bosnian and Croat forces, may mean talks over a map will be considerably easier.

Each side holds about 50 percent of Bosnia. This is very nearly the 51 percent for the Moslem-Croat Federation and 49 percent for Bosnian Serb agreed to recently in Geneva.

Still, there will be a battle over the size of the Brcko corridor which connects Serb-held territory in the east and west, and the corridor to Gorazde, an eastern Moslem enclave. US officials may propose a plan under which each of the corridors is the same size.

The right to return for the thousands of refugees who survived ethnic cleansing may end up getting quietly forgotten. "In the abstract it's an important right, but it is going to be a very difficult task," a US official said here privately. "My own guess is that the three parties will sign up to it but it may get muddled later." The official indicated that the war crimes tribunal may end up pushed aside. "It's comparable to the right of return, easy to proclaim in the abstract," he said.

No matter how the peace talks with Bosnian Serbs end up, tension is brewing on another front. Croatian troops, in addition to NATO airstrikes, were instrumental in the Bosnian army's successes in the north, and in fact Bosnian Croats are being allowed to vote in a Sunday election in Croatia. They make up about 17 percent of Bosnia's 4.4 million people. The Bosnian official acknowledged Sarajevo's debt to Zagreb, but also hinted that Sarajevo was suspicious of President Franjo Tudjman and the Croats who dominate southern Bosnia, which they call Herceg-Bosna.

Asked if he trusted Croatia, the official told the story of a Serb who hated Moslems so much he used the dull edge of a knife to slash their throats. He said: "At least the Croats will use a sharp knife."

Opposition to 'Interest Zones'

AU2510170295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 25 Oct 95

[Report on a news conference by the Social Democratic Party, in Sarajevo on 25 October, by Samir Huseinovic — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Social Democratic Party believes it is not good that our delegation has left for the talks in Washington without a unanimous platform adopted at the session of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Niaz Skenderagic [member of the party presidium] stressed that the Social Democratic Party had presented a program for the resolution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis and the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the public. The program clearly singles out the determination for an independent, sovereign, and democratic Bosnia-Herzegovina with the rule of law, freedom, and all principles that are built into the democratic systems of the European countries. The Social Democratic Party favors a federal Bosnia-Herzegovina that will safeguard all conditions for a normal life for its citizens.

We hope, Skenderagic emphasized, that our negotiating team will fight for a country that will ultimately be how the Bosniaks themselves want it, and not the way the terrorist armies or indifferent international diplomacy have shaped it.

The Social Democratic Party believes that each political party could have its own program for a resolution to the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis; however, no one single individual program should form the platform for our negotiating team. The platform for the negotiations should have been approved by the Assembly of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the negotiations, our delegation should represent the state and not any individual political party.

In connection with the arrival of NATO troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the signing of an agreement, Skenderagic said that these troops should be deployed on the outside borders of our country. In this way, the wholeness, the integrity, and [word indistinct] of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be protected. Any deployment of troops along the so-called separation lines within Bosnia would mean establishment of a sort of Cypriot model, which does not give long-term guarantees for the preservation of our country. This concept

does not provide guarantees for the return of refugees either. There are indications that the deployment of the U.S., French, and British troops on the territory controlled by the army and the Croatian Defense Council could be followed by the deployment of the Russian troops in the so-called Serbian Republic. The Social Democratic Party is opposed to the creation of the interest zones by the superpowers on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Does this mean a creation of the new eastern and western spheres of influence and erection of the Chinese instead of the Berlin wall on the Bosnian soil? The reanimation of Yalta on this territory can only generate new clashes.

Belgians Rule Out NATO Combat Troops for Bosnia

BR2510160395 Groot-Bijgaarden DE STANDAARD
in Dutch 25 Oct 95 p 1

[Report by Mon Vanderostyne: "No Belgian Paratroopers for Bosnia"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo — Belgium will not provide any combat units for the peacekeeping force which NATO wants to set up in the former Yugoslavia as soon as there is a peace agreement, said Defense Minister Jean-Pol Poncelet during his visit yesterday to the Belgian UN troops in Baranja. For the first time the minister lifted the edge of the veil covering Belgian plans in Bosnia.

As soon as the warring parties in Bosnia sign a peace agreement, NATO will set up a force which is to monitor the peace. For this peacekeeping force of a maximum of 60,000 troops, Belgium will supply some 1,000 troops, just as under the UN mandate now.

The new troops will no longer be UN troops, but come under a NATO mandate.

Poncelet announced that Belgium would not provide combat units, or combat support units like engineering or artillery. Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Jean Berhin specified that the paratrooper battery would not be sent to the former Yugoslavia. The deployment of Belgian paratroopers had been promised earlier for the NATO troops who were ready to take part in a possible Rapid Reaction [Force].

The fact that Belgium is not providing any combat units or combat support units for NATO's peacekeeping troops confirms the suspicion that Belgium is no longer able to enter into any long-term commitments in these fields — a result of the personnel shortage in the Army.

For the first time in a long while, a C-130 belonging to the Air Transport 15th wing landed in Sarajevo yesterday. The arrival of the aircraft, which is not

part of the regular air bridge, is another sign of the normalization in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the 10th day of a continuing cease-fire.

The Belgian C-130 took Defense Minister Poncelet to Sarajevo for a tour of inspection in Central Bosnia. He was accompanied by Berhin.

At the Sarajevo airport Poncelet and Berhin were offered protection behind two armored fire engines. The flight procedures are still the same as during the war, and require among other things that a helmet and bullet-proof vest be worn. The Belgian C-130 does not have electronic defense equipment, but was equipped with flares to mislead heat-seeking missiles. [passage omitted]

World Bank Official Discusses B-H Reconstruction

LD2210191295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 22 Oct 95

[Passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] We will begin the bulletin with statements by Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic and World Bank representative Kamal Darwish. They held talks today about the methods and conditions for financing the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Fuad Cubukcic has a report:

[Cubukcic] Both Prime Minister Silajdzic and Kamal Darwish, president of the World Bank [name and title as heard], made brief statements immediately after the meeting. Prime Minister Silajdzic expressed satisfaction at being the host to officials from the World Bank, the European Union, the European Bank [for Reconstruction and Development], and the IMF. He said:

[Silajdzic] "All world institutions are here, and this is the best proof that the international community is serious about reconstruction. We discussed everything today, including the ways of involving Islamic countries in reconstruction. I think that this was a good meeting, which represents the beginning of cooperation. As for us, the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has all the documents and everything necessary ready for good cooperation." [passage omitted]

[Cubukcic] Prime Minister Silajdzic also expressed the hope that the plan for reconstruction, as a financial plan with a specific schedule, will be an integral part of the document to be signed:

[Silajdzic] "So, not wishes, promises, and plans, but specific obligations undertaken by the international community within a specific time limit. This should be an annex, or in any event, an integral part of the document

we will sign. So, if a peace agreement is signed, the reconstruction must be the international community's obligation as part of the agreement. This is why these representatives of the international institutions are here."

[Cubukcic] Asked to give an estimate of the damage and money needed for reconstruction, Darwish said:

[Darwish] "We are not yet dealing with any particular figures, but we know that the needs are great. We have to mobilize the international community to meet these needs. I cannot tell you specifically what the estimates are, but we are talking about billions of U.S. dollars."

Further Reports on Implementation of Cease-Fire

Serbs: Muslims Violated Cease-Fire

LD2510221095 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2129 GMT 25 Oct 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Banja Luka, Oct. 25 (TANJUG) — Muslims on Wednesday [25 October] violated the ceasefire in northern Bosnia in the area of the towns of Doboje and Teslic, the Serb Republic army general staff said.

Muslims attacked Serb positions in this area with anti-aircraft and small arms fire, the statement said.

Croatian formations also opened fire on the Orasje front in the region of Bosanska Posavina, but the Serb side did not return fire.

It was quiet on the Herzegovina front, a statement by the local command of the Serb Army in Bileca said.

The two-month ceasefire in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina took effect on the first minute of Oct. 12.

Bosnian Army Honoring Cease-Fire

AU2510190895 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 25 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The units of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army have honored the cease-fire agreement on all fronts in the Bosnia-Herzegovina theater of operations. On the Zvornik and Kalesija fronts, however, the aggressor's forces opened flak fire on our defense lines.

On the Kladaj front, the enemy has been firing infantry arms from its strongholds in Spiljansko Brdo and (?Ahtilje) at the defense lines of our soldiers all day. Our soldiers did not respond to these attacks, thus honoring the orders about the cessation of combat activities. At

the same time, our soldiers remain vigilant to all the aggressor's activities.

Anti-Nuclear Group Claims To Hold French Pilots

LD2510160195 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian
1516 GMT 25 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 25 Oct (SRNA) — A hitherto unknown organization calling itself "Movement for Protection of People and Nature" today sent a letter to the BETA agency. The letter states that its "activists" are "hosts" to the French pilots whose aircraft was shot down on 30 August near Pale.

Following their downing, pilots Frederic Chiffot and Jose-Manuel Souvignat were captured by members of the army of the Serb Republic, but their further fate is not known.

The letter, postmarked at a Belgrade post office, says that the pilots will be released if France immediately ends its nuclear tests and promises not to carry out any more in the future.

The writers of the letter say that the health of the two pilots is "stable," and that "nothing untoward will happen to them." Their families are promised that they will be contacted soon.

The letter does not reveal any details about the organization, nor does it show any concrete or material evidence that the organization holds the pilots.

Humanitarian, Human Rights Situation Detailed

U.S. Official To Investigate

AU2610112595 Paris AFP in English
1112 GMT 26 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Oct 26 (AFP) — The senior US human rights envoy flew Thursday [26 October] to northern Bosnia to investigate reported crimes against humanity in an area where thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Croats are missing, a US official here said.

US Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck was flown to the Bosnian Serb stronghold of Banja Luka by helicopter after getting assurances from Serb officials that he will be guaranteed "full access to areas where he believes crimes against humanity are being committed," the US embassy spokesman said.

Shattuck said Wednesday that Bosnian Serb forces had reopened a number of their notorious detention camps in northern Bosnia earlier this month after a joint Bosnian government and Croat offensive pushed back the Serbs from northwest Bosnia.

Shattuck said that from dozens of interviews conducted in recent weeks in Zenica, central Bosnia, he had evidence of widescale killings and rapes, and said the Bosnian Serb detention camp of Keraterm was among several reopened by the Serbs in the period from October 6 to October 12.

He said he had evidence of "the systematic expulsion of people from their homes, lists of people to be rounded up, and many, many people missing ... many people have been killed"

The number of those missing "runs into the thousands," he said.

German Intelligence on 'Atrocities'

AU2410135995 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
23 Oct 95 pp 170-171

[Unattributed report: "Unambiguous Proof"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Federal Government knows far more details about the atrocities committed by the Serbs than it admits. The Federal Intelligence Service (BND) had provided detailed reports, which are based on eye-witness reports and reports by their own agents, on U.S. material, and also on electronic BND monitoring of telecommunications traffic. The following are excerpts:

It corresponds to a basic pattern of the Serbs' behavior to hide the real scope of human rights violations through diversion. The following methods are comprehensively used for this purpose:

- incomplete, incorrect, or no registration of prisoners;
- transfer of prisoners to other, so far unknown places of internment before the Red Cross checks a specific camp;
- hiding prisoners in inaccessible terrain outside the camp;

Assuming that the people who have disappeared from (the eastern Bosnian enclaves) Srebrenica and Zepa are only a fraction of the people detained in Serb prison camps, several thousand non-Serbs (both soldiers and civilians) are probably still in Serb prison camps, according to current estimates.

The physical abuse and torture of prisoners are characterized by particular brutality. In addition to physical violence, psychological violence is also used, such as threats of shooting or threats to kill or torture family members and friends.

Generally, physical violence is limited only by the perpetrator's imagination: Physical abuse is carried out most frequently through blows with fists or certain

instruments (hammers, butts of guns). Furthermore, prisoners are "tattooed" with knives, their limbs or parts of their limbs are "amputated," or they are forced to maim or kill their own family members, friends, or comrades. In several cases prisoners were reportedly forced to "donate blood" with medically unjustified frequency (several times a week) for Serb soldiers who had been injured at the front.

Since around the end of 1994 indications have been accumulating that non-Serb prisoners have been transferred from Serb prison camps in Bosnia to camps in the Republic of Serbia itself. Thus, some of the Bosniak men who were captured in Srebrenica and Zepa have reportedly been taken to Serbia. From the Batkovic camp in eastern Bosnia, cases have also become known in which prisoners, whose existence had been or was supposed to be hidden from the Red Cross or the UNHCR, were reportedly taken to Serbia.

The existence of a camp in Aleksinac, southern Serbia, has been repeatedly confirmed, where, in addition to soldiers, non-Serb civilians from Bosnia have already been detained under "terrible" conditions since 1992. The majority of the prisoners there seem to be forced to do the most severe kind of forced labor in a coal mine. This camp is reportedly controlled by the Yugoslav Army.

Initial information provided by eyewitnesses who fled from Srebrenica support the suspicion that, after the conquest of the enclave on 11 July 1995, members of the Bosnian Serb armed forces committed large-scale human rights violations against the people there.

Information available now shows that after the capture of Srebrenica about 200 Muslim refugees were detained by Serb forces near Konjevic Polje and were held prisoner in this village together with about 1,600 other Muslim men. On 22 July 1995 400 prisoners were arbitrarily selected and shot dead. Their bodies had to be buried by their fellow-prisoners near the village.

The photographs presented to the UN Security Council by the United States on 10 August 1995 concurrently show a suspected mass grave near Konjevic Polje/ Nova Kasaba. Even though these photographs are not available to us, there are at least six satellite photographs that were presented by U.S. UN Ambassador Albright. They show soccer fields north of Bratunac.

The photographs were taken on different days. The older ones clearly show the intact soccer fields, while later ones show crowds of about 600 people in the middle of the respective field. The most recent photographs show that the crowds have disappeared; instead, one can see that large amounts of earth have been shifted in two

places to the left. The dug-up areas are about 100 square meters and 50 square meters respectively.

Together with the fact that no vegetation can be seen on the fringes of the dug-up ground and that no military facilities are close to the field, the United States considers these to be clear proof of the existence of mass graves.

Furthermore, on 23 July a group of about 700 people was reportedly taken from Konjevic Polje to the village of Uzice on the territory of the FRY.

In addition, it is reported that a group of 200 prisoners were brought back from Konjevic Polje to Srebrenica for "clearing up" on 24 July 1995. There they found about 900 to 1,000 partly disfigured bodies, mostly of Muslim men. The prisoners were reportedly forced to load the corpses onto trucks, transport them to Zeleni Jadar, which is 10 km south of Srebrenica, and throw them into a prepared mass grave near a timber factory there.

In the course of the ethnic cleansing of Srebrenica by the Bosnian Serbs, people who refused to leave their houses were also shot dead.

After his successful flight from Konjevic Polje, an eyewitness, together with other refugees, reached Tuzla after walking for 16 days. On their way he reportedly found hundreds of bodies of his Muslim fellow citizens, who had been left in the woods by the Serbs. The area between Srebrenica and Tuzla was guarded more intensively by the Serbs to prevent the escape of eyewitnesses.

This information is supported by the report of another eyewitness, who, together with several thousand inhabitants, had already fled from Srebrenica to Potocari (about 6 km north of Srebrenica) on 11 July 1995. On 12 July 1995 the Bosnian Serbs reportedly selected 100 young Muslim men from among the refugees in Potocari and shot them down publicly. In addition, Muslim men were reportedly thrown into open fires alive and many girls were raped, including some who were only 12 years old.

The reports are considered to be generally credible. The statements are supported by more information that the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army in Belgrade is "annoyed" about the actions of the Bosnian Serbs. Initial doubts about reports on the atrocities of Srebrenica have been resolved by investigations carried out by the Yugoslav Army, which confirm the extensive violations of human rights.

UN Reports Violations by Serbs

AU2010163895 Paris AFP in English
1602 GMT 20 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Zagreb, Oct 20 (AFP) — The United Nations accused rebel Serbs in Bosnia Friday [20 October] of renewed "ethnic cleansing" and raping under-age Moslem girls amid reports that men of draft age had been separated from a refugee convoy with their whereabouts unknown.

"We have received reports of gross human rights violations against the non-Serb populations of the Banja Luka area from displaced people leaving," said UN spokesman Christopher Gunness. [passage omitted]

"Another report says that a 55-year-old woman in Prijedor who had persistently refused to leave her home was stabbed to death," Gunness said.

All refugees from the Banja Luka area were forced to walk across the confrontation line from Teslic to Tesanj, reports said.

According to another account, all Moslems from the town of Bosanski Novi and neighbouring villages were rounded up at the bus station, where draft-age men were then separated, said Gunness. They were reportedly held there for five days without food or water being provided.

Moslem refugees from the Serb-held area said that the soldiers who were rounding people up were wearing black uniforms and red berets and were believed to belong to units of the Serbs' infamous paramilitary leader "Arkan."

Around 100 people were said to have refused to leave their homes and their fate is unknown, Gunness said.

The displaced people fear that these people have been murdered.

In the ensuing bus journey, soldiers severely beat many displaced people and forced them to sing Serb songs. The displaced people were forced to cross the confrontation lines on foot after being forced to hand over money, he added, citing the reports.

A woman was said to have paid 600 marks (\$420) to get her family across the river.

In Bosanska Dubica, Serb soldiers said to belong to "Arkan's" units rounded up 200 people in a garage, and some lined up against a wall and thought they would be shot.

Gunness added that the United Nations was also extremely concerned about the plight of vulnerable Serbs who had been left behind, particularly in sector north.

Muslims Discover Mass Graves

LD2510195095 Zagreb HTV Television
in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 25 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Serbs are continuing with ethnic cleansing in northwestern Bosnia. Some 150 mainly elderly Muslim men and women, expelled from Banja Luka, Teslic, Prijedor, and Sanski Most, have reached the territory under Bosnia-Herzegovina Army control. There is not a single man of draft age among them and therefore the fate of two to three thousand men — separated from their families by the Serbs during the latest wave of ethnic cleansing just before the cease-fire came into effect — is still unknown.

In the vicinity of Sanski Most members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, accompanied by UN military observers, discovered two more mass graves. Fifteen bodies have already been pulled out from one of them. These were civilians who had been tied up with wire before they were killed. [passage omitted]

Chetniks Accused of 'Massacre'

AU2310162195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 23 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] (Mirzet Karabec), chairman of the Sanski Most War Presidency, has contacted us via ham radio. He speaks about the possibilities for the return of refugees, but also recalls the crimes committed by the Serb aggressor during retreat.

[Begin Karabec recording] Refugees are beginning to return; a group of 210 expelled people returned yesterday. Luckily, they had been expelled a few days ago before the liberation of Sanski Most. I say this because the Chetniks in Sanski Most massacred the innocent population. A few days prior to retreat, that is, before the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army entered and liberated Sanski Most, they killed some 300 innocent civilians, took another 700 in an unknown direction, and expelled another 2,100 who were thus spared the Chetnik massacre [words indistinct] I repeat, a great number of Bosniaks and Croats have been killed. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Serb Refugees Without Shelter

LD2210220895 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2120 GMT 22 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Banja Luka, Oct. 22 (TANJUG) — About 8,500 Serb refugees who have fled to

Prijedor and Banja Luka before the latest Muslim and Croatian offensive are still without shelters, said a local Serb official.

Nedeljko Rasula of the Sanski Most crisis staff said that over 10,000 persons were accommodated in makeshift shelters without any sanitary facilities and that another 1,500 refugees remained in their horse-driven carts on the road between Sanski Most and Banja Luka.

An estimated 40,000 Serbs, mostly elderly people and children, became refugees after the intrusion of Muslim and Croatian troops into the Sanski Most and Prijedor areas shortly before the Bosnia ceasefire took effect on October 12.

With infantry and artillery backing of Croatia's regular army, Bosnian Muslims and Croats continued to seize territory from Serbs in western Bosnia for several days after the ceasefire was enforced.

The hostilities abated on Saturday and Sunday after the warring sides reached a new agreement at Sarajevo airport on Friday.

Sarajevo-Stup Road Reopens

AU2410131095 Paris AFP in English
1204 GMT 24 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Oct 24 (AFP) — A main road linking the Bosnian capital with Stup, just to the west but in Serb-held territory, was opened Tuesday [24 Oct] to UN and aid convoys for the first time in more than three years of fighting.

French General Jean Rene Bachelet, commanding UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) troops in Sarajevo, said it was "a new stage toward peace which shows the UN's efficiency on this, its 50th anniversary."

However Vladimir Radojcic, who commands the Serb Ilidza brigade, said there was "no question for the moment of opening the Stup road to civilians" as long as free circulation could not be guaranteed on all roads between the different Serb sectors.

The Stup road was heavily mined by both Bosnian and rebel Serbs troops who feared it could be used for an attack. It has taken three weeks to de-mine it and quarter French peacekeeping soldiers along the route.

Tudjman Says Croatia Treated With Respect at UN
LD2510200095 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 25 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] At 1720, Franjo Tudjman's, Croatian president and president of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), helicopter landed in Rijeka's Kantrida stadium. He then headed for the main HDZ preelection rally in the Primorje-Gorski Kotar County. On that occasion, President Tudjman delivered an impressive speech. Milivoje Valencic reports:

President Franjo Tudjman stressed that during his stay at the United Nations in New York he had met a number of world statesmen, including U.S. President Bill Clinton. In this context, independent Croatia was met with a great deal of respect. Its political and economic, as well as, military miracle was acknowledged, and so was its role of the biggest regional military force in this part of Europe. All of this would have been impossible without the HDZ at the helm of the Croatian state and leaders who knew what they wanted, President Tudjman said and went on to say:

[Begin Tudjman recording] What remains is Vukovar. I promise you, just as I promised the Croatian people in other places, [crowd chants Vukovar for 15 seconds] you have heard what I said at the United Nations and to the world's most important world statesmen and even to U.S. President Clinton. Croatia is willing to support peace efforts, to liberate in a peaceful way west Srijem, eastern Slavonia, including Vukovar, this symbol of Croatian resistance and suffering, and Baranja, so we can wait and see whether we can reach a peaceful solution by direct negotiations with the Serbs or else in the framework of negotiations that will be conducted in the United States in Ohio. If this is not possible in this coming month then Croatia will carry out new stormy operations.

Dear Croatian brothers and sisters. How did we manage to do all of this? I said, because we had the HDZ. And this is why, as they say, for, the political successes and the economic successes and the military successes have been scored because you had leaders who knew what they wanted and how to get it.

My dear people of Rijeka, ask yourselves together with myself, why did you let Rijeka fail to be in the forward ranks of this HDZ fight for Croatia, for democracy, for Croatian freedom. I will tell you why this was the case. Why, because Rijeka is that Croatian town which the Hungarians wanted to strip of its national identity in the last century, then there were the Italian fascists and finally the communist anti-Croatian leaders. The consequences of this were also reflected in the fact that the HDZ did not win in this Rijeka, a Croatian

town. Consequently, it is high time that you people of Rijeka, Gorski Kotar and Istria join the first ranks in the fight for Croatian democracy and building Croatia. [end recording]

Rebel Serbs 'Close' to Agreement on E. Slavonia

AU2610113595 Paris AFP in English
1118 GMT 26 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Oct 26 (AFP)—Rebel Serbs are very close to agreeing a deal this weekend to avert another war in Croatia which risked upsetting the fragile peace talks due next week over former Yugoslavia, Croatian sources and diplomats said here Thursday [26 October].

The rebel Serbs, holed up in Eastern Slavonia, the last Serb-held strip of land within Croatia, are expected to agree a deal when they meet Croatian officials in the eastern town of Osijek on Saturday, diplomats said.

Croatia holds parliamentary elections Sunday and a breakthrough on the last bit of Serb-held land in Croatia, as well as putting Croatia in favour with the international community, would be a major boost to the ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) party of President Franjo Tudjman.

"It's almost in the bag," said a diplomat after talks Wednesday brokered by US ambassador Peter Galbraith and UN mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg in Erdut, in the rebel-held zone.

"They're very close, but they're not all the way there yet," the diplomat told AFP.

The East Slavonian Serbs had caved in on their demands for a five-year transitional period for the transfer of authority from Erdut to Zagreb, the diplomat said.

The Serbs are now demanding that the transfer of authority take place over three years while the Croatians were arguing for one year, he added.

"If it happens, and we're really pretty optimistic, we think it will be this weekend," he said.

Serb Negotiator Assesses Talks

LD2510190995 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1752 GMT 25 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Erdut, 25 Oct (TANJUG)—U.S. Ambassador in Zagreb Peter Galbraith said in Erdut today that he and Thorvald Stoltenberg, cochairman of the Peace Conference on Former Yugoslavia, would on 27 October submit to the two sides the final version of the draft agreement on the peaceful settlement of the problem of the Srem-Baranja region. [passage omitted]

The head of the negotiating team of the Srem-Baranja region, Milan Milanovic, said that the Serb side today made objections to four of the 11 points of the draft agreement.

Objections to the remaining seven points, he said, would be submitted to Stoltenberg and Galbraith by 1000 [0900 GMT] tomorrow.

"For the first time today we discussed the details of the draft agreement," said Milanovic, reaffirming the readiness of the Serb delegation to resume negotiations.

He specified that the Serb side particularly insisted on guarantees regarding the respect of human rights throughout the Republic of Serb Krajina.

The head of the Serb negotiating team emphasized that both sides needed to demonstrate a great deal of wisdom and tolerance in order to achieve a peaceful settlement.

"In order to prevent war, we must take a step back by agreeing that our region be placed under UN administration. We have taken this step, although everyone knows that the people who live here want to be part of Serbia and Yugoslavia. It is now Croatia's turn," he specified.

Milanovic added that the final agreement, if accepted by both sides, was scheduled to be signed on Sunday, 29 October. [passage omitted]

Ruling Party Poised To Defeat Divided Opposition

AU2610084795 Paris AFP in English
0009 GMT 26 Oct 95

[By Peter Cunliffe-Jones]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Oct 26 (AFP)—Facing a divided opposition, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman's ruling HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] party is slated to win a crushing victory in polls Sunday [29 October] after defeating a Serb rebellion and turning round the economy in five turbulent years.

The opposition, lacking almost entirely in charismatic leadership, has been handicapped by the ruling party's dominance of the mainly state-run media and faces an uphill struggle ousting the government which has led the country from Communist Yugoslavia to national independence, political analysts here said.

President Tudjman was one of the founders of the HDZ—the Croatian Democratic Union—in February 1989.

The HDZ won the first multiparty elections in 1990 and the first post-independence elections two years later and is both nationalist—seeking a purely Croatian Croatia—and generally viewed as rightwing.

It encompasses both so-called "modernisers" trying to turn Croatia into a European-style democracy and "traditionalists" keen on nationalist authority and the habits of the former Yugoslavia's Communist past.

Supported financially by the rich Croatian diaspora, the HDZ has expanded massively throughout the country since 1989.

In the often fog-bound and rather provincial capital Zagreb, HDZ posters showing Tudjman apparently celebrating the Croatian army's crushing of the rebel Serbs in August today appear on almost every street corner, one of the few signs of an otherwise lacklustre political campaign here.

HDZ membership is said to be valuable to those seeking to get on in key businesses and professions.

Last week, the running of the poll and recent election law changes were criticised by the US Congress-funded National Democratic Institute (NDI), a group trying to boost multiparty democracies in eastern Europe.

Tudjman and the HDZ control 90 percent of the country's media coverage while the country's second largest party, the Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLs), was banned from making television advertisements earlier this month and an electoral commission running the elections appears relatively toothless.

The NDI charged that electoral law changes pushed through in September have effectively disenfranchised many Serbs and given the vote to the pro-HDZ diaspora, unfairly benefiting the ruling party.

In the last parliament, the HDZ held 85 of the 138 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

In the October 29 vote, a 127-seat lower chamber will be chosen. The presidential vote will be in 1997 and the opposition fears that as could happen if the HDZ gets a two-thirds majority in parliament enabling it to change the constitution, it will make Tudjman president for life.

"In a society still obsessed by its war and by the 'need' to create a new state (after the breakaway from Yugoslavia), it is very easy to portray any opposition as treachery," a political analyst working at a university here said this weekend.

"So the opposition has a problem."

Zoran Cermak, a former soldier demobilised after the last offensive against the Serbs in August, said he would not vote willing for the HDZ but cannot vote for any of the opposition parties "because they do not offer anything either."

A western diplomat who has been in Zagreb almost since independence agreed. "Whether it is lack of opportunity, or lack of leadership, the opposition has failed to provide an alternative programme: political, economic or ideological," he said.

"The government has established sovereignty over most of Croatia's territory and its economic team has got inflation down and is turning round the economy," he added.

According to opinion polls, the HDZ will get nearly 40 percent of the vote, the HSLs around 20 percent, and another three party coalition around 15 percent.

The rest of the votes will be split among 17 other parties, including Serb and Hungarian interest parties, and the only party showing no national affiliations—the Natural Law Party, which is slated to pick up under one percent of the vote.

According to the western diplomat, however, even if the HDZ does as expected win the elections, afterwards it could be the HDZ's turn to face problems.

"For the moment, the HDZ has had the war against the Serbs to fight and that has kept it together. With peace, when and if it finally comes, the party could well split up into its two or more wings," he said this week.

Seks Views Elections, Eastern Slavonia

*AU2510151495 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST
in Serbo-Croatian 24 Oct 95 p 5*

[Interview with Vladimir Seks, deputy speaker of the Croatian Assembly and HDZ candidate for the 15th constituency, by Branko Vrbosic; place and date not given: "Slavonia Is Also Politically Strong"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] "Slavonia needs a political force." This is the slogan with which Vladimir Seks, until recently speaker of the Croatian Assembly, is trying to win back the trust of voters in Djakovo, Valpovo, and part of Osijek. The voters, as a rule dissatisfied with former assembly deputies, will certainly agree that the slogan is accurate, while Seks will find out in the electoral race in the constituency whether voters consider him satisfactory. Since every election is a risk, we asked him why he did not opt for the security of the Croatian Democratic Community's [HDZ] state list, all the more so since the HDZ in the last elections won in Djakovo and Valpovo by a "hair's breadth" and lost in Osijek.

The Constituency—A Challenge

[Seks] This is not exclusively my decision. I wanted to run in a constituency in the Vukovar-Srijem district, in which I had served two terms, but the party presidency decided that the majority of people from the HDZ

leadership should run in constituencies where each community would like to have its own candidate. This is true of the 15th constituency (Djakovo, Valpovo, and part of Osijek). It would be very difficult to reconcile the different interests and that is why we need a candidate who will be able to neutralize this. That was the main reason that 10 of us, who figure as the stronger people in the party, are going to run in the constituencies.

From a personal point of view, this is a challenge, because in politics a man can be lulled into a false sense of security and, owing to several external factors, can have the wrong picture regarding his value on the political market. Risky, but challenging.

[Vrbosic] The opposition and the trade union are warning voters to read the lists carefully, because the candidates heading the HDZ state list and certain constituencies will certainly not be in the assembly.

[Seks] This is not just true of Croatia. The point is that the head of the list enjoys the greatest reputation, he is the electoral bait who is supposed to overshadow everyone else on the list and thus create among the electorate the impression that they are voting for the president and his most trusted associates; candidates identify with the head of the list. This is an psychological and tactical electoral maneuver used in Croatia, but also worldwide.

[Vrbosic] This is useful for the party, but is it the right attitude toward the electorate?

[Seks] There are other reasons, too. We are talking about a four-year mandate and the party wishes to have wide maneuvering space, so that it can withdraw people from the legislative and representative bodies of authority into the realm of executive authority and vice versa. [passage omitted]

We Will Not Allow Playing for Time

[Vrbosic] This region has a problem that makes everything else contingent on it: occupation. Negotiations are under way, while our "neighbors" are sending us messages via various negotiators, Arkans, and generals. Is there a chance of peaceful reintegration?

[Seks] Croatia has approached the negotiations with sincerity, but without any illusions. For Croatia, these negotiations are truly the last alibi and crucial evidence for Croatian policy that it has exhausted all chances for peace within the U.S. initiative, despite being aware that nothing would probably come of it. Croatia needs this important evidence, so that no one can condemn it if it chooses to use military force. Since it is the U.S. initiative's firm stance that the occupied areas are part of Croatia and Belgrade and the political leadership of the Serbs in the occupied areas are refusing to accept

this as the fundamental stance, Croatia has a free hand to solve this in the manner of Storm and Flash [military operations to liberate the western Slavonia and the Knin regions].

Personally, I do not believe that Milosevic, the lord of war and peace in that respect, has the political strength to force them to comply or first to agree himself and then force them to do so, because he can remove this "warehouse personnel" [allusion to eastern Slavonian Serb leader Goran Hadzic, who used to be a warehouse attendant] with a flick of the finger or a telephone call. [sentence as published] He can order them immediately to initiate negotiations and concrete measures that would mean the reintegration of those parts into the Croatian state, but I believe that he has neither the political will nor strength for this and that he is using it as a trump card for Bosnia. The only result of the negotiations will be Croatia's trump card before the international community to go ahead with military action. Following the collapse of the negotiations and the UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia mandate, the world will insist that negotiations continue, but the political and military situation is such that Croatia will no longer tolerate playing for time.

[Box 1, p 5]

The HDZ Core is Intact

[Vrbosic] The third HDZ convention and Mercep's and subsequently President Tudjman's address are still being talked about.

[Seks] The party consolidated its ranks a long time ago and the core of the HDZ or its policy cannot be touched by any "side current" or "wind." Mercep had been warned several times that he had to understand that no one in the party could set ultimatum-like political demands. Therefore, this is not about some sort of Mercep line, but rather a personal stance that led him to cite irrational reasons for expressing certain curious political demands regarding personnel policy in internal affairs and the army. He believes that he should have a more prominent place in the party, but this assessment does not correspond to the party's assessment.

[Vrbosic] Has the influx of people from other parties strengthened the HDZ?

[Seks] Like any movement, the HDZ at a time when it was being created could not encompass all levels, particularly those in state structures that are by nature cautious. The HDZ very often remained with the first challengers, who narrowed the movement's scope. As soon as a firm organization began to take shape, they felt that they were the "guardians of the revolution"

and they shut the doors to a part of the population that had not joined at the very beginning. This led to a paradox: We wanted to be maximally open, but these "guardians of the revolution"—out of the best of intentions—prevented this. The party, however, cannot evolve in this way. This is why some people in the party assess that nothing has been gained. I believe, however, that something has been gained and time will tell whether they can truly integrate. Earlier, very well known names like Vladimir Veselica and others also came, but they could not find themselves in the party.

[Box 2, p 5]

Only Three Parties in the Assembly

[Vrbosic] What are you expecting from the elections and what result do you anticipate for the state lists and in the 15th constituency?

[Seks] I want the HDZ to have a strong majority, which does not have to be a two-thirds majority, and Racan's Social Democratic Party [SDP] to cross the election threshold with 7 to 8 percent of the electorate, because Croatia needs the social democratic left. I want to see the Croatian Party of Right [HSP] just marginally cross the election threshold, as well as the Croatian Peasant's Party [HSS], and the Croatian Social Liberal Party [HSLs]. This is the desired outcome, but the reality will be that the HDZ will come very close to a two-thirds majority. The SDP will not cross the election threshold because the left is disunited and factionalized, and neither will the HSP. The Croatian parliament will comprise the HDZ, HSS, and HSLs and, therefore, it will be a three-party assembly with representatives of the ethnic minorities.

This time, Croatian voters should give the majority of votes to the HDZ because it is capable of handling power and simultaneously politically mature. We have established the shortcomings of transformation, privatization, and the establishment of legal order; those from the opposition who would like to implement state policy would need a lot of time to master this. Second, this would be experimentation because they have neither the political experience nor the information needed to carry out policy.

Therefore, it would not be good for Croatia for power to change hands until its "east" is completely secure and it is precisely in the next four years that we need to achieve complete territorial integrity, security, and internal and external stability; after that, there will be no danger in a change of central authority.

Commentary: HDZ 'Not Playing Fair' in Election
AU2510124895 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian
23 Oct 95 p 5

[Commentary by Nino Djula: "The More Money and Connections You Have, the Better Your Election Campaign"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At least 32 million kunas or somewhat less than 9 million German marks [DM] is how much each political party should pay if it wants to be as extravagant in the election campaign as the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ]. According to a rough assessment that we have made, this amount is the least that the ruling party will have spent for a three-week campaign whose aim is to obtain two-thirds of the seats in parliament in the coming election, as Franjo Tudjman, its chairman, has said. Those voters who are happy to receive a salary that exceeds a three-figure sum can only become dizzy with such huge numbers. This heap of money would be enough to pay almost 23,000 average monthly salaries of 1,300 kunas. Furthermore, a recent scientific study made by Studio Weber shows that the average Croatian citizen has to make ends meet with 990 kunas in his pocket, so it is easy to calculate that the costs of the HDZ election campaign could have, according to our modest estimate, enabled as many as 30,000 people to survive through October.

In stable and rich countries, which cannot be compared to Croatia—no doubt about it—much more money is spent on election campaigns, but they are conducted according to better democratic principles, so the poor Croatian population should ask itself: "Where does this money come from?" This is the question that we asked the HDZ election staff.

"Our calculation is 0.000," Vesna Lusic readily informed us, which totally confused us. So we went on by asking: "Does this mean that the HDZ will not be paying for anything?" The lady tried to hide her hesitation, causing a new one at the same time: "You are engaged in irresponsible journalism and your calculation is pure 'real-socialism.' I can buy a jacket for DM100 in one shop that could cost 10 times more in another." Regarding concrete information about the HDZ election budget, Mrs. Lusic recommended that we contact Mr. Miomir Zuzul, the chairman of the election staff. He was, however, very busy the whole day.

It is true that the discrepancy between the sum that we obtained through a simple calculation and the money that the HDZ will pay into the accounts of its creditors could be huge. Some opposition parties, the Croatian Peasants' Party most of all, have already warned the people that the HDZ might not pay the highest costs

at all, such as its presentations on state-run radio and television. This must not be ruled out, because there is the impression of a strong connection between these two centers of power.

Business Between Croatian Television and the HDZ

It has already been published that the chairwoman of the election staff of Croatian Radio-Television has become used to sitting in the HDZ election staff for hours every day. (Let us mention that we tried to talk to Mrs. Marija Peakic-Mikuljan at least 10 times, but unsuccessfully, since she, too, was very busy.) Was it Croatian Radio-Television that undermined the campaign of some of the opposition parties, forbidding the featuring of their allegedly inappropriate television spots, on grounds that were later declared void by the Constitutional Court? Who else, if not Croatian Radio-Television, has characterized HDZ election meetings as "people's" meetings, to be able to report on them without the application of the strict rules applied to other parties? Have some of the HDZ election meetings not been chaired by Branko Uvodic, who is the deputy manager of Croatian Television in charge of marketing?

If we know all this, it is difficult to believe that the business between the HDZ and Croatian Television is clean. The price list of Croatian Radio-Television's marketing services includes a provision that allows for manipulations: A discount of up to 12 percent is given for large orders and even larger discounts are negotiable with Mr. Parac, the general manager of Croatian Radio-Television. It would be interesting to hear what Parac will be charging his party boss for the HDZ promotions on Croatian Radio-Television.

Since it can only be speculated about what kind of a settlement Canjuga made with Parac, we made a calculation of the HDZ's television campaign costs by taking the average prices from Croatian Radio-Television's price list. According to this, a broadcasting second costs about 300 kunas. Assuming that the HDZ will be broadcasting up to 15 spots of 30 seconds each every day through the 20 days of the campaign, we have reached the sum of DM980,000, including the production costs for these spots. The HDZ music spot, in which 10 well known musicians participate, is featured at least twice a day. It lasts for 4 minutes, that is 240 seconds, which would be 150,000 kunas per day. For the 20 days during which this spot will be broadcast, the HDZ should pay DM810,000. The biggest item is the recording and half-hour presentations of election meetings, which—assuming that there will be 20 programs like this—amounts to as much as DM2,800,000.

Two-Day Program on Zagreb's OTV

The Zagreb OTV channel charged an opposition party 20,000 kunas for an hour-and-a-half program. The HDZ ordered from this local station coverage of its two-day party convention, which, together with propaganda spots, cost DM135,000. The broadcasting of several events such as the luxurious one at Zagreb's Intercontinental Hotel would cost as much as DM500,000.

We have reached a figure of DM175,000 as our assessment of the costs for the production and broadcasting of spots on 97 local radio stations, assuming that on each of them the HDZ will appear just five times per day for approximately 30 seconds, which means 97,000 presentations. The publicity in newspapers, based on current price lists for advertisements and a detailed analysis of the HDZ's advertising activity during the first election period, costs DM190,000. The HDZ political marketing with its "jumbo posters," other posters, and leaflets, including distribution costs, will cost DM1,075,000 according to the price lists of printing firms, publicity agencies, and students' "labor exchanges."

Preparing and holding election meetings is not a negligible item, either. In this case the calculation includes the costs for the installation of stages, lights and recording equipment, fees for performers, travel expenses, hotel costs, gasoline, etc. Here is only a part of the calculation: It is assessed that 20 HDZ politicians on average go on a promotional trip, accompanied by the same number of staff, and by 30 people from the president's security service. Average travel expenses per day are 140 kunas and hotel costs amount to 200 kunas per night, while a liter of gasoline costs 4 kunas. The renting of the video screen, which is a part of the choreography of HDZ meetings, costs DM40,000. For a 20-day engagement Alen Vitasovic will get DM90,000 and Gibonni DM70,000 [singers]. The total costs for HDZ election meetings amount to approximately DM800,000.

Who Is the Sponsor?

Speaking of artists, I should mention that the opposition parties cannot afford to hire famous singers to participate in their promotional activities. For the very simple reason that the ruling party offers more. The question is again: "Where does this money come from?" Is the HDZ being supported by its rich members or by some other sponsors to whom the party will give something in return? Will the expensive HDZ promotion be paid from party coffers at all? Or out of television license fees or from the budget? We hope not?!

The budget is quite inaccessible to the opposition parties. Therefore their campaigns are poor, which jeopardizes their election success. All the major opposition

parties together will spend about DM1.5 million on the election campaign and, if they succeed in entering parliament, they will get an election campaign allowance of 80,000 kunas each.

Last but not least, it must be mentioned that the sum of DM9 million, the estimated costs of the HDZ election campaign, does not include the costs that this party incurred for preparing the election campaign and for the promotion that started even before the official beginning of the campaign, which was 9 October. If we were to add, for example, the costs of the opinion polls conducted by the HDZ among the voters or the president's tour of Australia, where he promoted the interests of his own party, this sum would certainly double.

In the war of posters, messages, spots, and meetings, which is now drawing to an end as election day approaches, one party is obviously not playing fair. But why, for God's sake? Does the party that knows anyway that it will win need to commit such great offenses in the election campaign? Is the fabulous sum of DM9 million really the price for the victory of the party that does not seem to doubt that every Croatian citizen of age wants "to be embraced by the HDZ in a safe future?"

Tudjman Said to Control HDZ

AU2510125495 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
17 Oct 95 p 7

[Article by Branko Podgornik: "Who Is Up and Down on the New Croatian Democratic Community Top List—and Why"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After the Third Convention of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ], observers are trying to figure out the significance of some personnel changes at the very top of the ruling party.

Comparing the composition of the old party leadership and that of the new one, it is noticeable that some remained at the very top of the HDZ, around President Tudjman, while others were either promoted, demoted, or are gone altogether.

Top List In the Wake of the Second Convention

Let us recall who was elected to the party leadership at the Second Convention two years ago. Mate Granic (with 1151 votes in favor), Gojko Susak (1120), Franjo Greguric (1097), Marijan Sunjic (785), and Nikica Valentinc (697) were elected vice presidents. All of them were proposed by Franjo Tudjman personally.

Djuro Decak (1000 votes), Djuro Brodarac (787), Antun Vrdoljak (707), Hrvoje Hitrec (685), and Ivic Pasalic

(674) were elected into the party presidency. All except Hrvoje Hitrec, who was put up as a candidate at the party assembly and was adopted, were proposed by Franjo Tudjman. Actually, the president proposed Hrvoje Sarinic as the fifth member of the presidency, but he could not get enough votes.

Let us not forget that, according to the HDZ Statute, both president and secretary general and—if they are members of the HDZ—presidents of clubs of HDZ assembly deputies, presidents of chambers of the National Assembly, president of the HDZ Youth, and prime ministers, are also members of the presidency by their position. And so Stjepan Mesic and Josip Manolic were also members of the former party presidency for a while—until they left the party—and were replaced by Nedjeljko Mihanovic and Katica Ivanisevic sometimes in the middle of last year. Apart from them, Ivan Milas, Vladimir Seks, and Ivan Valent, who ran the Club of the HDZ Deputies in the National Assembly, Chamber of Representatives, and Chamber of Counties, were also members of the presidency.

Jure Radic was elected party secretary general at the Second General Assembly and was later replaced by Zlatko Canjuga. However, according to the changed party statute, the secretary general is now appointed by the HDZ presidency and the National Assembly has nothing to do with it.

Two New Vice Presidents

The Third Convention did not appoint five members of the presidency, like the last one, because the changed statute says that five party vice presidents are also members of the party presidency. At President Tudjman's proposal, the Third Convention elected the following vice presidents: Mate Granic (1150 votes), Gojko Susak (1147), Jadranka Kosor (1003), Ivic Pasalic (1002), and Franjo Greguric (964).

If we compare the old and the new vice presidents who are also members of the new party presidency, we can see that those who are left are Granic, Susak, Greguric, and Pasalic (he did advance a little), while Nikica Valentic is no longer a member of the party leadership proper or even of the Central Committee.

Jure Radic, Zlatko Canjuga are no longer members of the party leadership proper either, probably because they failed to meet somebody's expectations, but they did become one of 80 members of the Central Committee. The rumor in the corridors of the "Vatroslav Lisinski" Concert Hall, which hosted the HDZ convention was that Ivan Valent—who was then president of the Club of HDZ Deputies in the Chamber of Counties and member of the Central Committee—could become the

new HDZ secretary general. If that should happen, the politician originally from Hrvatsko Zagorje (just as Zlatko Canjuga) will climb high on the ladder of the party hierarchy.

Djuro Decak, Djuro Brodarac, Hrvoje Hitrec, and Antun Vrdoljak are also conspicuously absent from the party leadership proper. They all became members of the Central Committee. Katica Ivanisevic and Nedjeljko Mihanovic—and rumor has it that he will no longer be chairman of the Assembly—also became members of that committee. It remains to be seen who will be new Assembly officials and presidents of clubs of deputies.

Party Leaders Included on the Election List

In order to take a good look at the personnel changes in the HDZ leadership, we must also consider the party state list [državna lista]. As a rule, assembly deputies also become members of the HDZ Main Committee (in addition to members of the Central Committee and government members, heads of counties, mayors, officials from major bodies of the state and others).

Out of first 20 candidates on the HDZ state list for the 1992 elections, 15 are no longer there on this year's list. Some of them went over to the Croatian Independent Democrats. Only five of them remained among the first 20, with Ivic Pasalic advancing best of all, having climbed 39 places to the very top of the list. There are 45 new candidates on the HDZ state list, while 35 are gone.

It is common knowledge that Vice Vukojevic, Gordana Turic, Sime Djodan, Adam Mestrovic, Ante Klaric, Boris Segota, and many others are not on the state list. However, Gordana Turic and Adam Mestrovic became members of the HDZ Court of Honor, and candidates were put up by President Tudjman. Klaric became president and Segota member of the HDZ Supervisory Committee. There is a great deal of speculation that Ante Klaric will be assigned an important role in the Croatian judicial branch. Vukojevic was put up as a candidate for Andrija Hebrang's deputy minister and the elections in the Sesvete election unit [izborna jedinica] and will become a deputy only in the event a HDZ candidate should win and if Hebrang remains health minister.

The Mercep Theorem

Observers noticed that, after the Third Convention, people like Tomislav Mercep—with whom President Tudjman publicly had a determined and uncompromising dialogue—were pushed aside. Interestingly enough, explaining why Mercep cannot be put up as candidate for member of the Central Committee, the president used

similar words as at the Second Convention, when he prevented the candidacy of the representatives of the so-called Slavonian, authentic HDZ line, for party leadership proper. In both cases, the president emphasized that the candidacy would provoke an unpleasant backlash by European Christian-Democratic and other circles and that it would recoil on the position of Croatia and prevent it from being included in European institutions.

In short, the HDZ Third Convention pushed aside all those who, from the left or the right, deviated too much from the so-called presidential faction, which established itself in the party in the past two years.

That mother faction is trying to push aside former divisions in the HDZ and transform it into a modern national party, so that the HDZ remains the main player on the Croatian political scene in the next couple of years.

Analysts Predict Economy Will Improve in 1996

AU2610083995 Paris AFP in English
0017 GMT 26 Oct 95

[Report by Peter Cunliffe-Jones]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Oct 26 (AFP)—After four years of war economy, black markets and rampant inflation, the slimmed-down Croatian economy is finally expected to turn the corner in 1996, benefiting from peace and economic reforms, economic analysts here say.

"Croatia is rich in human resources, well educated people, especially in the technical areas. It has one of the more market oriented people in eastern and central Europe," said an official at a western embassy in Zagreb.

"If it weren't for the war it would be right up there with Poland and Czech Republic and ahead of Slovenia," he said.

The Croatian economy has featured little in official campaigns for parliamentary elections due Sunday but the state of the economy is increasingly important politically, diplomats here say.

The Serb-Croat war that erupted after the breakup of former Yugoslavia in 1991 is estimated by officials here to have cost Croatia some 23 billion dollars in direct losses up to the end of 1994 and some 30 billion dollars in indirect losses.

As well as losing tourist income, spending on military equipment and armed forces and war damage, the country has also through the war supported some 400,000 displaced people and refugees, mainly Croats and Bosnians.

Western analysts agree that the economy is set to grow this year, for the first time since 1991, suggesting gross domestic product (GDP) will grow one percent this year in real terms though saying output last year stood at closer to 12 billion dollars than the 16 billion officially claimed.

This is well down from the 25-30 billion dollars seen in the heydays of the late 1980s, before war broke out, and the effects on the population have been harsh.

"It is certainly true that there is an economic elite here, but the mass, the majority, is finding life quite difficult," said an official at a European embassy.

Inflation, often an early consequence of war, leaped to 660 percent in 1992 and 1,500 percent in 1993 before falling to nearly 40 percent in 1994 and is expected to drop to three or four percent this year, according to government officials.

Last year, agriculture accounted for 13.7 percent of output, industry 36.5 percent and services, including government services, tourism and shipping about 49.8 percent.

Economy Minister Nadan Vidosevic in 1993 introduced a stabilisation programme, fixing the local currency—now known as the kuna—to the German mark and working hard to keep down the government deficit.

But unemployment over recent years has on official figures stood steady at around 17 percent, despite the need for rebuilding work, while the average salary in June 1994 was just 331 German marks a month.

An opposition leader, Vlado Gotovac of the Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSL), criticises Vidosevic for increasing the divide between rich and poor.

But the world financial institutions express striking confidence in the government.

"There has been considerable progress from the economic team here to privatise and turn this round into a market economy," a spokesman for the London-based European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) said Wednesday.

"This year we will have taken a 240 million dollar exposure in Croatia, financing infrastructure projects, opening credit lines ... and signing next week a 60 million dollar financing agreement to expand and restructure Pliva," Croatia's biggest pharmaceuticals company, he added.

However the outlook is not all good and analysts say direct foreign investment remains low—amounting to just 250 million dollars over the past four years according to western economists here.

A key problem area, all analysts agree, is the financial and banking sectors which is seen by western banking specialists as over centralised and over-exposed on bad debt.

"The big banks' portfolios are in bad shape. It needs a fairly severe clean up," the visiting head of a British banking group said recently.

'Ina' Oil Conglomerate Said To Be in Trouble

AU2510114795 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA
in Serbo-Croatian 21 Oct 95 p 11

[Article by Zorislav Antun Petrovic: "'Ina': Three Managers Within a Year"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Less than half a year after Vladimir Koscec was appointed "Ina" [Croatian Oil Industry] general manager for four years, he was released—at his own request—from his duties as general manager of Croatia's largest company. The Board of Directors released Koscec at its meeting on 13 October 1995. Mr. Andrija Kojakovic, Koscec's former deputy, was appointed to the position of "Ina" general manager. This was reported by "Ina's" internal paper on 14 October 1995, and by the press three days later. The former manager of the "Elan" company of Begunje and "Varazdinska Banka" of Varazdin resigned from as "Ina" general manager much more quietly than was the case with his appointment.

Koscec's predecessor, Franjo Greguric, announced at a news conference at the beginning of April that he was resigning as "Ina" general manager. The "Ina" Assembly met several days later and elected the new seven-member Board of Directors, which appointed Vladimir Koscec new general manager with a 4-year mandate on the same day.

In his own words, Koscec accepted the position of "Ina" general manager as a professional manager guided the idea of managing and reshaping the company like similar companies in the world. He also assessed that that was the reason for his appointment. The appointment of the former "Elan" manager was somewhat of a surprise, since there had been speculation about several better known candidates who were given much better chances.

Restructuring in Three Stages

"Ina" has suffered more than \$0.5 billion in losses as a direct result of the war, while indirect losses are measured in hundreds of millions of dollars. The largest Croatian company, which, according to some assessments, accounts for almost a third of the Croatian economy, had to take massive efforts during the last years, from the contribution it had to make for the

defense and establishment of the Croatian state to the purchase of some not very profitable companies such as "Polikem" of Zadar, "Inavinil" of Split, or "Vartilen" of Varazdin. It has also invested money in other branches of the economy, the ship-building industry for example, in which it invested \$180 million. At the same time it has cut the number of employees from the 36,000 it had five years ago to the present 25,000, without giving a single one of them notice. These burdens have left traces in the company in spite of its power.

At a Croatian Government session at the end of March [1995] it was announced that "Ina" would be restructured in three stages: The company's legal organization having been partially restructured last year, the restructuring of its financial organization and business activities were to follow. It was planned to make "Ina" a vertically organized corporation with a multi-dimensional management and clearly defined profit centers. After the first two stages were successfully carried out, the third—the gradual privatization in line with state policy—had to be accomplished.

Greguric soon resigned as "Ina" general manager, and the new management started working on the program for financial consolidation and restructuring, which, according to the new general manager, was assessed positively by World Bank experts. The new management established that "Ina" had too much long-term debt and that it had to finance certain investment programs that could not produce a return on investment, so it was proposed, among other things, that these liabilities be taken over by the state, while the company would concentrate on its core activity. Specifically, out of \$720 million in foreign debt the state should have taken over \$252 million, and "Ina" would have given it the "Dina" company of Kutina and several other companies in return. The proposal was submitted to the government for discussion in September, but in October the new general manager was appointed, the second within less than half a year.

Something Does Not Work

The reorganization of "Ina" regarding the definition of its core activities, such as oil surveying and production, the processing of oil in refineries and trade, is coming to an end. Apart from that, the "Ina Polimenri" company has been established with the aim of merging the plastics industry with "Ina." The plastics industry, together with the "Petrokemija" Company, the tourist branch of "Ina," and some of its ancillary activities should be privatized in agreement with both the government and banks, but the basic condition for the privatization of these activities is the company's financial consolidation, on which Koscec was working.

Andrija Kojakovic, the latest manager, is excellently acquainted with "Ina's" business activities and reorganization plan, since he has had several responsible assignments during the last twenty years, beginning with the "Ina-Petrokemija" [manager] in Kutina to the function of deputy general manager, but it is still unclear how it could happen that in a company that is so important for the Croatian economy in general three managers have been changed. At the moment it is almost impossible to obtain specific information about the reasons for these changes. Neither Koscec nor Kojakovic are prepared to issue a statement.

In his last statement issued as "Ina" general manager, Koscec pointed out that the relationship between "Ina"

and the state had to be the relationship between two proprietors. He stressed that "Ina" had solved many of its problems during the war together with the state, not sticking to its interests only, and success could have been achieved only if the company had done business professionally. Before he took up his new duty, Koscec was asked by reporters whether there was anything that might force him to give up, and he answered that this could be the case if he saw that something was going wrong. The government has not officially adopted a position on the proposal for financial restructuring submitted to it in September by the then "Ina" management, but it looks as though something has gone wrong.

MIC Reportage on Greek-FYROM Relations

Protocols on Relations Signed

AU2510184795 Skopje MIC in English 25 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The delegation of the Macedonian Foreign Ministry which took part in the negotiations with the Greek side in Athens last week, announced at yesterday's news conference in Skopje that five protocols had been concluded. The head of the delegation Ljupcho Arsovski stated that the protocols deal with the opening of liaisons offices, customs regulations, green cards, visas and transport and connections.

The liaisons offices will be opened in coordination, in the capital cities, with the agreed characteristics, title of the heads of missions, privileges and immunity, in accordance with the Vienna Convention.

The liaisons office in Athens, provided it is in a private house, will have a board placed on the fence with the coat of arms and flag of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], while a board with the name Republic of Macedonia will be placed in the front part of the entrance door. The Greek side has the right to place a sign with the temporary name FYROM some distance away from the gate of the fence. In the lower part, it will be stated that the board was placed there by a third party.

One of the more significant things to come from the Athens meeting is the resolution of the question with the "green cards," since the recognition of this document, which is issued by the Macedonian National Bureau of Insurance opens the possibility for the same document to be recognized by all EU members soon.

It was said that the normal cargo transportation between the two countries is expected to start soon. Namely, 60,000 metric tons of crude oil have already been unloaded in the Salonika port, which were supplied by the Skopje Refinery, as well as 6,000 metric tons of zinc. The Macedonian engines have already crossed the border, which means that the transportation of these raw materials will soon start. To the question regarding the refusal of Greece to issue visas to citizens born in the Aegean part of Macedonia, the journalists got the reply that the practical problems will soon be the topic of new discussions. As to the question whether these citizens were even mentioned in the negotiations, the journalists were told that it did not matter where who was born, but, for the Macedonian delegation, all the people with Macedonian passports are citizens of the Republic of Macedonia.

To the question whether they had any information that the tourist agencies were already thinking of not accepting citizens born in Aegean Macedonia in busses

travelling to Greece, since they could not risk having their busses turned back, the response was that they had no such information. The journalists received a similar reply to the question regarding the fact that upon entering Greece, Macedonian citizens are forced to write FYROM instead of Republic of Macedonia in the forms they are given to fill in. According to Jovan Cicakovski, chief of sector in the Interior Ministry, this ministry does not have any such information. He added that it has been agreed that the Macedonian citizens can write the Republic of Macedonia, however, the Greek side has the right to write FYROM over that, and that no one has the right to force the citizens of Macedonia to write FYROM.

Visa System Described

AU2510184995 Skopje MIC in English 25 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In the negotiations, it was suggested to the Greek side to abolish the visa regime, or to at least simplify the use of the travel documents, however, that was not accepted. It has been agreed that some other documents can also be requested beside the travel documents upon the issuance of the visas, namely, a personal ID card.

In effect, there will be four types of visas: a tourist visa for one trip, transit visas, visas for several trips, valid from 3 to 12 months, and diplomatic visas. The tax for a tourist visa for one trip will cost 900 denars, for more than one trips—from \$22 to \$80, for transit visas—\$10. Furthermore, in order to simplify the protocol, groups visas can also be used, for groups that consist from at least ten persons. The possibility has also been left open for the future realization of the visa-passport regime, and this agreement will remain in effect up to the moment of the inclusion of Greece in the Schengen agreement, when the provisions from this agreement will be applied. Up to the opening of liaisons offices, visas will be issued at the very border points and in the diplomatic-consular missions.

Skopje Refinery To Resume Work After 18 Months

AU2510210995 Skopje MIC in English 25 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] After an 18-month break caused by the Greek embargo, the Refinery "Skopje" will resume the production of oil derivatives from the beginning of next month, MAKPRESS reports. For this purpose, the refinery has already purchased 60,000 [metric] tonnes of crude, light, Siberian oil, which has arrived in the Salonika port. Its distribution from Salonika to Skopje is expected to start these days.

The daily transportation dynamics would be from three to four thousand tonnes of crude oil. If everything goes

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according to plan, the plants in the refinery should start working around the 5th of November.

For the start of the heating season, the refinery is announcing there will be sufficient quantities of crude oil with 1 percent sulfur, which is the best possible combination from an ecological aspect.

Official Silence on Gligorov Attempt Questioned

AU2510211095 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA
in Macedonian 25 Oct 95 p 3

[Commentary by Z. Petrov: "How Much Longer Do We Have To Wait for Information on the Investigation?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It has been three weeks since the assassination attempt on President Kiro Gligorov of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and the authorities remain silent about the first and unique such event in Macedonia's history. For over 20 days, the people were only "nourished" with two news conferences by the Interior Ministry—the first, at which some policemen were most probably ordered to meet the correspondents and convey in a completely unqualified manner some technical aspects of the attempt, and the second, which was held at the U.S. Information Service, at which Dime Gjurev, deputy secretary of public security, showed maximum efforts in saying absolutely nothing about the assassination attempt. Only a few pieces of information could be derived from these two official news conferences, and they were related to the physical act—that is, to the technical part of the terrorist act, with which the public is already more or less familiar with.

Police Without Evidence

For instance, it is officially known that the explosive was placed in a "Citroen Ami 8" with Kumanovo license plates, which was bought at the car market in Skopje on 24 September—nine days before the assassination attempt. On this basis and according to the description by the former owner from Kriva Palanka, a computer sketch of the buyer was made, which is why the police questioned dozens of people. It is also known and officially confirmed that an economic explosive activated by a remote control was used in the attack on President Gligorov. The drawings and schemes that were presented at the news conference confirmed that the explosive was placed very professionally and directed by two sand-filled bags (another unofficial version says a bucket was also used) in order to achieve

maximum effect against the target. In this sense, we should understand the very ambiguous statement made by Deputy Secretary Dime Gjorev that the assassination attempt, according to the way in which it was carried out, reminds one of a well-known terrorist group. This is more or less the hitherto response of the official investigation.

Speaking about the investigation, which has also been conducted under great secrecy so far, unofficial sources say there are no details about the possible executors. As we have been informed, the police are extremely involved, over 2,000 people have been summoned for questioning, strict controls have been implemented on the border, and all enterprises using explosives have been thoroughly investigated. The final version that has not yet been made official is that the Macedonian police do not have any concrete evidence that could indicate the executors. As for the tracks, they are out of the question at this time.

Slipups in Security

It is true that political assassination attempts are usually the most difficult to clear up. However, there is one thing that the public will have to be informed about, not by the police or deputy secretaries in the Interior Ministry, but by top officials in this institution—and that is the analysis about police procedures before and after the assassination attempt. So far, it has been concluded, although not officially confirmed, that the entire security force (from the Directorate for Security and Counterintelligence to the service for the president's security) made slipups in protecting the president. Unfortunately, this has not been confirmed and will have to be explained at a future news conference—why were all the streets around Hotel "Bristol" not blocked off just after the assassination attempt? Is it necessary to note that after such events, all accesses to the place of the incident are usually closed and checked out (at least in identifying passersby), knowing that the executor will try to hide among the mass of curious people? It was exactly the opposite that took place on 3 October—the police were dispersing the citizens. Moreover, is there a need to explain why the car bomb and the president's car, as top evidence, were removed from the place of the incident only a couple of hours later? We recall that answers to these questions are more than necessary because it has to do with routine procedure by the police and investigative bodies that were not respected on the critical day. Someone will have to answer why.

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MACEDONIA****FBIS-EEU-95-207****26 October 1995**

Just three weeks after the criminal act that took place in the center of Skopje, keeping quiet "in the interest of the investigation" has not only not produced any effect but threatens to become counterproductive. Namely, although there is not a conscious tendency for this, there is the impression among the public that something

is being secluded. That is why a countereffect and speculations that are not always well intentioned are created with hesitation and avoid confronting the "hot" questions.

Bartoszewski, SR's Schenk Discuss Bilateral Ties

LD2510212995 Warsaw PAP in Polish
1717 GMT 25 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 25 Oct— Polish-Slovak bilateral relations and cooperation within the Visegrad Group were the topics of talks on 25 October between Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk and Polish Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski. Schenk had talks with the Sejm and Senate speakers and delivered a lecture on Slovak foreign policy before the Senate Foreign Affairs Commission. He also met representatives of the Slovak community in Poland.

Both foreign ministers agreed that there had been no serious differences or controversial issues in Polish-Slovak relations; each state proceeds along a different path toward integration with the Western structures, but both want to cooperate as far as efforts aimed at full membership are concerned. The ministers also discussed drafts of bilateral agreements still being negotiated and concerning border cooperation, and cooperation in health and social insurance that would make life easier for citizens of both states.

Schenk stressed that integration with European and transatlantic structures remains a permanent goal of the foreign policy of the Slovak Republic [SR]. He resolutely rejected discussion on "ambiguous orientation" of Slovakia and gave assurances that, as far as the priorities of foreign policy are concerned, there had been consensus of parliamentary political parties, and the present government confirmed this in its programmatic declaration.

Walesa Leaves for Florence Peace Meeting

LD2210124595 Warsaw PAP in Polish
1016 GMT 22 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 22 Oct—On Sunday morning, President Lech Walesa left for Florence to take part in the ninth international peace meeting. The president's participation in the proceedings will be unofficial and religious.

The president will return to Warsaw on Monday afternoon.

Grants Interview on Presidency

BR2410142195 Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA
in Italian 24 Oct 95 p 8

[Interview with Polish President Lech Walesa by Sandro Scabello in Florence; date not given: "Walesa's Last Resurrection"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Florence—[Passage omitted] [Scabello] Mr. President, you have never seemed

worried, even when your separation from Kwasniecki seemed impossible to resolve. Where do you get such confidence?

[Walesa] I have not yet reached top speed; my motor is still running at half-speed. I do not want to go too far or be too ferocious. If you knock out your adversaries too soon, you have nobody with whom to train.

[Scabello] Now, 15 years after Gdansk, you are having to struggle against a communist. How does it feel?

[Walesa] The communists feel threatened and are presenting stubborn resistance. In Poland, as in the other postcommunist countries, the Left commands 20-30 percent of support, whereas the remaining 70 percent, which I call the profreedom movements, have split, fragmented, and this is why we do not prompt much interest or create much of a sensation. But, if the communists continue to act in a united manner and to gather successes, they will stimulate unity on the other front, too, which could rally 10 million people to prevent a return to the old regime in Poland. There would be a final reckoning in the country.

[Scabello] Are you referring to the possible union of the right-wing forces behind you in the elections?

[Walesa] No, this is a picture of the present situation in Poland.

[Scabello] The Left is identified as a threat to democracy. Do you really believe that?

[Walesa] Soviet communism comprised two fundamental elements—the totalitarian management of power and a planned economy. Now the communists have opted for the market economy, but as far as the exercise of power is concerned, they remain closely bound to centralism. If we succeed in transferring power down to the lowest levels, we will pull the carpet from under their feet. Be that as it may, we are bound to coexist with the heirs to communism for another five years. One thing is certain: The communists never give anything for nothing, and, when they embrace capitalism and grow wealthy, they defend their assets even more fiercely than others.

[Scabello] Your adversaries maintain that the most serious threats to democracy come from your own authoritarianism.

[Walesa] I consider a strong presidency necessary during this period of transition. We must change many of the laws that were in force during the communist era, but parliamentary proceedings move slowly, the debates are never-ending. The president must have the right to establish some order, to set priorities and hierarchies. When I talk about governing by decree, I certainly

do not intend to limit freedom and democracy: I am thinking only about how to make parliament grant priority to this or that law.

[Scabello] Are you sure that most Polish voters will grant you their confidence again?

[Walesa] The country needs a revolutionary president, with a desire to innovate and struggle. If the old ideas were to triumph, the reforms would be paralyzed.

Platforms of Top Presidential Candidates Compared

WS2610090795 Poznan WPROST in Polish
29 Oct 95 pp 30-31

[Article by Boguslaw Mazur: "What Will the Future President Do? Position Vacant"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] We are presenting an attempt at an analysis that was developed not so much on the basis of the platforms of the most serious presidential candidates as on the evaluation of their performance to date and the circumstances under which they might have to act.

Aleksander Kwasniewski

Finances: Having to choose between a coalition with the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] or the Union of Labor [UP] led to the introduction of six tax brackets, which means that huge sums of money will be taken away from the few so as to give small sums to many. One may expect further stabilization of the zloty.

Privatization: The candidate declares he supports it, yet it is rather doubtful whether he would join forces with the governing coalition to accelerate it upon taking office. In other words, privatization—yes, but slow and cautious.

Agriculture: A coalition with either the PSL or UP will most probably mean that the current structure of the farming sector will be retained, or at most that reforms will be slow.

Social Issues: A rather slow and cautious pace of reforms of the pension and health-care systems. Reforms would be accelerated only in the face of an imminent threat of the collapse of the public financing system.

Domestic Policy: Retaining the current presidential system, albeit modified. The current political scene causes the necessity to either rely on the current governing coalition or form a new coalition with UP.

General Views, Relations With the Church: Liberalization of the abortion law, ratification of the Concordat upon the constitution's passage, tense relations with the church.

Foreign Policy: Integration with NATO and the EU, cooperation with Germany and Russia.

Overall Characteristics: Well educated, modern, intelligent, good-looking, young, successful.

Lech Walesa

Finances: He generally supports the stabilization of the zloty. He understands the dangers of excessive tax burdens. He will suggest that a fixed part of the budget be allocated to the Army, education, health care, culture.

Privatization: He has thus far supported the policies of the post-Solidarity governments. Returning to the concept of mass enfranchisement modeled after the Czech kuponovka [coupon privatization] cannot be ruled out.

Agriculture: He has not shown a lot of initiative in this area. Thus, he will insist on neither retaining the current structure of the sector nor reforming it to match West European standards.

Social Issues: By using populist slogans, he will try to play the role of a "defendant of the people," regardless of what the government is. Depending on the circumstances, he will either suppress or incite vindictive tendencies.

Domestic Policy: The introduction of strong presidential rule, dissolution of the parliament, taking control of the Armed Forces. An attempt at constructing his own political camp.

General Views, Relations With the Church: Retaining the ban on abortion, ratification of the Concordat before the constitution is passed, good relations with the church.

Foreign Policy: Integration with the EU and NATO; a probability that concepts similar to CEMA-II and NATO-II will be presented.

Overall Characteristics: The most famous Polish politician, whose star, however, has already considerably faded. Slightly out of step with the times. Successful, but a tough player.

Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz

Finances: The basic point of her platform is the universal lowering of taxes. Most probably tax abatements for families with many children. Decentralization of state finances, further stabilization of the zloty.

Privatization: Yes, but by way of implementing the mass enfranchisement project. Substantial curbing of state ownership.

Agriculture: A gradual reform of the farming sector targeted at enhancing the competitiveness of Polish agriculture.

Social Issues: Reform of the pension and health-care systems as a precondition of healing public finances, most probably protection of families with many children.

Domestic Policy: Decentralization of the state. Dissolution of the parliament. Relying on a new rightist bloc led by the Christian-National Union.

General Views, Relations With the Church: Support for the ban on abortion, ratification of the Concordat before the new constitution is passed, submissiveness toward the bishops.

Foreign Policy: Integration with the West but on the principles of a "Europe of nations." Preferential treatment of Ukraine and the Baltic republics in the East.

Overall Characteristics: Resembles Margaret Thatcher. Not much political experience to boast of. Emphasizes her religiousness.

Jacek Kuron

Finances: Stresses the need of moderate taxation, the stabilization of the zloty, and taxes, as well as decentralizing state finances. Tax abatements for companies offering additional insurance for their employees.

Privatization: Acceleration, particularly in the so-called strategic sectors; will encourage foreign capital, limit state ownership. Preferential treatment of domestic capital.

Agriculture: Modernization, development of the food-processing industry and services to eliminate unemployment. Attempts at obtaining funds from Europe for the restructuring of the farming sector.

Social Issues: A deep reform and a partial introduction of market mechanisms to the pension and health-care systems. Emphasis on the health and education systems.

Domestic Policy: Encouraging an agreement between civic and political forces in solving the most important problems of the country. Limiting the right of veto, presiding over cabinet sessions.

General Views, Relations With the Church: Against penalty for abortion. A willingness to develop good relations with the bishops, some of whom will attack him anyway.

Foreign Policy: Speedy integration with the EU and NATO. Cooperation with neighboring states and the whole region. Clear-cut guidelines of foreign policy.

Overall Characteristics: The most popular Polish politician, yet not readily seen in the role of president. A social activist, substantial political experience.

Tadeusz Zieliński

Finances: "It is not the aim of the president to oversee the economic policies of the government," he states in his platform. It is very likely, however, that he will support eliminating huge differences in the incomes of citizens. Possibly a decentralization of public finances.

Privatization: No definite views, but he might support mass enfranchisement.

Agriculture: Preference for social protection at the cost of slowing down the pace of reforms.

Social Issues: Emphasis on social security and employee rights, equal access to culture, education, and health care.

Domestic Policy: Respect for the law and tolerance. Supervision of foreign policy and the defense carried out with the help of the government. At least in the beginning he would rely on UP.

General Issues, Relations With the Church: Against penalty for abortion and violating the principles of the neutrality of the state. He might come under attack from the church.

Foreign Policy: Integration with the EU and NATO coupled with an unwillingness to cover the costs it entails.

Overall Characteristics: A legalist, well educated. Fit rather for an "ornamental" presidency. Not very deft as a politician.

TV Prevents Broadcast of Candidate Bubel's Program

LD2510212495 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1700 GMT 25 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Polish Television prevented the planned broadcast of Leszek Bubel's election program after the prosecutor's office impounded the tape with the program pending investigations in progress.

In an earlier development, Wieslaw Walendziak, Polish TV chairman, reported to the prosecutor's office the existence of conspiracy to sneer, slander, and defame people of Jewish origin in a free election broadcast by Leszek Bubel.

A request to instigate proceedings against Leszek Bubel had also been made by Aleksander Kwasniewski's election committee.

The prosecutor's office is currently investigating four incidents connected with Bubel's election campaign.

Minister Flies in MiG-29, Views Military Budget

*LD2510212295 Warsaw TV Polonia Network
in Polish 1830 GMT 25 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko paid a visit to the First Fighter Squadron at the invitation of National Defense Minister Zbigniew Okonski.

The main attraction was the finance minister's flight in a MiG-29. After the flight he talked with Defense Minister Okonski and General Tadeusz Wilecki about the National Defense Ministry budget. Being on the path to NATO, you have to modernize the equipment, especially the Air Force, which is the basis of defense in the contemporary world, the deputy prime minister said.

[Begin Kolodko recording] Over the next few years, we have to modernize this equipment to match the technology and quality requirements that will be expected of us when we are in NATO. I think it is just a matter of time until we become a full NATO member. Our Armed Forces, including the Air Force, have to match all of the requirements. [end recording]

Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko thinks the government and parliament will allocate the appropriate level of funds for the purchase of new equipment.

Wilecki's Rise to General Staff Viewed

*96EP0001A Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish
14-15 Oct 95 pp 14-16*

[Part I of a serialized article by Wlodzimierz Kalicki and Krzysztof Grybos: "The Hat Under the Four-Cornered Cap" (reference to the cap worn by the Army); for Part II, see FBIS-EEU-95-202 of 19 October 1995, pp 49-54]

[FBIS Translated Text] For the last six years, the military and civilian establishments have been battling about the place of the Army in the Third Republic.

"The Army and military facilities in this country should not be a ball being kicked by the political parties in order to score goals against each other or against the government. Such a game demoralizes the military, especially the higher officers, who are trying to gain in importance and power with the support of the political parties." (Jozef Pilsudski as interviewed by KURIER PORANNY on 9 January 1924.)

The military has spoken. To be sure, it is not the cannon that speaks; it is the generals. The Army high command

has decided to enter the world of politics. The political class has reacted torpidly, if not permissively, to the claims of the generals, with some patting the politicking military on the arm and others protesting feebly.

Public opinion is calmly looking on at the skirmishes between the Army high command and the government and at the impotence of the Sejm. This is surely due to the traditional sympathy of Poles for their military and the universal ignorance of the consequences of the political ambitions of the generals.

The Green Black Box

The structure and military plans of the former Polish People's Army were totally subordinated to the plans of the high command of Warsaw Pact troops. Line units were of a definitely offensive nature. The armored and mechanized divisions deployed in western Poland were prepared to take part in the first strike against the German Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark. They were to strike in accordance with Moscow's doctrine—with massed medium-quality tanks without regard to any huge losses.

A considerable part of the Army consisted of engineer, sapper, quartermaster, rail, road, and supply units. In eastern Poland, they accounted for an overwhelming majority of the troops deployed there. The unnatural proliferation of these auxiliary units ensued from the role which Moscow had ascribed to Warsaw in its planned future conflict. Poland was to be principally a strategic supply hub for the Soviet armies once they were going to strike at West Europe. The citizens of the Polish People's Republic knew practically nothing about the Polish People's Army. After all, a major objective of that Army was to mask its existence. It was to be enough for the citizens to know that the Army was there, that it drills, rescues flood victims, helps out in harvests, and builds the Warsaw-Katowice Highway. As to the cost of that Army, its equipment, and, most importantly, its real worth and the extent of its independence, such questions were forbidden.

The Communists always treated the military and the ministry of internal affairs as their exclusive fiefs. The political opposition tacitly accepted this. In the 1970s the independence-minded milieux considered various ways of emancipating the society and limiting the power of the Communists, but their scenarios did not consider the Army's future. The advisers and leaders of Solidarity adopted, immediately after its emergence, the principle that no one within Solidarity would attend to military affairs. They feared that exploring contacts with the military would be viewed by the authorities as undermining the structures of the state; on the one hand,

this would alarm Moscow, and on the other, provide an occasion for political provocations. Contacts with the Solidarity National Committee were being explored only by a few officers (including one of the generals, who later emigrated), but until the martial law era Solidarity avoided even talks with the military.

Only after the martial law was over did a few officers in active service organize an opposition group which issued in Warsaw a periodical called HONOR I OJCZYNA. It was intended for the officer cadre and had considerable circulation. Some of the conspiring officers were arrested. It is interesting, however, that not one of their readers wearing military uniforms had denounced them—the authorities uncovered that conspiracy when a structure of the civilian underground happened to become exposed.

Still, contacts with a few Army conspirators were not enough. The opposition joined the Roundtable deliberations and the 1989 elections without having the least idea about the military. No one within the opposition was familiar with the organizational structures of the military, their dependence on the Warsaw Pact high command, and the views of the generals and the officer cadre. No one even had a broad vision of what kind of military was needed by a democratic Poland.

The military were viewed as a pillar of the authorities, a strong pillar, because it was thought that the officer corps were corrupted by the authorities, that most were party members and would defend the old order until the end. The 1989 elections showed otherwise. In many electoral districts in which a substantial and sometimes even largest segment of the electorate were the families of the military, a large number of votes was cast for Solidarity lists. The officers, especially the younger ones, were ready for a change.

The Time of the Reformers

Actually, however, changes within the military began earlier, as early as in the mid-1980's. The Communist authorities had slashed the defense ministry's budget and the numbers of military personnel owing to economic problems. Thus at the time, the then Army high command began to switch from an offensive to a less aggressive strategy. Emphasis was shifted from first-strike armored divisions to the more multipurpose mechanized ones. In addition, defense ministry heads began to eliminate the rear-echelon units which were principally intended to provide logistical services for Soviet troops. Unfortunately also Territorial Defense units were reduced in size. A side effect of this measure was the disappearance of Polish troops from the voivodships adjoining the country's eastern boundary, because only

auxiliary and Territorial Defense units had been stationed there.

During 1988-89, General Jaruzelski replaced the commanders of all three military districts. The new commanders were the Generals Zygmunt Zaleski, Tadeusz Wilecki, and Zdzislaw Stelmazuk; they were young and not linked to the old Army high command dating to as far back as World War II, whom the officers mordantly nicknamed "the platoon of machine gunners from Ryazan" [where the Polish People's Army was formed in the Soviet Union]. The commanders of the Air Force and civilian defense also were replaced. It was then also that Gen. Jaruzelski decided to disband the Main Political Directorate of the Polish Army—the political gendarme of the military and, to the civilians, a symbol of the subservience of the military to the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party]. President Jaruzelski appointed Rear Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk as the liquidator of that directorate, that arm of the PZPR Central Committee.

The appointments of new men to commanding positions facilitated adjusting the Army to the new political realities, but at the same time, this postponed the need for an urgent restructuring and personnel purges, which the military greatly feared.

But Solidarity was in no hurry to make drastic changes. In April 1990, Prime Minister Mazowiecki appointed two new [the first civilian] deputy ministers of national defense, Janusz Onyszkiewicz and Bronislaw Komorowski, a director at the Office of the Ministerial Council. The previous lack of interest in national defense on the part of the democratic opposition was such that the two appointees had to begin by familiarizing themselves with the personnel, structures, and informal arrangements within the military. As both recall now, that was extremely difficult. Many, if not most of the officers offering cooperation to these two men, were motivated by frustration and feelings of personal wrong done to them in Communist Poland. Most generals were not eager to cooperate, if only because they bore in mind Onyszkiewicz's comment that defense spending should be reduced by 20 percent. It was only in the late autumn that the new deputy defense ministers decided that they were sufficiently familiar with the operating mechanisms of the military and the personnel of the Army high command. Even so, the Mazowiecki government refrained from initiating any radical changes within the military.

In July 1990, the Sejm recalled Gen. Florian Siwicki from the post of minister of national defense and appointed in his stead Vice Admiral Kolodziejczyk. The new minister also was in no hurry to introduce changes

within the military. During the Mazowiecki Administration, the heads of the ministry of national defense chiefly focused on acquiring information about the organizational structure of Western defense ministries.

Serious work on restructuring the military was initiated in 1991. On the basis of a decision by Prime Minister Mazowiecki, but by then under the premiership of Krzysztof Bielecki, a commission for restructuring national defense was appointed. It was chaired by the then head of the Office of the Ministerial Council, Krzysztof Zabinski. The commission's report in July 1991 was accepted by the government and by the Committee for National Defense, inherited from the Jaruzelski Administration. It was then that the approach to restructuring the military and the introduction of a civilian minister of defense were formally decided upon.

Owing to the report of the Zabinski Commission the Sejm in October 1991 amended the first part of the Law on Universal Defense Training, which to this day remains the basic legal act regulating the activities of the ministry of defense and the military. At the same time, the small constitution was voted into being. The powers of the president as the commander in chief of the Armed Forces, are delineated so vaguely in the Law on Universal Defense Training and in the small constitution that both these legal acts have been an invitation to disputes and conflicts about who is in command of the military.

The Army of Mr. President

At first Lech Walesa feared the military.

It is hard to tell whether the reason was that he had ended his military career with the rank of a corporal, his experience during the martial law era, or absence of contacts with the military while exercising the duties of the presidency, along with unfamiliarity with the operating rules within the military. Lech Kaczynski recalls that when he became a minister of state at the Presidential Chancellery, Lech Walesa openly told him that he feared the generals. At that time the president agreed with the views of a radical group of officials, including those from the National Security Bureau, who wanted the command cadre within the military to be politically vetted. In a conversation with a deputy minister of defense he declared that, should the military make trouble, "generals will be turned into sergeants and sergeants into generals."

The "war at the top" and the deliberate breakup of the Solidarity political camp by the president soon made Lech Walesa aware of the need to gain the support of forces outside the political scene. In February 1991, the task force of the Minister of National Defense held

a meeting that was so organized as to exclude the attendance of the civilian deputy ministers of defense. It was attended by the president and the head of the National Security Bureau, Lech Kaczynski. At the time, Lech Walesa gave a speech addressed to Admiral Kolodziejczyk and the generals in which he declared, "Gentlemen Generals, I trust you totally and believe in your patriotism. In this domain, you should be the bosses, because civilians know nothing about it."

Many politicians of various orientations agree that this was a momentous meeting. At the time, Walesa declared his rejection of the radicals within the National Security Bureau and opposed the idea of "acceleration," that is, of an accelerated replacement of the military cadre. He promised the generals relative safety and exclusivity in reforming the military, and in return he expected political support of the military.

That also was how the generals interpreted the president's speech.

The meeting in February 1991 was also momentous in another respect: it was the first of the meetings between the president and the generals at which civilian politicians were evaluated by the military under the patronage of the head of state.

Since then, representatives of the president have been trying to influence personnel decisions at the ministry of national defense and within the military as well as legislative work concerning the military. Soon after his election to the presidency, Lech Walesa demanded of Minister Kolodziejczyk that he dismiss deputy ministers Komorowski and Onyszkiewicz. He viewed them as supporters of his electoral contender, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, and as opponents of the subordination of the Armed Forces to the president. These attempts failed.

Later, during the work of the Zabinski Commission, Lech Kaczynski, representing Walesa, clashed with Deputy Minister Onyszkiewicz. Kaczynski demanded that the military be explicitly subordinated to the president, but Onyszkiewicz resolutely opposed this.

Shortly before the National Defense Committee approved the report of the Zabinski Commission, including the principle of a civilian minister of defense, Mieczyslaw Wachowski [then Walesa's confidant] informally attempted to retain control of the ministry in military hands. He declared to the politicians in charge of national defense that the military would not accept the principle of civilian leadership, that, to be sure, this is an ideal solution, but in Polish conditions, it is hardly feasible. He even said that 20 years would have to pass before the climate for civilian control of the military would be right.

His attempt, too, had failed. Early in July 1991, the National Defense Committee approved the recommendations of the Zabinski Commission.

In 1991, the president linked his hopes for influence with the military to Minister Kolodziejczyk. At the July meeting of the National Defense Committee, he declared that he supported either Krzysztof Zabinski or Lech Kaczynski for the post of minister of defense. He also declared that his nominee for chief of the reformed General Staff was Minister Kolodziejczyk, sitting next to him.

No one, including the then Prime Minister Bielecki who was present, declared himself opposed.

The then Chief of the General Staff Gen. Stelmazuk, was unpopular with both the generals and the politicians.

His unpopularity among the generals derived from the fact that Gen. Stelmazuk was a sapper, whereas the generals preferred a chief of staff whose military career would, as the Army lingo goes, proceed "along the chain of pure [field] command." Moreover, both the generals and the politicians thought Stelmazuk to be too soft and unable to make the military obey him. This opinion was not changed by the fact that on other substantive issues, such as that of the subordination of the chief of the General Staff to the minister of defense rather than to the Polish president, Gen. Stelmazuk often disagreed with Minister Kolodziejczyk.

Lech Walesa's plans collapsed after the Olszewski government was formed and Jan Parys became the first civilian minister of defense. Parys's first major decision was the sudden retirement of Admiral Kolodziejczyk without consulting anyone. The president, whom in principle Minister Parys should have consulted first, learned about that decision from a TV newscast on the last day of December 1991. The relieving of an officer from active military service is an irrevocable decision, and since then Piotr Kolodziejczyk ceased to be the president's nominee for the chief of the General Staff.

Minister Parys soon proved to be a dogmatic political visionary. He desired a rapid vetting of the [communists in the] Armed Forces. Unexpectedly, the Chief of the General Staff Gen. Stelmazuk became his loyal ally. At the time it was thought at the Belweder that it was precisely Gen. Stelmazuk who would facilitate eventual purges within the military, since he would make his professional expertise available to the new minister, given the latter's unfamiliarity with the personalities and structures of the Armed Forces.

That was when the president and his advisers realized that the chief of [General] Staff had to be replaced first, before the minister of defense.

In March 1992, the president repeated more explicitly to the generals his opinion that civilians know nothing about military matters and that the nation's defense should be entrusted to the military.

Soon afterward, on the president's recommendation, Minister of State for National Security Lech Kaczynski and Director of the National Security Bureau Jerzy Milewski toured all the military districts and larger units. Their objective was to sound out higher officers about whom they considered the most suitable candidate for the chief of the General Staff to replace the then still officiating Gen. Stelmazuk. The higher officers in practice recommended two generals one of whom was Gen. Tadeusz Wilecki, the commander of the Silesian Military District.

Gen. Wilecki was visited by Jerzy Milewski who asked him to stop by at his office at the National Security Bureau the next time he visited Warsaw.

Gen. Wilecki discussed his eventual nomination a couple of times with officials of the Presidential Chancellery, Jerzy Milewski and Mieczyslaw Wachowski. He kept Minister Parys posted about his visits to the Belweder and the course of these talks. At first Parys was not interested in the visits of Gen. Wilecki to Warsaw, but ultimately he held a press conference at the General Staff at which he declared that certain unnamed politicians were maintaining behind his back secret contacts with certain generals and intriguing within the military. The scandal resulted in the formation of a Sejm committee (which in principle did not confirm the minister's substantive accusations of the general and the persons he talked with) and in a political crisis which was temporarily averted when Prime Minister Olszewski furloughed Minister Parys.

Jan Parys pursued his political crusade against Lech Walesa with the aid of the military. The president picked up that gauntlet in the same field. The military and the issue of national security became for the first time exploited as pawns in the power game.

Minister Parys was replaced with Romuald Szeremietiew, who held that post for a brief time.

The next candidate for the minister of defense was Janusz Onyszkiewicz. Nowadays he claims that he took that office without making any prior personal commitments, because the president did not ask him to meet any terms in advance. But a majority of politicians of other orientations believe that a political deal was concluded with that nomination: the Belweder demanded the replacement of the chief of the General Staff as a precondition for Onyszkiewicz's nomination. Whatever may really have happened, at that time the

belief took root in the military that in matters of national defense the last word belongs to the president.

Janusz Onyszkiewicz began officiating by taking several major personnel decisions, including the replacement of the chief of the military information services, that is, of the military intelligence. He also wanted to replace the chief of staff, because he admittedly viewed cooperation with General Stelmaszuk as impossible. In two months the minister and his associates sounded out three candidates. The candidacy of General Franciszek Puchala collapsed, because various political circles had reservations about his political past. General Zbigniew Zalewski, the commander of the Pomeranian Military District, known for his proneness to making compromises, resigned his candidacy on his own. He informed Minister Onyszkiewicz that he was aware that the Belweder preferred General Wilecki and therefore did not want to be a candidate.

Gen. Wilecki became the new chief of the General Staff.

A Most Promising Officer

Tadeusz Wilecki was born in Lubartow County, Lublin Voivodship, to a peasant family; his father commanded a unit of the guerrilla Peasant Battalions during the German occupation.

He completed an academic high school in Olesnica near Wroclaw and in 1967 was graduated from the Officer School of Armored Troops in Poznan.

In 1967 he began service in Unit 1607 in Opole-Szczepanowice as a platoon commander in a tank battalion. A year later he took part in the invasion of Czechoslovakia. His colleagues in the Army at that time say that he accomplished excellently the objective of protecting a seized airfield. In 1969 he then commander of his company enrolled at the Academy of the General Staff and Tadeusz Wilecki was promoted to his post. Thus commenced a series of rapid promotions in his career.

As an old Army saying goes, only one out of an hundred soldiers beginning their military career really desires to become a marshal, with the remainder focusing on a life of security until they reach retirement age. Tadeusz Wilecki's colleagues from the first years of his military service stress that it was immediately evident that he was one of those who wanted to be a commander in chief. He was very ambitious. He did not kowtow to his superiors—a rarity in People's Polish Army. He kept at a distance even from his colleagues.

As platoon leader, and later company commander, he cared greatly for his subordinates. He spent much more time with them than did other young officers. It helped

that he got married rather late, only after graduating from the General Staff Academy. He made sure that his soldiers received all the needed supplies, but at the same time he gained fame for his strict discipline. He tried to provide a personal example to his subordinates. He engaged in defensive sports and was personally very athletic. He led his unit on prolonged marches on the run.

The subunits he commanded always occupied leading spots in such contests.

Outside the service he was thought of as rather secretive and absorbed in his military career. He drank little and preferred books on history and historical fiction, for which among the tankers he became known as an intellectual.

Within the military, the opinion is that Tadeusz Wilecki owes his rapid upward career to not only his accomplishments as a commander. In the mid-1960's he won the military triathlon of Warsaw Pact armies, thus attracting the attention of Gen. Jaruzelski. Ever since then he could always count on Jaruzelski's goodwill.

At age 26 he enrolled at the General Staff Academy, which he completed at age 29. He became the chief of staff of a tank regiment and was quite rapidly—considering the customs in the People's Polish Army—promoted a year later to deputy commander of 10 Tank Regiment in Opole.

At age 31 he already was a major.

For three years, he commanded 18 Tank Regiment in Wedrzyn, Lubusz [western Poland]. There too he enjoyed the reputation of a very good commander who cared for his subordinates. In a firing-range garrison where at the day's close the soldier can expect nothing more than vodka and sleep under the bare sky, he had on his own initiative built a clubhouse. Edward Gierek, first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, came to Wedrzyn for the official opening of that club in 1979—this was Gierek's last official visit to a military unit. His subordinates viewed Wilecki as a clever commander who succeeded in keeping up very good relations with members of the Zielona Gora Voivodship party committee without being servile toward them.

Soon after Gierek's visit to the garrison, Tadeusz Wilecki was appointed lieutenant colonel. Further promotions followed. He became deputy commander for line affairs of 10 Armored Division in Opole. Very soon afterward, because only eight months later, he was assigned to study at the Voroshilov USSR Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. His absence in Poland during the martial law era did nothing to hurt his career. After graduating from the Soviet academy

in 1982 at age of barely 38, with the rank of colonel, he became chief of staff of the 5th Armored Division at Gubin. That was a spectacular promotion, for in the military structure of those times armored divisions were a most important element and the 5th Armored Division had a reputation for excellence.

As soon as a year and half afterward, Tadeusz Wilecki was promoted to commander of 5 Armored Division. At age 42 he was appointed brigade general.

In 1987 he became chief of staff of the Silesian Military District and a year and half later the commander of that most important military district. He was a PZPR member and belonged to various party bodies. He was elected to party congresses, but all the same among the military he was viewed as a professional soldier and not a politician in uniform.

Gen. Wilecki's unusually rapid military career pointed to outstanding ability but also caused some resentment. In the opinion of broadly educated professional officers, continual advancement to commander of ever larger military units punctuated by brief promotions to chief of staff strengthens an officer's belief that everything can be commanded by means of orders. Quite often this is accompanied by a feeling of one's own mission, especially when one is a good officer respected by his subordinates. In Western armies this is prevented by appointing promising officers for a time to assignments requiring cooperation and negotiations—to diplomatic service, to civilian universities, to cooperation with civilian structures.

His feeling of dignity and personal mission, his firm assertion of his rationale, and his ostentatious contempt of the servility ubiquitous in the communist military won for the young General Wilecki popularity among the officer cadre. They were also noticed by politicians.

In 1990 the Tadeusz Mazowiecki government decided to replace the colorless Chief of the General Staff Gen. Jozef Ozycki with somebody more colorful. Prime Minister Mazowiecki and deputy defense ministers Onyszkiewicz and Komorowski at the time considered two candidacies, those of Commander of the Warsaw Military District Gen. Stelmazuk and Commander of the Silesian Military District Gen. Wilecki. At the time Gen. Wilecki was viewed as a very interesting person, a dashing officer who in a hopeless situation would leap onto a tank and give the order to attack—in a word, as an excellent wartime commander, but not a peacetime one. To be sure, at the time Poland's international situation was viewed as highly dangerous, but in the end the choice fell on Gen. Stelmazuk.

The presence of Gen. Wilecki's name in these calculations has never before been made public and had no direct effect on his career.

The attention of officials at the National Security Bureau in early 1991 was drawn to the commander of the then best military district. But at the time the Bureau had reservations about the extremely one-sided course of the military career of Gen. Wilecki—the extremely short periods of command interspersed with study at military schools.

Following the appointment of Jan Parys to minister of defense many generals made toward him gestures of loyalty verging at subjection. At the time Gen. Wilecki's conduct was very restrained. This again attracted the attention of the politicians from the National Security Bureau, who planned to use him against Minister Parys. In the opinion of those who were at the time in the president's entourage, the best psychologist proved to be Minister Wachowski, who sooner than anybody else perceived in the commander of the Silesian Military District an officer greedy for power, vain, and firmly convinced that only the military know best about military matters.

As early as the spring of 1991, the then Minister of Defense Admiral Kolodziejczyk recommended to Minister Wachowski Gen. Wilecki as chief of [General] Staff. He viewed him as a pragmatist, as a man somewhat conservative on military affairs and uninterested in politics.

Soon afterward, in the summer of 1991, Minister Wachowski tried to convince Lech Kaczynski about the fitness of Gen. Wilecki for the post of chief of [General] Staff. But Minister Kaczynski, whom Gen. Wilecki offended during a previous visit to Wroclaw, was adamantly opposed.

The promotion of Gen. Wilecki to chief of General Staff was a personal accomplishment of Minister Wachowski, who gladly substituted for the president in contacts with the chief of staff and ultimately met with Gen. Wilecki much more often than did Lech Walesa.

Green Fish

The late writer Andrzej Kijowski compared different generations of PRL artists to two shoals of fish of various species passing one another in mutual ignorance. This comparison is just as apt with regard to the condition of the military in PRL times. Contrary to official declarations, the Army was isolated from the life of the society. It operated its own trading organizations, housing and recreation facilities, judicial system, a system of academic and vocational education, and health care, including maternity care. This was advantageous

to the officer cadre, who were better off materially than others, especially in the crisis years.

The feeling of belonging to a caste was reinforced by the organizational structure of the Ministry of National Defense, where the minister and all deputy ministers had always been military men.

An overwhelming majority of the officer cadre were Communist party members, but paradoxically for that very reason they did not nourish any independent political ambitions. Ideological control by the party—that is, by civilians—over the army was, properly speaking, unlimited. It was morally ruinous. The cadre's frustration was magnified by the dependence of the Armed Forces on Moscow.

The martial law era afforded the middle generation of officers an opportunity for venting their frustrations and familiarizing themselves with civilian life. Under martial law military commissars oversaw party secretaries, enterprise managers, and civil servants. The military returned to their barracks fêted and rewarded by their superiors as well as convinced that, first, they were better than civilians at managing the government administration and the economy, and second, that the life of the society and politics, too, can be governed by orders. This experience became a strong part of the memories of the military commissars of 15 years ago who are now... generals.

At the same time, the memory of the ideological pressure exerted by the party caused the idea of an apolitical military to become very popular among the officer cadre in the early 1990s. What is more, by the same token, the idea of civilian control of the Army, along with the appointment of a civilian minister of national defense, became accepted by the military. According to WIBS polls in the summer of 1990 only a dozen or so percent of officers had accepted the idea of creating a partly civilian and partly military ministry of national defense, but by the end of 1990 as many as 70 percent had accepted that idea.

Support for the principle of civilian control of the Army shriveled within the Armed Forces while Jan Parys was minister of defense. His anticommunist fundamentalism, lack of military expertise and experience, and treatment of the Army as a pawn in the political power game with the president, turned the Armed Forces against civilian experts on defense. Parys's appointment of Radoslaw Sikorski as deputy minister of defense proved particularly disruptive (the president had learned about that appointment, too, from the daily TV newscast). When the Press began to discuss the (British) citizenship and (highly questionable) competence of the new deputy minister, his loyalty to the Polish state became debated

within the military. It does not even matter greatly whether the special services and the generals had tried to isolate Minister Sikorski from access to important information and even sometimes provided him with false information out of fear that he would leak military secrets to the West. What really matters is that officers considered such practices to be facts and often accepted them. The Armed Forces again began to view civilians as persons unfit for directing national defense and ones from whom military secrets should remain kept.

The self-awareness of the officer corps as an elite also was revived by the deliberate references of the leadership of the Armed Forces to prewar traditions. As far back as in Communist times subliminal sentiments in favor of the prewar basically aristocratic esprit de corps existed among the officer cadre. Hence also the tendency of young officers with typically peasant names to adopt legally new names that could be viewed as those of the gentry. Hence also the fad for hunting. That also is why lately the generals have been giving each other high-priced "officer rings" of 585-proof [as published] white gold inlaid with amethyst in three colors.

The memories of the military of the Second Republic now kept alive include not only patriotism and willingness for sacrifices but also a feeling of superiority of the officer corps to civilians and the then universal belief that politicians should not interfere in military affairs.

All Power in the Hands of the Chief of Staff

The period of the management of the General Staff by Gen. Tadeusz Wilecki has been a period of his ceaseless attempts to reduce the power of civilian ministers of defense, along with continual concessions by politicians in face of the combined pressure of the chief of the General Staff and the Belweder.

In the opinion of many politicians, Minister Wachowski systematically encouraged in the chief of the General Staff a tendency to make the Army autonomous politically. But as early as in mid-1992 Gen. Wilecki complained about the chaos and irresponsibility dominating the political scene in his informal talks with politicians. He told the same thing to various people: That only those forces which base themselves on two stable pillars, the Roman Catholic Church and the Army, will survive in politics. He made explicit political offers promising his support in return for the commitment of politicians on behalf of the Army and to represent his interests. He presented himself as the man who can at will give or withdraw the support of the Army.

During his informal talks with National Security Bureau, officials at more or less the same time Gen. Wilecki declared himself in support of the direct subordination of

the military to the president. These talks also indicated, however, that he was aware that Lech Walesa's control over the Armed Forces could be only symbolic. The National Defense Committee inherited after Gen. Jaruzelski and the National Security Bureau were relatively small agencies lacking properly ramified administrative structures. (The president of France, whose control over the French Army has repeatedly been invoked by the supporters of Lech Walesa, has at his disposal, in addition to a civilian chancellery, an extensively staffed military chancellery headed by a four-star general. A similarly effective apparatus for control and management of the military is available to the President of the United States.) The chief of the General Staff was at the time clearly aware of Lech Walesa's unwillingness to build solid administrative structures and of his personal distaste for systematic work.

Soon after he became minister of defense Janusz Onyszkiewicz carried out the reform of the Ministry of National Defense recommended by the Zabinski Commission. He separated organizationally the civilian part of the ministry from the purely military part. When allocating powers he guided himself by the principle that whatever does not require purely military competences should be within the purview of civilian officials. The civilian-military management of the ministry became a fact.

The chief of the General Staff accepted this division, but soon it turned out that when two people say the same thing they do not think the same way.

The generals expected of the civilian structures of the ministry that these would merely to serve the military by striving for more funds and favorable legal regulations. When it became clear that the civilian structures of the Ministry of National Defense will not remain appurtenances of the military but are to influence it, the first clashes and misunderstandings began.

The struggle for influence between the ministry and the General Staff was facilitated by loopholes in the laws governing national defense. The operating procedures of the ministry and the Army are based not on statutory provisions but on lower-ranking legal acts such as executive orders of the minister and orders of the chief of the General Staff.

To make matters worse, all the civilian ministers of national defense charged the chief of the General Staff with current management of the Armed Forces, whereas he should be not commanding but attending to operational planning.

That started when Jan Parys was still the minister, as he relied completely in this matter on Gen. Stelmaszuk.

Janusz Onyszkiewicz issued an in-house order charging Gen. Wilecki with current management of the Armed Forces while personally focusing on national defense policy, although the law requires that the defense minister personally oversee the Armed Forces.

Even broader powers (including control over special services) were transferred to the chief of the General Staff by Admiral Kolodziejczyk as soon as he was reappointed minister of defense.

Minister Okonski not only accepted unprotestingly the appropriation of the ministry's prerogatives by the General Staff but agreed to further major emasculation of his powers.

(The second in this series of two articles will be published in the Monday issue of GAZETA WYBORCZA.)

Komornicki Cleared of Electioneering Allegations
WS2510151695 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY
in Polish 25 Oct 95 p 3

[Article by Luiza Kowalska: "No Trace of Electioneering; Leon Komornicki's Visit to Szczecin Not Likely To Ruin His Career"]

[FBIS Translated Text] General Leon Komornicki was not electioneering on behalf of the ruling president during his meetings with the military cadre, according to the conclusion of the special report of a collective body created by the head of the Ministry of National Defense [MON] to investigate the matter. The report has just landed on the minister's desk.

The news about "politicizing" trips of Gen. Komornicki, who is the deputy head of the General Staff [GS] of the Polish Army, appeared in the press this past August. GAZETA WYBORCZA covered one such meeting, suggesting that in the Szczecin garrison the general was supposed to be trying to convince the officers that both the head of the GS and the president should be credited with the latest pay hikes. According to GAZETA WYBORCZA, Komornicki was also warning the officers of the possible victory of the presidential candidates of the ruling coalition and encouraging them to support Lech Walesa in the coming elections.

Because MON did not confirm the above, the prime minister instructed Minister Zbigniew Okonski to create a special collective body to clear the charges. The minister appointed his own deputy, Andrzej Karkoszka, who is supported by the Democratic Left Alliance, to head the committee.

A week ago, Karkoszka prepared the first report. There he confirmed that Gen. Komornicki had tackled political

subjects during his visit to Szczecin, but Karkoszka did not consider this to be an instance of agitation.

At the same time, though, Karkoszka quoted in his report an anonymous letter that suggested the opposite. Most probably it was because of this letter that Zbigniew Okonski decided to "send the report back to the authors to be supplemented." "We need not hurry. This is about an officer and his career," the minister explained to us.

According to our unofficial source, the new and supplemented report does not contain any reference to the letter.

We have learned that Deputy Minister Karkoszka had considered resigning as the head of the committee before the only circumstantial evidence was removed. Karkoszka did not resign, though, because was persuaded not to do so by...Prime Minister Oleksy. The prime minister was supposed to ask Karkoszka not to create another scandal in the military just before the elections.

Let us recall that the question of collecting signatures under the names of the Sejm and the Senate parliamentary candidates in 1993 had a very similar conclusion. Then, in fact, the military prosecutor's office confirmed the press allegations, but finally none of the generals (accused of collecting the signatures on the premises of his military unit) was punished.

Poland Studying Bavarian Local Government Model

MM2510153195 Opole NOWA TRYBUNA OPOLSKA in Polish 18 Oct 95 p 4

[Article by Maria Szylska: "Germans To Teach Our People: Bavarians Set Out To Persuade Us, Almost Certainly With Success, of the Advantages of Districts"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A Polish-German conference on regional and local municipal self-government systems took place in Warsaw recently on the initiative of the Hanns Siedl Federation. Representatives of Bavarian regional authorities, including, among others, Landtag Deputy Dr. Wilhelm Kempfler, chairman of the Commission for Local Issues and Internal Security, and Josef Bestler, who for 26 years held the office of head of local administration structure and who now, in his retirement, serves as a plenipotentiary for the drafting of local administration legislation in the new federal Laender, shared their experiences in these fields with us.

Why should we learn self-government from Germans rather than anyone else? Well, one very good reason is

that they carried out their own local reform as early as 1946, and so have accumulated almost 50 years of experience in these matters. As regards Bavaria, it is generally conceded that its legislative solutions are the most advantageous and at the same time the most democratic. The best proof of this is that, with several existing administration systems to choose from, the majority of the newly established Laender selected none other than the Bavarian model.

Sejm Deputy Joachim Czernek, who represents the German minority in parliament and is a member of the Sejm Commission for Local Self-Government, does not try to hide his disappointment with the slow tempo and the difficulties hindering the creation of the second (district) tier of the local self-government system in our country. Despite the fact that the Extraordinary Sejm Commission for the Creation of Districts (chaired by Deputy Krzysztof Janik) has been active for almost a year, there is still no decision on whether to opt for districts in our sociopolitical and administrative system or, as some would wish, to grant a broader range of powers to parishes. Nor is the future of districts made more assured by what happened to the cities taking part in the pilot program (which was supposed to be an initial test of the district model). To begin with, their range of powers was extended, and they were allocated additional tasks. This was followed by the withdrawal of the funds for the realization of these tasks. Of the originally envisaged 14 trillion old zlotys [Z] to be earmarked for them, only Z8 billion have remained in the state budget. A proportion of the pilot scheme cities had to face the need to meet additional expenses out of their own local budgets, while some decided to withdraw from the scheme altogether.

All in all, the Bavarians came to Warsaw with the mission to persuade the Poles of the advantages of the district system. And they seem to have accomplished this task.

According to Dr. Wilhelm Kempfler, the district system in Germany is now consolidated, and people have a well-developed sense of being citizens of their districts. [passage omitted]

"The district," Dr. Wilhelm Kempfler remarked, "provides a special opportunity for the smaller parishes, which are unable to accomplish their tasks and obligations in the fields of education, health service, and social welfare on their own." [passage omitted]

Melescanu Discusses NATO Expansion, Bosnia

AU2510194895 Bucharest AZI in Romanian
17 Oct 95 p 5

[Interview with Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu by Ana Cristina Litescu; place and date not given: "I Believe That NATO Expansion According to Geographic Areas Is Not Only Desirable But Also Necessary"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Litescu] Mr. Minister, the documents that form the basis for the historic Romanian-Hungarian reconciliation have already been forwarded to Budapest and the reaction of the Hungarian Government was favorable. What are the concrete steps that are going to be taken to achieve this desideratum?

[Melescanu] After the Romanian-Hungarian reconciliation initiative had been launched following consultations with all parliamentary parties, on 22 September 1995 we forwarded to Budapest the draft documents that we had elaborated in order to start this process. We are talking about a general accord based on the French-German model, which comprises two parts: a set of objectives that we concretely set ourselves in the political, economic, social, cultural, human rights, and minorities area and a mechanism to solve them by groups of experts for each issue. Likewise, we have issued a draft code of behavior regarding the rights of people who belong to national minorities. We have always claimed that the forwarded proposals are an illustration of the way in which we envisage as achievable the idea of historic reconciliation between our countries. In no way does it mean that these documents, their number, their content, and the character that we conferred to them have an obligatory connotation. As a matter of fact, the result of all our discussions is that in about two to three weeks we will have the first reaction of the Hungarian side, and we are going to learn about that reaction in a meeting to be held at a level of state secretaries. That meeting will probably be organized in Budapest, given the fact that the state secretaries in the Romanian and Hungarian Foreign Ministries have met several times, and the last meeting took place in Bucharest. According to the reaction of the Hungarian side, we will think about ways of phasing out the process.

[Litescu] Does the launching of this initiative at such a time not mean a way of evading the basic Romanian-Hungarian treaty?

[Melescanu] One of the working groups—stipulated in the accord mechanism of the historic reconciliation—will continue to negotiate the basic Romanian-Hungarian treaty. The main idea is that the reconciliation process should assist the acceleration of negotiations of the treaty and should not replace or

renegotiate it. If, at the end of the negotiations on the basis of draft documents envisaged in the process of reconciliation, we reach the conclusion that we can solve everything, except for maybe one or two things, for example, these will remain in the mechanism treaty and we will have to establish a working system in order to examine them and reach a conclusion. Thus, we are not talking about replacing the basic treaty with Hungary but about facilitating the process of negotiating it.

[Litescu] If, as far as the Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty is concerned, we see that things proceed in the desired direction, one cannot say the same thing about negotiations with Ukraine and, mainly, with Moldova.

[Melescanu] The treaty with Moldova is a special situation, because we practically have not had any negotiations on this issue so far. Thus, we are talking about starting a process of negotiations with Moldova, a process that will not be simple because this treaty is not an ordinary one concluded with one of the neighboring countries. It is a document that is concluded between two countries which share common language and elements of ethics, culture, and even territory in a certain historic period of time. No doubt it will be a treaty that will proceed from the existence of two internationally recognized independent and sovereign states, which, nevertheless, have a common heritage. Therefore, the treaty will have to have a certain specificity, which we and the Chisinau Government perceive differently, as was revealed by the first exploratory discussions that we held with our Moldovan colleagues. We will need a preliminary period in which we should rather hold clarifying discussions. After that, we will be able to proceed to the prestage of prenegotiating our treaty.

[Litescu] The major obstacle in the path of concluding the treaty with Ukraine is the inclusion of a denouncement of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact in the text of the document. What are the prospects for concluding this treaty?

[Melescanu] As regards the treaty with Ukraine, several rounds of negotiations have taken place and I could say that things are evolving positively. The major issue that raised difficulties for us is indeed the reference to the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. For us, this has two very clear objectives: We insist on having the pact condemned, first of all, because we wish a moral repair of a serious prejudice that Romania suffered at a time for which no current government in Bucharest or the Kiev Government are responsible. And second: We wish, if I can say so, to obtain a sort of moral guarantee that this kind of approach will not be repeated in

our relations. Nobody at the level of the Romanian Government wishes to raise a territorial problem. The Romanian Government proceeds from the territorial-political realities created in Europe after World War II, from the respect for international treaties that we have signed, and for the provisions of the Helsinki final document. Certainly, the negotiations are much more complicated than they seem at first glance!

[Litescu] However, mentioning the denouncement of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact might be interpreted as a "gate" left open for certain territorial claims.

[Melescanu] My personal position—since there is no official Romanian position regarding this prospect—is that we will all witness a process of regrouping in Europe, which is based on very strong integration processes promoted first of all by the EU. I sincerely believe in a reunion, if you wish, of all Romanians who today live between different borders. That, however, will not be achieved through classical means of changing borders but on the basis of our belonging to a common economic, political, security, intellectual, and cultural space. A European space in which the free circulation of people, capital, services, and ideas will prevail. First of all, people will be free to settle in one country or another, will enjoy the possibility to circulate unhampered, a situation which, added to the fact that we share a common heritage, could solve the problems of Romanians everywhere, namely, the desire to be able to belong to the same cultural and intellectual space. This is the solution that I envisage, but, I must repeat, this is not an official position.

[Litescu] Romania showed its intention to join the North Atlantic Alliance. Is the policy promoted by Romania also the policy of the West?

[Melescanu] I believe that Romania is one of the countries that proved, through very many concrete documents and political declarations, the determination to become a NATO member and to assume all the obligations deriving from this capacity. Certainly, also to benefit from appropriate rights. But since you have referred to concrete actions, I would like to mention a very important exercise, namely the "Cooperative Determination '95" held in Sibiu. I would also like to refer to our—highly valued—participation in various similar exercises that have taken place in various countries and, last but not least, to the outstanding effort that we have made on the most important issue of Central European countries' integration into NATO, namely, ensuring the interoperational capability in the military field. I would like to tell you that in this respect a serious effort has been made. Certainly, Romania has also benefited from a good starting base, because it

was the only country in this area, the only candidate to be admitted in NATO, which has had infinitely less military technology from the East than the other states. Therefore, we have had a good starting basis and currently I believe that the efforts that our colleague Mr. Gheorghe Tinca (Romanian defense minister) and the chief of staff have made together are indeed noteworthy. I believe that today, on the issue of interoperation, Romania occupies one of the first places.

[Litescu] Romania's very good military relations with Western countries are very well known. But what is the level of political relations?

[Melescanu] An excellent level. I could tell you that from this viewpoint Romania is, I believe, among the countries that succeeded in reaching—in the area of political relations—the same level with all the Central European countries, and this in a very short time. I would also mention that there is no difference on the political or military plane either. On the contrary, from this viewpoint we are even more advanced, but everybody tries to emphasize its trump cards! In fact, if you allow me another observation of a personal nature, I would say about the cooperation on a military level that it is part of the political cooperation.

[Litescu] Returning to the process of Romania's integration into the euro-atlantic structures, how would you comment on the NATO decision in Williamsburg to "freeze" the expansion process until 1997?

[Melescanu] I believe that what happened in Williamsburg is a recognition of the fact that the NATO expansion process has a certain speed that must be respected, it should be neither decreased nor increased. What seems to me important is the fact that the participants emphasized the fact that the process will continue. Thus, I would not call it freezing but a sort of acceptance of the idea that the expansion process must have a certain evolution and a certain speed. Actually, the fact that at that time, the member countries of the Alliance had accepted the criteria connected with the NATO expansion—soon we are expecting an important NATO delegation—proves that the plans of action are being respected and the process continues.

[Litescu] The argument in favor of postponing the NATO expansion process was "let us wait until the elections in the United States and the Russian Federation are over." Does that mean that the NATO expansion depends on the United States and Russia?

[Melescanu] No, you are only half right. It depends on the United States just as it depends also on the other NATO member states. I would like us to understand

something very clearly, namely, that the NATO expansion depends exclusively on its own decision—and certainly Washington plays an important role in it—and on the will of the states that applied for membership. The other countries become what in legal terms would be called "third party." Emphasizing this idea, relations with Moscow are very important, both for the Alliance—and this thing must be taken into account—as well as for its associates. In fact, what we are all looking for is to increase our own security as well as the climate of security in which we live. Romania's wish is not to become a first rank country, to be perceived as a threatening factor to its neighbors. The NATO expansion process must be carried out in such a way as to contribute to the security of all countries that will be admitted into NATO and, at the same time, to represent a positive factor of stability for the countries that for the time being have chosen just to be partners.

[Litescu] The way Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova are for the time being.

[Melescanu] Within the Partnership for Peace (PFP) signed also by those countries, there are two categories of countries: some of them that wish to become NATO members and others that do not aspire to this status. However, I believe that cooperation will continue within the PFP. I believe that this is also Romania's official position, namely, that the process of the Alliance's expansion be carried out in parallel with a process of building a relationship—of partnership—between an expanded NATO and the Russian Federation, so as not to have Moscow perceive this expansion as a negative factor affecting its security and not to have new demarcation lines and new borders created in Europe.

[Litescu] Do you believe that there is a possibility that only some East European countries will join NATO while others the EU, respectively the Western European Union [WEU], as a form of compensation?

[Melescanu] No doubt from a philosophical viewpoint, such schemes are possible and they are not only philosophical. Because there are certain countries such as Austria and Sweden, for example, which are full members of the EU but have not shown any desire to join NATO. Thus, I believe that there is such a possibility. However, as far as we are concerned, Romania believes that the process of NATO expansion will take place parallel with the expansion of other organizations. I can say that it will be a correlated process, as a result of which Romania will become a member with full rights in NATO, the WEU, and the EU. As regards the method of joining NATO within a group or separately, Romania values the fact that in none of the stands taken on this issue are zones

or corridors mentioned. It has been stressed that the process of expansion will be an individual one, the case of each candidate will be studied separately, on the basis of convergence criteria. Each candidate will be evaluated according to its characteristics; however, the NATO expansion starts from a fundamental criterion: the expansion of the area of stability, prosperity, and democracy that the Alliance represents, to a very important zone, which is the area where we live. Therefore, I believe that NATO expansion on individual criteria, however in a very serious group, according to geographic zones, is not only preferable but also necessary. Ultimately, there are certain balances that are being established on a regional plane, a group of military-type of balance, and the admittance of only one or another one of them could bring prejudice, and, I could say, in some specific cases could even create an extremely dangerous state of tension. However, when I am referring to a regional balance I am not thinking of some groups, such as the Visegrad group—I hope that this will not be the approach that will prevail—but I am thinking of the region as a whole.

[Litescu] The implementation of a cease-fire accord in Bosnia-Herzegovina created conditions for the process of reconstruction of the states that belonged to the ex-Yugoslav space. How do you view the possibility of Bucharest's involvement in this process?

[Melescanu] The formula that we have always used and that I stress again is equidistance. I believe we have done all that is in our power to show very clearly that in this conflict Romania has an equidistant position and wishes to transfer to all republics the good relations that it used to have with the former Yugoslavia. We have diplomatic relations with all these countries, we have had permanent contact with them. Thus, there was never an issue of favoring someone, or to be against the West. On the contrary, we have been one of the pillars of the West in ensuring the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro. We have believed from the very beginning—and I believe that we are the only country that stressed this fact—that solution to the former Yugoslavia implies not only solving hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina but also a much broader approach in which the process of reconstruction of the ex-Yugoslav countries is fundamental. I would also add to this that, to offer these republics certain prospects of integration in European structures seems to be the best guarantee both for their future as well as for the entire region. From this viewpoint, we are indeed very interested in the most active possible participation. The thesis that we promote is that for Romania, as a country that has suffered the most as a result of the embargo, there should be a certain preferential treatment. We do not wish just to be

involved in this process, but also to be among the first to be taken into consideration. Our concept is that, in this process of reconstruction, there should be a certain compensation granting, a certain reparation that can be achieved by granting certain facilities, certainly both to Romania as well as other countries which suffered as a result of the embargo, first of all the neighbors. There is an increasingly spreading practice of applying economic sanctions as a form of pressure to halt hostilities and to start peaceful negotiations. However, practice has proved that, in most cases, this form of protest used by the UN is achieved through neighboring countries, which very often are confronted themselves with great difficulties and which are really the ones that pay the price of these economic sanctions. We have suggested, and a document is being drafted by the UN in this respect, a mechanism to grant compensation. However, before that draft is concluded, we advocate some pragmatic measures which should permit granting beneficial treatment to the countries affected by the embargo imposed on neighbors. I believe that the intense participation in the process of reconstruction of Romanian firms is one of these possible pragmatic measures.

[Litescu] If NATO asks Romania to participate in the multinational peacekeeping force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, what will be Bucharest's response?

[Melescanu] No doubt that, if we were NATO members, there would be no question about it, because no matter what decision the Alliance takes, this would be obligatory for Romania. In our capacity as a state associated to NATO, I am convinced that any request that would be addressed to us will be examined with greatest good will. Romania will participate, within the limit of its possibilities, in all operations that NATO, the WEU, and the EU deems appropriate for the continuation of the peace process. Likewise, Romania respects the principle of not participating with troops in peacekeeping operations on the territory of a neighboring country, a principle accepted by the UN. We have adopted the principle to consider the former Yugoslavia in its entirety as well as the Soviet space as neighboring countries. I would also like to mention the fact that participating with troops is only one of the concrete ways through which we can make our presence felt.

[Litescu] Thank you very much, Mr. Minister.

Tinca Responds to General Cheler's Criticism

96P20041A Bucharest *TINERETUL LIBER*
in Romanian 15 Oct 95 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Minister of Defense Gheorghe Tinca Responds to General Cheler"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In connection with the statements of General of the Army Paul Romeo Cheler, Minister of Defense Gheorghe Tinca gave the following explanations: "On 9 October, Army Gen. Paul Cheler organized a press conference at the Officers Club in Cluj-Napoca during which he made a number of comments, mainly related to his retirement.

The organization of this conference without the knowledge of the leadership of the MAPN [Ministry of National Defense] is an abuse of military regulations and Gen. Paul Cheler is permitted to do this only because he is already retired.

Presidential Decree No. 318 on the retirement of Gen. Cheler as of 5 October 1995 was signed on 20 September of this year, exactly two months after the promulgation of Law No. 80 on the statute of military personnel, which specifies that the maximum age for active duty generals of the Army is 64 years.

On 2 October 1995, the general was invited to a meeting with the chief of the General Staff of the Army corps, Dumitru Cioflina, who informed him of the decision to retire him. He was also consulted in connection with the filling of vacancies in the leadership of the 4th Army. Additionally, he was told that he should be present in Bucharest, along with other generals, for a meeting with President Ion Iliescu, as part of a ceremony organized in connection with the conversion to reserve status or retirement of these generals, a ceremony which would take place during the first week of October. Later, Gen. Cheler was informed by the General Staff of the Ground Troops, to which the general is subordinate, that the ceremony was postponed until 17 October.

In regard to Gen. Cheler's requirement that he be notified of his retirement six months in advance, let me state that the provisions of Article 86 of Law 80/1995, which are more than clear, are not applicable in the case of generals more than 64 years old and Gen. Cheler is 67 years old. In addition, the opinion of the general of the Army in regard to Law 80/1995, which regulates the status of military personnel, is a personal opinion. It is the opinion of others that the law provides a number of benefits which will be an advantage to military cadres throughout their career. It is certain that these benefits are taking concrete form in the substantial increases in personal services expenditures in the Army budget or

the exemptions from taxes which reduce revenues in the state budget.

I would like the budget to provide financial resources for the application of this law in its totality without dramatically affecting funds for equipment and similar small items.

For the first time, this law sets clear criteria and conditions which link the career of military personnel with their professional training. Thus, subjectivism and other influences are eliminated in their promotion.

Other issues on which Gen. Cheler expressed his opinions are already known and are a matter of concern for the government and the MAPN leadership in the course of the implementation of the process of reform in the armed forces, as part of the general reform of the Romanian economy and society. The situations pointed out by the Army general are not new and we are trying to find solutions to the limit of our possibilities.

In the following days, we will organize a press conference in which we will reexamine the situation of reform in the Army.

The military career of Gen. Cheler is remarkable and so are the careers of the other generals who are being retired. Throughout his career, he served the country and the Army with a sense of duty and professionalism, exercising command upto the highest echelons. Under these conditions, the bitterness caused by retirement is understandable. Personally, I blame myself for not paying enough attention to Gen. Paul Cheler or to the other generals and military personnel who are being retired, so as to lessen their bitterness as much as possible. Therefore, I ask him to accept my apologies and also to accept the gratitude of the leadership of the Ministry of National Defense for their entire military career, until the ceremony set for 17 October when the generals will meet with President Ion Iliescu."

Foreign Minister Discusses Dispute With Italy
AU2510201695 Ljubljana MLADINA in Slovene
 18 Oct 95 p 12-17

[Interview with Slovene Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler by Igor Mekina; place and date not given: "One Step Back, Two Steps Forward"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Mekina] One has heard increasingly more criticism of the Slovene foreign policy in some circles recently. What has the Slovene foreign policy actually accomplished so far?

[Thaler] It is not difficult to give an account of the events after Aquileia. In March, we achieved the lifting of a blockade on negotiations on the European Union [associate membership] agreement, then we negotiated effectively with the European Union Commission, and afterward accomplished the initialing of an associate membership agreement within three months. The Slovene side, of course, sees this document as being worthy of a signature. All we need is some technical preparation and editing and, ultimately, the signing of the agreement with all the necessary pomp. Italy's efforts to shake off the responsibility for being the only one to block our accession to Europe have, of course, been intensive in the meantime and have led to others in the European Union occasionally criticizing Slovene property legislation. This gave rise to some initiatives for the overcoming of this situation.

[Mekina] In this sense, there has been a lot of talk and writing about a certain Spanish initiative. What was this initiative actually all about?

[Thaler] With the mediation of Spain, as the EU chairman, over the past few months, additional proposals on the resolution of a dispute between Slovenia and Italy emerged. One of these proposals envisaged that Slovenia would, with an exchange of letters on the Article 64 of the association agreement, promise to liberalize completely the real estate trade for foreigners within four years from the realization of the agreement. This is perhaps possible, however, only with an additional sentence that delays such a liberalization until the time when we become a full-fledged member of the Union. The second proposal envisaged that each foreigner who resided on Slovene territory in the past for at least three years would gain the right to become a real estate owner. It is not difficult to see that this formulation was most probably not invented in Madrid, but in Rome. These two proposals, as they stood, accompanied by a demand that we also sign a bilateral agreement with Italy, we rejected additional conditions for the signing of the agreement as unacceptable. [passage omitted]

What is fundamental for us is the position of the State Chamber from 1993, which stipulates that the contents of the agreements signed earlier could not be negotiated, but that "we need to agree on a further mode for realizing the Rome Treaty." This position of the State Chamber could perhaps allow for a sort of minimalist compromise solution if there is political will on both sides, but only if we are not slaves to the doctrine and if we show willingness for such an agreement. A very brief, technical text with compromises that could clarify the matter from the agenda, if Italy would care about it, has emerged in the talks with the Italian side.

[Mekina] What is this document actually about?

[Thaler] This is a so-called "non paper," a brief text without many flowery phrases and preambles. On one hand, it emphasizes the validity of the Rome Treaty and, on the other, it stipulates that only empty and available [preceding three words in italics] housing units owned by the municipalities, whose owners used to be the Italian citizens, could, according to a mixed Italian-Slovene commission, be restituted to their former owners so that their value would be subtracted from the total Slovene debt to Italy—in other words, they would be exchanged for money. What is essential, of course, is that the text refers to housing units and not real estate. By this, industrial installations, land, forests and everything else is exempt from the process. The area of restitution is also specific. Namely, the "non paper" only speaks about parts of the municipalities of Koper, Izola, and Piran and does not entail other parts of Slovenia. To avoid any later misunderstandings, we also told the Italian side that there were very few unoccupied and available housing units left. If one could have anticipated 7,000 real estate units after a pessimistic reading of the Aquileia draft and if, later, there was talk of some 300 to 400 housing units, it is now clear that, according to the present formulations, only about 40 housing units are still available for exchange.

[Mekina] Do you find this proposal acceptable?

[Thaler] Well, this is definitely not my one and only proposal. On the contrary, we must take into account that Slovenia was—against its wish and also because of pressure from Europe, which wants an agreement—coerced into the negotiations on the restitution of the aforementioned property. If Italy rejects the proposal, the matter will be forgotten, and, if not, then we will have to discuss it seriously. I will always advocate a proposal that will not essentially harm Slovenia and will bring considerably greater advantages. Of course, the ball is with the Italian side now. Minister Agnelli decided to consult the parliament and the political

parties on this proposal. Such was our agreement from New York. [passage omitted]

[Mekina] Why is the agreement that you have drafted together with Italy not slightly more "complicated?" For example, why did you not envisage individual stages of the restitution of property, so that the Italian owners would first acquire management of apartments and would then become their owners with our entry into the European Union? Would we not, in this way, rid ourselves of the repeated Italian blockades?

[Thaler] You mean a sort of a comprehensive agreement by which we would rid ourselves of the debt, where there would be a lot of construction work with our companies, where a new investment cycle would be started, and everybody would be happy?

[Mekina] Something along these lines.

[Thaler] We probably cannot accomplish this because, in Italy and Slovenia alike, we have ended up in a sort of irrational position where all debates end with a mere mention of the word "option-taker" or "restitution." Precisely for this reason, we avoided complex "baroque" texts that would allow for ambiguities and pessimistic interpretations. Your question is valid, however. In diplomacy, disputes between countries are often resolved with pompous and imprecise agreements. I must admit that we ourselves have dwelled on more-complex texts. However, all these complicated compromise solutions gradually became such that in time we no longer liked them. Slovenia is the weaker partner in the negotiations and, for that reason, simply cannot afford lax and imprecise formulations. If this was the case, Italy would have very rapidly enforced its own interpretations. For example, Italy proposed supporting our [associate membership] agreement with the European Union itself when the European Union Commission passes a positive opinion on our real estate legislation. This is, again, unacceptable for Slovenia, because the arbiter in this case is somebody who has a greater specific weight than Slovenia. For that reason, simple formulations are a lot better.

[Mekina] In the meantime, did you find any independent arbiter outside the European Union who would be willing to mediate in the quest for a Slovene-Italian agreement?

[Thaler] It is no secret that an important factor plays a role in our negotiations with Italy. Namely, the United States. We have a principled agreement with the United States that, in case of support for the present agreement by Italy and Slovenia alike, the United States would support our mutual agreement and also its finality. We discussed this during a visit by U.S. Defense Secretary

Perry to Slovenia and also with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs Tarnoff in New York.

[Mekina] Would the United States be a cosignatory of such a Slovene-Italian agreement?

[Thaler] There are numerous possibilities, however, I doubt that the United States would decide to be a cosignatory. With a presidential statement or a similar form of active support, the U.S. Administration would probably hail our agreement.

[Mekina] What will happen if the association agreement does not materialize? What sort of a danger is looming for Slovenia in this case, in light of the fact that Slovenia is still dependent on trade quotas that could shrink rapidly with the accession of the new members from the Yugoslav territory?

[Thaler] I remain cold toward such a possibility. The cooperation agreement that Slovenia has with the European Union at the moment satisfies our basic needs. Because this is an agreement for an indefinite period of time, its cancellation would not be all that easy. The cancellation would have to be passed unanimously within the European Union, and I do not see great chances of that. The European Agreement is important for us, of course, but things are not that easy. The expansion of the European Union is far from being linear. There has been increasingly less talk about the Visegrad group members becoming full EU members by the year 2000. Furthermore, at the last EU summit, apart from the German and the Austrian representatives, nobody favored the expansion and quite a few were actively opposed to it. For that reason, we are, naturally, interested in associate membership, however, not at all costs. And not at the cost of major concessions either.

[Mekina] Some foreign agencies and papers have written recently that the Slovene politicians themselves did not know what they actually wanted. What is your comment?

[Thaler] This is a false debate that some in Slovenia, not to say within the coalition, are creating deliberately. In this way, they are trying to create an impression that some in the government favor Europe while Liberal Democracy is stalling this rapprochement. Of course, this is absolutely untrue. For as long as these are only folklore opinions aimed at livening up the domestic political scene, I can be tolerant of them. However, when some politicians are professing this to any ambassador that they come across in Ljubljana and they also influence certain press agencies, this is detrimental to the interests of Slovenia. In the moment when we are resisting the pressure from abroad with arguments, the easiest thing to say is: "You do not know yourselves what you

wan; agree on matters at home first." The reduction of our difficult negotiations with Italy to a simple dilemma for or against Europe is harming Slovenia first and foremost.

[Mekina] Something similar goes for Croatia. Lately, Croatia has explained its stance toward the Piran Bay rather thoroughly, while a substantiated reply from the Slovene side has been lacking. Why is the contact between the territorial and the international waters so important for Slovenia?

[Thaler] Slovenia is a country that has a part of its coastline in the Mediterranean, in the north Adriatic. For that reason, it is a maritime country. Its vital interest is to be and remain in contact with all the international seas. Furthermore, some call this its natural right. For that reason, Slovenia will insist on its demand, and we have told our Croatian friends so on several occasions. We, therefore, cannot curtail our right to a contact of our territorial waters with the open sea to a mere "right of a harmless passage" according to no matter how liberal a regime of sailing. For that reason, I am convinced that, if the fundamental Slovene interest is not satisfied in the resolution of this problem, Slovenia will not be in a hurry at all. Even more indicative, in my opinion, is the question of why Croatia, which has kilometers of coastline and sea, would not indulge this Slovene request. Unless of course, and by saying this we are treading in the area of speculation, there are some special Croatian intentions behind this rejection.

[Mekina] What if this is the case?

[Thaler] Our position is rather coldblooded here. In its links with Europe, Croatia is not merely geographically but also politically rather dependent on Slovenia. The same goes the other way, however, but not to the same extent. It would be bad, of course, if we were to start competing for the sake of unnecessary disputes over who needs the other less. That is why an agreement among ourselves is even more important.

[Mekina] It seems that Croatia also has a rather good trump card in its hands. Namely, it maintains that Slovenia is, at present, just as before, connected with all seas via the Croatian territorial waters and that Croatia is offering a very good transit agreement. So why is Slovenia rejecting this Croatian offer?

[Thaler] This agreement is problematic for Slovenia because Slovenia cannot discern from the Croatian offer why Croatia would not agree to "a clean cut" variant, that is, the contact of the Slovene territorial and the international waters. Perhaps in a decade or two, when both countries will be EU members and signatories of the Schengen Agreement, this matter will be essentially

immaterial and the course of the sea border will not be of great significance. However, at the level of political and legal culture that we sometimes encounter in this area, it would be foolish to anticipate that such divisions are already immaterial. It is precisely this that makes me believe that, in the future, there would be less scope for a dispute between Slovenia and Croatia if the division were simple and clear, that is, such that it would allow Slovenia independent access to the international waters.

[Mekina] As Dr. Hrvoje Kacic, president of the Croatian state commission for borders, said in an interview for MLADINA, Croatia is reportedly afraid that Slovenia would, via its territorial waters, invite foreign ships that would be hostile to Croatia to its harbors. Do you find this argument rational?

[Thaler] I think that, for two reasons, such arguments can be viewed with a smile and not taken overly seriously. Even when we agree on the Slovene access to the open sea, the ships in the Slovene part of the sea will, for purely geographical reasons, have very few chances of any sort of maneuvering, let alone the endangering of Croatia. On the other hand, the political circumstances in this part of the world would have to be very strange indeed for Slovenia to be preoccupied in the future with the idea of how foreign ships could attack or endanger Croatia from Slovene waters. So far, French, English, and U.S. ships have paid friendly visits to the Slovene sea, and it would be difficult to imagine that they have endangered our southern neighbor in any way. It is also possible, however, that Croatia has some long-term interest in controlling the Slovene access to the open sea. It seems to me that such a desire could signify a sort of a burden and cast a shadow on the good relations between the countries. For this reason, precisely such obstacles should simply be removed by Slovenia's direct access to the international waters. [passage omitted]

[Mekina] What is your opinion about international arbitration if it ever happens in the case of the Slovene-Croatian dispute? One can also hear that Slovenia has already commissioned and also obtained the expert opinion of international lawyers abroad about the Slovene-Croatian dispute? What is their opinion?

[Thaler] The opinion of the foreign experts who deal in international and maritime law is that Slovenia has a "strong case," that is, very good arguments for its proposals. For that reason, the dispute before the arbiter would definitely not end with a simple division of Piran Bay into two halves. There are so many specific, historic circumstances and, given the specific position and influence of the current division of the Trieste Bay with Italy that, pursuant to the principle of justice and the principle "uti possidetis," the arbitration would

definitely result in a unique solution that would probably not be all that bad for Slovenia. The position would probably be different had Croatia had a very short coastline, for example, only the Istrian coast. In that case, the arbitration would probably have to take into consideration the fact that Croatia, whose access to the open sea is blocked by Slovenia, also has very little sea. However, the situation is completely different, of course. Mr. Kacic himself once said that he felt like a banker who had \$70 billion and was negotiating with his neighbor who had only \$70, denying the latter \$5 that he needed to feed his family. For that reason, a false impression is being created in the public that Slovenia was opposed to the arbitration. I must say that Slovenia is preparing for arbitration very seriously. However, prior to this, we wish to give Croatia time to realize that an agreement with Slovenia could be extremely favorable for it in many departments.

Report Outlines Structure of 1996 Budget

AU2510125195 Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene
13 Oct 95 p 4

[Report by Marjan Lacic: "Surplus Goes to Pension Fund"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana—On 11 October, the government adopted the proposed budget for the coming year and submitted it to the parliament. As regards its basic items, the budget has been coordinated with the budget memorandum. However, before adopting the budget, the government coalition parties had to coordinate above all the items such as universal child benefit and subsidies to exporters. According to Finance Minister Mitja Gaspari, all users of budget resources will be more or less deprived, as Slovenia now simply cannot afford the public financial deficits. The 1996 budget will even have a surplus which will be used to cover shortages, mostly in the pension funds.

According to the budget drafters, there will be 582 billion tolar in the state coffers, which is 12.1 percent more than anticipated. As for the nominal increase in budget revenue, one could "blame" the planned 7-percent inflation, but also the approximately 5-percent real increase. The most significant budget source will first of all be the traffic tax (318.1 billion tolar) and income tax (115.1 billion tolar). There will be no significant changes in the taxation sphere next year, although, according to Gaspari, next May the government will be discussing a new law on income tax and the law on added value tax. However, adopting any kinds of changes in the sphere of taxation usually takes a long time. As regards budget earnings, some 15 billion tolar may fall out in the category of duties and import tax, if we sign the association agreement with the

EU this year. However, according to Minister Gaspari, the budget drafters had anticipated this possibility. The income shortage in that case will be "covered" with taxes on alcoholic drinks, tobacco, and gasoline.

We therefore should not have many problems regarding the income aspect of the state budget for the next year. Coordinating and drafting the budget expenditures were more difficult. In the next year, these will amount to 570.7 billion tolar and the coalition and government managed to draft certain priorities at first. Thus, realistically, a sum at least equal to this year's will be allocated for traffic and communications, education, social security, and technological development. Material expenses will nominally remain at this year's level. There will be no considerable changes in defense, although the program of purchase for the basic program is still going on and "devouring" between 8 and 10 billion tolar per year. As we purchase weapons and military equipment on credit, payments will come up in 1997 or later. For the first time in the budget history in independent Slovenia, obligations from international agreements have been planned for the year 1996, above all for the Paris Club countries and commercial banks (about 4 billion tolar). Among subsidies and transfers in the economy, one should mention further help to railroads that should conclude financial recovery in the coming year and a half. Subsidies in agriculture will increase by about 20 percent, which is the "price" of coming closer to Europe. About 11 billion tolar will be available for exports stimulation in 1996.

In drafting next year's budget, one had also to factor in the pope's visit to Slovenia which, according to Gaspari, should be appropriate for both the pope and Slovenia. Resources for the papal visit will be ensured from budget reserves. The Maribor Airport should be restored, but it was generally established to stop most investment except in the field of energy (three mines are to be closed down) and the highway program. The state will also invest some money in the housing fund. Anyhow, budget expenditure next year should be reduced by 1 percentage point, so we are within the European average in terms of the budget expenditure's share of Gross National Product. The main problem of our public finances is that our contribution for pensions and the disabled as well as health insurance are considerably above average.

Army Ends Tactical Drill Before Reorganization

AU2510213495 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network
in Slovene 1800 GMT 25 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A Slovene Army tactical maneuver named Skok '95 [Leap '95], which lasted for several days, ended on the Pocek military firing ground

near Pivka this afternoon. Our correspondent, Branko Dobranic, has the details:

[Begin recording] [Dobranic] The more than 2,000 participants in the Skok '95 maneuver have done a good job over the past few days. This is the preliminary but reliable assessment, especially by the direct commander of the maneuver, Colonel Anton Turk.

A special trait of the above drill, the experts claim, lies in the very good cooperation of all branches of the Slovene Army—armored batteries, infantry, antiaircraft defense, air force, and a portion of the special forces. All activities were not merely acted out as the General Staff only issued some of the most basic guidelines to the defending and attacking sides and the junior commanders then decided everything completely independently.

The concluding ceremony that gathered numerous army commanders and officials was also dedicated to the memory of the day of departure of the last Yugoslav Army soldier from Slovene territory. The speaker of honor, Defense Minister Jelko Kacin, said, among other things:

[Kacin] We have had four years of peace and an independent and internationally recognized Slovenia. For

that reason, we can and should be proud of everything that we have accomplished together. However, let me emphasize something that I have emphasized on numerous occasions before and that I will continue to reiterate in the future. Nobody has ever fought for us nor will anybody if we do not fight ourselves first. We will have allies and friends, we will have sympathizers and supporters, however, we must prepare and realize our defense by ourselves.

It is precisely these historic events that prove that we must develop our own defense system and modernize and strengthen the Slovene Army. A country of 2 million people and its army cannot endanger anyone. However, such a country needs an effective defense system within which the Slovene Army has an important place.

[Dobranic] The tactical maneuver Skok '95 was the last bigger maneuver before a general reorganization of the Slovene Army, its units, and its commands. According to Defense Minister Jelko Kacin, reorganization and a greater effectiveness will be the chief tasks in 1996. [end recording]

Federal

Kontic Expects Unconditional Lifting of Sanctions

LD2510203195 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1929 GMT 25 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Oct 25 (TANJUG)—The Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Radoje Kontic said Wednesday that there was no valid alternative to a political solution of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, and that the international community had invested too much in this to risk failure.

At a meeting with members of the visiting French economic delegation, Kontic said federal government was optimistic regarding the holding of the international peace conference in Paris in November, in spite of the present critical stage of the peace process, and regarding the unconditional lifting of anti-Yugoslav sanctions at the same time.

The prime minister told the visiting delegation he was happy that this historic event would take place in friendly France.

Kontic also pointed to the symbolic importance of the visit of eminent French industrialists headed by the general director of the telecommunications giant Alcatel Gerard Dega.

Describing the talks between French and Yugoslav businessmen as the right way to prepare for the resumption of bilateral economic cooperation, Kontic said this cooperation was a strategic objective of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and among the chief priorities of Belgrade's foreign policy.

Kontic noted that federal government was ready to provide maximum support to overall bilateral cooperation by drawing up programs and measures based on modern and stimulating legislation on foreign investments, free trade zones, etc.

Kontic pointed to tremendous losses in all fields, especially in economy, that Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has suffered due to three and a half years of comprehensive and binding sanctions and the closeness of war, pointing out that recovery would take several years.

The prime minister said that Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had initiated intensive preparations for the forthcoming stage of development and international cooperation, pointing out that this included a wide scale of measures regarding the change in ownership of enterprises and banks as well as production, management, organizational and financial transformation.

At the same time, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is preparing for the normalization of relations with inter-

national financial institutions, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, Kontic concluded.

French delegation head Dega said after two days of meetings with Yugoslav businessmen that the two countries were at a turning point marking the continuation of their cooperation. That cooperation had never completely ceased, Dega said.

Dega noted that his delegation was informed of the condition of Yugoslav economy and had studied the possibilities for the transfer of technology and for joint ventures at third markets at which Yugoslav economy used to be competitive, once the international community sanctions are lifted.

The French businessman said his delegation would inform French Government of Yugoslavia's proposals, as Paris has played a significant role in the peace process and will play a similar role as regards economy, too, Dega said.

The talks with French businessmen were attended also by Deputy Federal Prime Minister and Finance Minister Jovan Zebic, and Federal Ministers of Trade and Communications Djordje Siradovic and Zoran Vujovic.

FRY To Adopt 'Very Energetic' Stand in Peace

LD2510191495 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1843 GMT 25 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Herzeg-Novi, Oct 25 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Deputy Premier Nikola Sainovic said in Herzeg-Novi on Wednesday [25 October] that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would adopt a very energetic stand in the peace process in a bid to bring about lasting and just peace as soon as possible.

In a speech delivered at the first Yugoslav Brewers' Congress, Sainovic said that the basis for such peace was an equal treatment of all peoples in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The war in these lands would have been averted, had an approach like this been respected, as we insisted, at the time of Cutileiro's plan.

Portuguese diplomat and European Community negotiator Cutileiro proposed a plan for resolving the Bosnian Crisis in early 1992. The Bosnian Muslim side rejected the plan.

The principle of equality should include lifting sanctions against Yugoslavia, which we strongly demand, because all sides recognize that Yugoslavia is playing a vital role in the peace process, he said.

Kontic, French Industrialists Discuss Cooperation
AU2510175795 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 25 Oct 95

[Report by Mirjana Petrovic]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] On the third day of its visit to Belgrade, a delegation of French businessmen led by Alcatel's boss (Gerard Dega) was received today by Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic together with Jovan Zebic, deputy federal prime minister and finance minister; Zoran Vujovic, federal minister for transportation and communications; and Zoran Siradovic, minister of trade. The French guests were accompanied by (Keller), charge d'affaires of the French Embassy in Belgrade, and their host, Mihajlo Milojevic, head of the Chamber of Economy of Yugoslavia. Mirjana Petrovic has the details:

[Petrovic] Addressing the French industrialists, Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic first of all expressed satisfaction with their visit to Yugoslavia and their motives to reestablish not only the broken links but also establish new ones with partners from Yugoslavia. [passage omitted]

The federal prime minister has also expressed the hope that, considering the influence of the visiting industrialists, the French Government, too, will make efforts so that the business contracts are implemented with the necessary financial support and guarantees, and that it was necessary that the two government regulate the institutional bases of cooperation in the near future.

[Begin Kontic recording] We are preparing ourselves intensively for the normalization of our relations with international financial organizations, primarily with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. We are currently working on five projects: the stabilization program, the restructuring of the economy, the financial recovery of the banking system, the social program, and the servicing of debts. [end recording]

[Petrovic] Of course, the efficiency of all our projects, especially those concerning other countries, will essentially depend on the realization of the current peace initiatives and the lifting of the sanctions on Yugoslavia. This is why we expect with optimism the peace conference in Paris in November and the end of the Yugoslav crisis, Kontic said.

Gerard Dega, head of the French business delegation, takes the view that the difficult past period has come to an end, that the French industrialists have formed the right picture of the situation in which the Yugoslav economy has found itself.

We now know that we can continue cooperation where we stopped, and that we can establish new cooperation and appear in the third markets jointly. We will be your spokesmen. We will brief the French Government on everything that we have seen and what we think we can do together, Gerard Dega said.

He also wanted to know about major infrastructural priorities in the Yugoslav economy. The answer was provided by the Federal Prime Minister Kontic, who said that the priorities are connected to all forms of transportation, telecommunications, and the power industry. We are a country with such a position that the developed infrastructure does not only serve the interests of our economy but also that of the entire region, Kontic said.

The next question referred to the practical models of restructuring the Yugoslav banking system. Jovan Zebic, deputy federal prime minister and finance minister, said that the federal government is preparing a package of measures that it plans to present to the international financial organizations. The international blockade, the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the international financial organizations, and the blocking of our accounts abroad has in fact caused the most damage to the banking system. We are also planning to allow private capital and foreign capital in the banking system, Zebic said. [passage omitted]

Serbia

Parties Comment on Bosnia Peace Process

LD2510202495 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1917 GMT 25 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Oct. 25 (TANJUG)-President of the opposition Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) Vojislav Kostunica said Wednesday that it was of the utmost importance for the Bosnian Serb Republic Republika Srpska (RS) to secure for itself territorial integrity and political personality.

Kostunica told a news conference that it was normal that the warring sides set maximum demands before the peace talks in the U.S., so that they would secure optimum interests in the end.

He said the Americans, as hosts, would offer their proposal for a solution, which he said was 'the nearest to a final document.'

Vice President of the opposition Civil Union of Serbia (GSS) Zarko Korac said Wednesday that the international community was determined to bring the peace process to a close and have an agreement implemented.

Korac, who also held a news conference, said that preparations for a peace conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina were unfolding parallelly through talks on the military engagement of peacekeeping troops and preparations of the warring sides for elections.

Korac said the Muslim side wanted to put off the elections as much as possible.

Socialists Believe in 'Just Peace'

LD2510222995 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2145 GMT 25 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Oct. 25 (TANJUG)—A Serbian ruling party official Wednesday [25 October] said it was realistic to expect the coming closing stage of the peace talks on Bosnia would bring a just peace, the lifting of anti-Yugoslav sanctions and a full normalization of international position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Vladimir Krsljanin, Socialist Party of Serbia main board member in charge of international cooperation, told party activists that the present stage of the peace process 'shows concentrated political will of nearly all key international factors to achieve a stable and lasting peaceful solution.'

What was most important, he said, was that the protagonists of the peace process have accepted the principle of equality and equal acknowledgement of interests of 'all peoples in the former Yugoslavia, the principle which Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and the Socialist Party of Serbia had adopted and persistently urged even before the crisis erupted,' he said.

In his view, ignoring of this principle by some great powers has assisted the eruption and prolongation of the bloody civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Kosovo

Rugova Warns Butrus-Ghali of 'Possible Conflict'

AU2510153795 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT
in English 24 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] President of the Republic of Kosova Dr. Ibrahim Rugova sent today (Tuesday) a letter to the UN Secretary General, Dr. Butrus Butrus-Ghali.

On behalf of the people of the Republic of Kosova, Dr. Rugova extended his congratulations on the 50th anniversary of the United Nations Organization, "which has for half a century been an international institution of world nations, serving their benefits." President of the Republic of Kosova expressed his deep appreciation for the resolution on Kosova passed by the UN General As-

sembly late in 1994, which, Dr. Rugova said, "identified the problems the people of Kosova has been facing for several years, urging for the will of the inhabitants of Kosova to be fully respected, as a prerequisite for the settlement of the Kosova issue." In this context, Kosova president acknowledged the great job UN special rapporteur for human rights in the former Yugoslavia, Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, has done in documenting the very grave situation in Kosova, voicing hopes that his successor, Mrs. Elizabeth Rhen, will commit herself to the job just like Mr. Mazowiecki did. "Being a constitutive unit of the former Yugoslav federation, Kosova was an associated member of the United Nations, just like other republics," president of the Republic of Kosova recalled, noting that countries smaller than Kosova are full members of the United Nations. "Therefore, we look forward to seeing our country becoming a full-fledged member of the United Nations, the world assembly of nations," Dr. Rugova wrote.

President of the Republic of Kosova went on to give a short historical account of Kosova. Kosova has made a distinctive administrative and territorial entity since the ancient times, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova stated, adding that during the Illyrian kingdom and the Roman age, the then Dardania (present-day Kosova) was a kingdom and a province, respectively. Kosova enjoyed considerable self-governing authority during the Ottoman rule, too, as it made up a large administrative unit, he remarked. Although coercively included in the then newly emerging Yugoslav state in 1918, when Kosova was left out of the Albanian state proper, it has constituted a separate and defined administrative entity, the president said, recalling that in the aftermath of World War II, Kosova emerged as a federal entity within the former Yugoslav federal arrangement, with the right to veto and equal representation at the federal level. "Kosova has its ethnic, historical, political, and constitutional identity," President Rugova of Kosova emphasized, noting that the country has its clearly defined borders and a territory of around 11,000 square kilometers, with a population of 2.2 million, of whom 90 percent ethnic Albanians. "Kosova abounds in natural resources," Dr. Rugova asserted, pointing out that it produces at least 70 percent of its food needs.

President of the Republic of Kosova reminded UN secretary general that Kosova was stripped off its constitutional position in the now defunct Yugoslav federation in 1989. "The Kosova Government, vehemently opposing the illegal abolition of such a position, has pursued its self-determination rights," Dr. Ibrahim Rugova said, noting that the Parliament of Kosova adopted in July 1990 a Constitutional Declaration, namely Independence Declaration. It was followed by a popular refer-

endum in September 1991, in which over 87 percent of the people opted for independence and sovereignty, now that the former Yugoslav Federation "was falling apart amidst Serbian aggressive policies," he said, adding that in May 1992, the first multiparty parliamentary and presidential elections were held in the Republic of Kosova. "For over five years now Albanians in Kosova have been going through an outrageous discrimination and systematic repression waged by the Serbian occupying regime, amounting to sheer apartheid," the president of the Republic of Kosova said, informing the UN chief that Serbia has in the recent couple of months embarked on a stepped up campaign of bringing Serb settlers to Kosova in a bid to change the ethnic structure and colonize Kosova. In spite of harsh conditions prevailing in the country due to Serbian occupation, the Albanians, being committed to a non-violent political resistance to Serbian rule "have created and maintained a civic society and state structures through democratic mechanisms," Dr. Ibrahim Rugova said, remarking that the people of Kosova has been promoting a democratic and pluralistic spirit. "They are awaiting international recognition of the Republic of Kosova, as an independent and neutral state," Kosova president said.

Ending his letter to UN Secretary General, President of the Republic of Kosova Dr. Ibrahim Rugova said the goal of ensuring a peaceful and negotiated solution to the Kosova issue makes an interim international civil administration in Kosova a facilitating step. "This would avert a possible conflict breakout (in Kosova)," a conflict which would put stability and peace in the entire region at stake.

FRG's Kinkel: Kosova 'Will Not Be Forgotten'

AU2510174895 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian
20 Oct 95 pp 1, 3

[Report by Jusuf Buxhovi: "Kosova Has Not Been and Will Not Be Forgotten"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bonn, 19 Oct—The main themes that German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel discussed in Bonn yesterday evening with some foreign journalists accredited to Germany were the EU, the expansion of NATO to include new members from the former socialist bloc, a fair solution to the crisis in the Balkans, and relations with Russia. [passage omitted]

Proper Behavior of the Kosovars...

During the dinner with foreign journalists, Klaus Kinkel also dwelt on the question of Kosova and the danger that it may cause another greater conflict. This was a response to RILINDJA's correspondent, who asked the German foreign minister why Kosova, as part of

the framework of possible solutions to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, is increasingly being treated within the package of issues concerning the rights of national minorities, in terms of extensive autonomy, or some other status within rump Yugoslavia, and not as the equal entity it was in the hierarchy of the former Yugoslav federation.

German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel said that Kosova has not been and will not be forgotten, although one may have that impression because of the fact that there are no conflicts there, no wars, and other problems. This does not mean that this question will not be treated in the way it deserves.

The German foreign minister praised the Albanians' policy of peaceful resistance and their determination that problems will be solved by dialogue and understanding. This is the fairest and most beneficial method for the Albanians, he said. As for the future status of Kosova, Kinkel said that questions are open, but, because borders will not be changed, a solution that will be satisfactory and acceptable to everybody remains to be seen. Respect and guarantees for national and human rights and the restoration of the autonomy the Albanians once possessed could be a good starting point for a comprehensive agreement. The situation still seems unclear in some areas, and will greatly depend on further developments and under what circumstances proposals will be made. The Americans, Kinkel said, are very committed in this direction, and it can be fairly expected that they will do their utmost to ensure that the southern Balkans do not remain a hotbed of tensions.

Asked whether the sanctions will be used as a card to compel Serbia to solve the question of Kosova by agreement with the Albanians, Kinkel said, "I would also like the sanctions to be used for this purpose." [passage omitted]

Serbia To Continue Policy Despite Separatism

LD2510204995 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1712 GMT 25 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pristina, Oct 25 (TANJUG)—The armed attack on policemen near Podujevo in Kosovo and Metohija (Kosmet) last Saturday was a terrorist act aimed at spreading fear and destabilizing the political and security situation in Serbia's southern province, federal parliament official Zivorad Igic said Wednesday in Pristina.

Igic, m.p. and member of the lower house committee for defense and security, said the attack in which two policemen were wounded seriously and one lightly, was identical to other attacks perpetrated in past years.

Regardless of such attacks, Serbia will pursue its policy of peace, equality and protection of the rights and freedoms of its citizens, and against all forms of terrorism and crime, Igic underlined.

A strong separatist movement of ethnic Albanians has been active in Kosmet for decades, working for the secession of this province from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its joining with neighboring Albania.

Separatists have so far perpetrated several terrorist attacks on members of Serbia's Ministry of Internal Affairs personnel.

Serb Students in Pristina To 'Transform' Capital

AU2010093795 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 17 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Eighteen thousand Serb students—of whom 10,000 being non-Kosova citizens, namely Serbs from Serbia and other parts of former Yugoslavia—are currently studying at the Serb University in Prishtina, the Serbian local daily JEDINSTVO reported today. The Serbian regime's rector of the Serbian University in Prishtina, Radivoje Papovic, told JEDINSTVO [words indistinct] of the faculty come from the so-called "Serbian Krajina" (in Croatia) and Bosnian Serb "Republic." Radivoje Papovic, a Milosevic protege, namely a senior Socialist Party of Serbia member, maintains those 10,000 Serbs from outside Kosova are a "mobilizing factor" which has "transformed the city as a whole." Papovic's statements are clear-cut evidence that the political aspect, rather than the academic, is the hallmark of the Serb University in Prishtina: the goal is to bring Serb "students" who will transform the capital city of Kosova, and Serb "teachers" who intend to "permanently settle with their families." The Serbs coming as "university teachers" to Kosova are granted free housing opportunities. It is a commonplace fact that mostly those Serb high schools graduates who have a bad record and no prospects to study in universities in Serbia proper come to study in the Serb Prishtina University. They are rewarded for this by the Serbian regime. The Serb arrivals in Kosova are granted "patriotic" excellence, for they come here to fulfill the task of Serbianizing the overwhelmingly Albanian-inhabited country.

The Serbian-installed management of the Prishtina University has been announcing open-ended competitions for additional teaching staff on an annual basis. For the 1995-96 academic year there is a competition for 395 new teachers. The Serb University has been hiring Serbs from Croatia who had been involved in education before they left their homes. JEDINSTVO says that a considerable number of teachers from Croatia have already

been given jobs at the Prishtina University. Following the expulsion of the Albanian faculty and students from the University of Prishtina four years ago, thousands of students and teachers from Serbia were reported to have been admitted at the Serb Prishtina University. The Albanian-medium University of Prishtina (formerly three quarters of the University of Prishtina, one quarter being the Serb-medium part) has been operating in private homes and other makeshift classrooms, at a time the Serbian regime's University occupies the University of Prishtina premises.

Serb Police Detain Activists, 'Harass' Students

AU2110205795

[FBIS Editorial Report] Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English No 728 on 18 October carries various reports on Serbian police "detention" of political activists and "harassment" of ethnic Albanians in the province.

Under the headline "Serbian Police Detains BUJKU Correspondent in Rahovec [Orahovac]," KOSOVA DAILY REPORT cites the Pristina-based Albanian newspaper BUJKU, reporting that the Serbian police on 17 October "arrested" a BUJKU correspondent at his home in Orahovac. The correspondent "initially had his home raided on by a Serbian police patrol" and was "later sent to a local police station." The report notes that "during a four-hour detention he was cross-examined about his articles published in the BUJKU newspaper regarding the settlement of Serb refugees in Rahovec and the Serbian police practices against the Albanians in the area." The report concludes by saying that the correspondent "was ordered to report back at the police station."

Another report says that "Islam Balaj, formerly a member of the LDK [Democratic League of Kosova] Branch Presidency in Prizren, was taken to the police on 16 and 17 October." A few days earlier, his wife "was likewise summoned to the Serbian police station" and was "questioned over her husband's political activities." LDK sources in Prizren report that the LDK activist "was questioned for three hours by the Serbian police" and was ordered to "report back to the police on 20 October."

The Pristina Medical Faculty reports on 18 October that the Serbian police have been "harassing and maltreating Albanian students" of this faculty, who "had carried out their professional training in the clinics and health care centers in Istanbul during the summer." It is reported that an Albanian student from Gnjilane "was taken to the police station," while three students from Prizren "were likewise taken to the police station" and "questioned

over their stay and training in Turkey." The report notes that "the police alleged the Albanian students have been trained on handling war situations!" One of the students "had her passport confiscated by the police." The report says that "all the above-mentioned students were told they would be summoned for questioning in the police again." Another report says that the chairman of the Independent Students Union at the Medical Faculty has been "twice summoned by the Serbian police."

Sources in Urosevac say that a Serbian policeman on 14 October "halted" an Albanian from Jezerc village,

beating him up and offending him "on national grounds" just because "he had not said hello to him." The same policeman had also "beat up" another Albanian this February. A report from Vucitrn says that an Albanian resident "was held in police custody for four hours," allegedly "in connection with illegal arms possession," and was "physically maltreated by the police while in custody." Another report from Vitina notes that a 75 year-old Albanian and his 44 year-old son "were arrested and taken to the police on alleged arms possession charges."

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